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TWO TREATISES

OF

PROCLUS, Diadochus

THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR;

THE FORMER CONSISTING OF TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE, AND A SOLUTION OF THOSE DOUBTS;

AND THE LATTER CONTAINING A DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURE OF EVIL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE EDITION OF THESE WORKS

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"Who finds not Providence all-good and wise,
Alike in what it gives, and what denies?"

"All partial ill is universal good."

"One truth is clear; whatever is, is right."

POPE'S *Essay on Man*.

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TO

CHARLES ATTWOOD, Esq.,

THIS WORK

IS INSCRIBED, AS A TESTIMONY

OF VERY GREAT ESTEEM FOR HIS TALENTS AND WORTH,

AND PARTICULARLY FOR HIS

ADMIRATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO;

AND AS A MOST

GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE KINDNESS

WHICH HE HAS

SO MUNIFICENTLY AND SO DISINTERESTEDLY SHOWN TO

THE TRANSLATOR.

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PREFACE.

NO subjects of discussion are perhaps more interesting or more important than those of which the present volume consists. For what can more demand our most serious attention, or what can be more essential to the well-being of our immortal part, than a scientific elucidation and defence of the mysterious ways of Providence, and a development of the nature of Evil? For as Divinity is goodness itself, it is requisite that all the dispensations of his providence should be beneficent, and that perfect evil should have no *real* existence in the nature of things. That this is necessary, is demonstrated by Proclus in the following Treatises with his usual acuteness and eloquence, by arguments which are no less admirable for their perspicuity, than invincible from their strength.

In praise of Proclus, I have said so much in most of my other numerous works, that I shall only summarily observe at present respecting this coryphæan philosopher, that his disciple Marinus says in his Life of him, "that he was wise in a most transcendent degree"[a]; and that Ammonius Hermias calls him his divine preceptor, and says "that he

[a] Ου κατα μονην λεγω την των σοφων ευδαιμονιαν, ει και τα μαλιστα ταυτην διαφερόντως εκεκτητο.

possessed the power of unfolding the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific judgement of the nature of things, in the highest perfection possible to man"[a]. And with respect to his eloquence, his before-mentioned disciple Marinus says, "that he did not appear to be without divine inspiration, for he produced from his wise mouth words similar to the most thick-falling snow[b]; so that his eyes emitted a bright radiance, and the rest of his countenance participated of divine illumination"[c]. Among the moderns also, the sagacious Kepler, after having made a long extract from the first book of the Commentaries of Proclus on Euclid, says of him, "His language flows like a torrent, inundating its banks, and hiding the dark fords and whirlpools of doubts, while his mind, full of the majesty of things of such a magnitude, struggles in the straits of language, and the conclusion never satisfying him, exceeds by the copia of words, the simplicity of the propositions"[d]. Dr. Barrow also,

[a] ..... του θειου ἡμων διδασκαλου Προκλου του πλατωνικου διαδοχου, του εις ακρον της ανθρωπινης φυσεως την τε εξηγητικην των δοκουντων τοις παλαιοις δυναμιν, και την επιστημονικην της φυσεως των οντων κρισιν ασκησαντος.—*Ammon. in Aristot. De Interpretatione.*

[b] Alluding to what Homer says of the eloquence of Ulysses, in the third book of the Iliad, v. 222.

Και επεα νιφαδεσσιν εοικοτα χειμεριησιν.

[c] Marini Proclus, cap. 23.

[d] "Oratio fluit ipsi torrentis instar, ripas inundans, et cæca dubitationum vada gurgitesque occultans, dum mens, plena majestatis tantarum rerum, luctatur in augustiis linguæ, et conclusio nunquam sibi ipsi verborum copiâ satisfaciens, propositionum simplicitatem excedit."—Vid. *Harmonices Mundi*, lib. iv. p. 118.

in his Mathematical Lectures (p. 8.), quotes Proclus's eulogy of a point, and says that it is magnificently written. And lastly, the author of the Pursuits of Literature calls Proclus, alluding to his diction, "the animated rival of Plato."

With respect to Morbeka, the author of the Latin version from which the following translation was made, the Greek original being unfortunately lost, nothing more is known of him than that he was Archbishop of Corinth in the thirteenth century, and that the version of the former of these treatises was completed by him in the year 1280, on the 4th day of February. His version also of the very admirable treatise of Proclus on Providence and Fate, was first published entire by Fabricius in the eighth volume of his Bibliotheca Græca[a], and afterwards, together with his Latin version of the two following treatises, by Victor Cousin, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Paris, 8vo, 1820. To this gentleman, who, as well as myself, is an ardent admirer of the philosophy of Plato, the public are indebted for excellent editions of the Commentaries of Proclus on the First Alcibiades, and on the Parmenides of Plato[b].

I shall only further observe, that in the following

[a] Of this treatise I have given a translation, which the reader will find near the end of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

[b] This justly celebrated man has done me the honour to correspond with me, and has spoken in the most handsome manner of my Platonic publications.

translation I have endeavoured to give the accurate meaning of Proclus, and to preserve as much of his manner as is possible, from an original which, as Fabricius justly observes, is "all but barbarous"[a]; and that the reader will find in these Treatises a demonstration of those great Platonic dogmas which Pope has so elegantly celebrated in his Essay on Man, but without attempting to prove that they are true. The dogmas I allude to are the following: That "*there must be somewhere, such a rank as Man*"[b]; that "*all partial evil is universal good*"; and that "*whatever is, is right.*" Hence Proclus proves by incontrovertible arguments, that evil has no real existence, but has only a shadowy subsistence, and that Divinity concealed it in the utility of good.

[a] "Versio inculta fateor, et *tantum non barbara*, sed ex qua Græcæ linguæ et Philosophiæ Platonicæ peritis pulchras sententias auctoris perspicere, nec difficile ut confido erit, nec injucundum."

[b] Pope also says of man, in the above-mentioned philosophical poem, with no less accuracy than elegance, that he is,

"Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise and rudely great."—*Epist. II.*

For man is situated between beings that eternally abide in the possession of *real* good, such as divine natures, and those that perpetually participate only of *apparent* good, such as brutes. Hence, ranking in the last order of rational essences, his wisdom may justly be said to be *dark*, and his greatness *rude*.

TEN DOUBTS

CONCERNING

PROVIDENCE, &c.

THE great Plato, in the tenth book of his Laws, compels us, by adamantine arguments, as it were, to confess that Providence has an existence; and also elsewhere in many places, as in the Timæus, he shows[a] that the Demiurgus has elaborated the fabrication of things, by his providential energies, as far as to the last portion of intelligence, and this he likewise clearly asserts. But it is requisite that we should be persuaded by what Plato has demonstrated, and by the most efficacious attestations given by the [Chaldean] oracles to the demonstrations of Plato. For I conceive that this tradition of the oracles to the worthy auditors of the Gods, is a most manifest demonstration of the existence of Providence, in answer to whatever

[a] In the version of Morbeka *ostendes*; for which it is necessary to read *ostendens*.

opposes it according to the conceptions of the multitude, and is sufficient to repel the phantasms which prevent them from believing that all things subsist conformably to the will of Providence, and to lead them from base garrulity on this subject, to the truth of things. And we say this, not as if we thought that what has been written on this subject by those prior to us is not worthy of great attention, but because the soul, though these things have been the occasion of doubt, and have been distinctly considered a thousand times, yet desires to hear and speak concerning them, to revolve them, and, as it were, discuss them in herself, and is not willing to receive information alone about them from others[a]. Let us, therefore, interrogate ourselves, and doubting, in the secret recesses of the soul, endeavour to exercise ourselves in the solution of doubts, considering it as of no consequence whether we discuss, or whether we do not, what has been said by those prior to us; since as long as we deliver what we are persuaded is truth, we shall appear to assert and to write our own conceptions on this subject. To which may be added, that we shall have Hermes for our common leader, who is said to insert anticipations of common conceptions in every soul.

1. And prior to everything else, let us investigate whether Providence extends to all things, to

[a] The latter part of this sentence in the version of Morbeka is, "et non solum de foris recipere de his sermones nolente." But for *nolente* I read *volente*.

wholes and parts, and to the most individual things in the heavens, and under the heavens, to eternal and corruptible natures. But it is requisite that Providence should either know the desert of the things for which it provides, or that it should not lead all things according to their desert, in consequence of being ignorant of their worth. We must also investigate the manner in which Providence knows all things, both wholes and parts, and corruptible and eternal natures, and what the characteristic is of its knowledge. And if we are able to apprehend this, afterwards something else, and again another thing will become the subject of doubt.

Considering therefore this in the first place, and invoking the common leader, Hermes, we must say that with respect to knowledge, one kind is connascent with irrationality, and is called sense or phantasy; it also pertains to things of a partial nature, and which are not external to body, and therefore manifests that the cognitions themselves are directed to partial essences. But another kind of knowledge is essentially inherent in the rational life, and is called opinion and science; differing indeed from irrational cognitions in this, that it knows universals, they, as we have said, having a perception of partial qualities alone. These two kinds of rational knowledge likewise differ from each other, because the one, viz. opinion, is the knowledge of mutable natures; but the other, viz. science, is the knowledge of things permanently

immutable. Prior to these, however, there is another knowledge, which is denominated intellectual; of which one kind apprehends all things at once and simply, but the other is a knowledge, not of all things at once, but of one thing at a time[a]. And in this they differ, one being the knowledge of an intellect in every respect perfect, but the other being the knowledge of partial intellects; all intellectual essences indeed understanding all things, and in this transcending rational cognitions; but one intellect having a total subsistence, and intellectually perceiving all things totally; but another apprehending all things partially, because being itself partial, its intellections are also of a partial nature.

Beyond all these, however, is the knowledge of Providence, which is above intellect, and exists in *the one* alone, according to which every God is essentialized, and is said to attend providentially to all things, establishing himself in an energy prior to intellectual perception. By this one, therefore, according to which also he subsists, he knows all things. For if we admit that other cognitions necessarily remain connascent with the essences to which they pertain,—as, for instance, phantasy and sense, which, being irrational, belong to the irrational life, and likewise the cognitions prior to these, which are rational, as pertaining to rational souls, and the intellectual to intellectual essences,—it would be absurd not to admit, that the cogni-

[a] And such is the knowledge of our intellect.

tions of the Gods, so far as they are Gods, are defined according to an hyparxis[a] which is transcendently one, since from common conceptions we think that divinity is something better than intellect, and that the knowledge of everything is conformable to what the thing is.

If, therefore, Providence subsists according to *the one*, and is that which imparts good to all things, and *the good* is the same with *the one*[b], through being which it provides for all things, in this one it likewise knows the things which are the subjects of its providential energies. By the one, therefore, it possesses the power of knowing all things. To this one, however, there is no greater knowledge of wholes than of parts; of things which are according to nature, than of such as are preternatural; of species, than of things which are without species. For as of all sensible things, it is necessary that there should be some impartible organ which forms a judgement of them,—and likewise of the forms prior to sensibles, that there should be another judiciary organ by which they are perceived; since if the judiciary organ was divisible, and by one part of itself perceived one thing, and by another part of itself another thing, it would be just the same as if I should perceive this thing, but you that;—thus

[a] Hyparxis signifies the *summit* of the essence of a thing, and is that according to which that thing *principally* subsists.

[b] *The good*, according to Plato, is the same with *the one*. For in his Republic, he celebrates the principle of all things by the former of these appellations, and in the Parmenides by the latter.

also it is requisite that there should be something prior to forms, which has one knowledge both of universals and individuals; or after what manner could it arrange them,—these indeed as participants, but those as things participated? To these, however, there is nothing else common than unity. Prior therefore to forms, there is something gnostic, which knows all things so far as they are one. But it is evident that this which knows according to *the one*, knows so far as the similar is known by the similar, I mean so far as that which proceeds from a cause is known by its cause. For everywhere, and in all these, there is *the one*. And, indeed, every being, of whatever kind it may be, does not subsist universally; since that which exists according to a part, is different from that which exists as a whole[a]. Nor is everything species [or form], since there is something else which is not species; nor is everything according to nature, since there is also that which is preternatural. But everything which can be conceived, whatever it may be, is one, in consequence of *the one* existing above all things. If, however, there is anything which does not participate of *the one*, neither will it wholly participate of being, nor will it be able to participate of Providence. If, therefore, nothing escapes *the one*, that which knows all things from itself, will possess this knowledge *through a transcendency*

[a] *i. e.* Whole does not subsist universally, because some things are parts; or in other words, everything is not a whole, because a part, so far as it is a part, is not a whole.

of union[a]; since it will know all things either by *the one*, or by that which is not *the one*. This latter mode of knowledge, however, is of a subordinate nature, and foreign from that of *the one*. By *the one*, therefore, Providence knows everything which is in any respect whatever one. For unity is common to all things, both to beings, and to non-beings. [Hence Providence, as we have said, being defined according to *the one* and *the good*, and *the good* being prior to intellect (for intellect aspires after *the good*, since this is the object of desire to all beings, but *the good* does not aspire after intellect,)—this being the case, it is necessary that providential should be superior to intellectual knowledge; and in consequence of this, that Providence should know all things by its own one, through which it benefits all things, the intellectual and the non-intellectual, the vital and the non-vital, beings and non-beings, inserting in all things *the one*, as a representation of its own one[b].] For *the*

[a] In Morbeka's version "*unialiter*". But this in the original was doubtless ενιαιως, *i. e.* (κατα την της ενωσεως ὑπεροχην) *according to a transcendency of union.*

[b] The original of the part within the brackets is to be found in Philoponus contra Procl. de Mundi Æternitate, and is as follows: Της δη συν προνοιας ὡς ειρηται κατα το ἑν και το αγαθον αφωρισμενης, και του αγαθου προ του νου οντος, (νους γαρ ορεγεται του αγαθου, και γαρ τα οντα παντα, και ουχι του νου το αγαθον,) αναγκη και την προνοητικην γνωσιν ὑπερ την νοεραν ειναι· και οὑτω δη την προνοιαν παντα γινωσκειν τῳ ἑνι τῳ ἑαυτης, καθα και αγαθυνει παντα, τα νοουντα (supple και τα μη νοουντα, και τα ζωντα*) και τα μη ζωντα, και τα οντα και τα μη οντα, πασιν επιβαλλουσα το ἑν, εμφασει του ἑαυτης ἑνος.

* This addition, which is obviously necessary, is corroborated by the version of Morbeka, which has in this place "*et non intelligentia et viventia*," &c.

one of it is not like an individual one. For this is the last of beings, and is inferior to that which is universal, through the participation of which it is that which it is. *The one* of Providence, however, is more excellent than that which is universal: for the universal is a certain one, but is not *the one itself*; because it is many things, and not one alone, in consequence of possessing the differences of the things which it contains. But neither is *the one* according to which Providence exists such as a whole; for this indeed is partible; but that as being truly one, is also truly impartible.

[In short, therefore, since we assert that this one of Providence is productive of all things, we must also acknowledge that it is the saviour of all things; having an hyparxis more true than all essence, and more manifest than all knowledge; not being distributed into parts together with things which are the objects of its knowledge, nor moved about them, since these are the peculiarities of psychical[a] and intellectual knowledge. For every intellect is *one many*, both in its being and its intellectual perception; and every soul, since it is essentialized in motion, perceives intellectually in conjunction with motion. But *the one* of Providence abiding in *the one*, is at the same time immutable and indivisible, and knows all things in a way which is eternally the same. Nor does it know man alone, and sun, and everything else of this kind, but also every particular thing. For nothing escapes *that one*, whether you speak of the being of a thing, or

[a] *i. e.* Pertaining to soul.

consider it as an object of knowledge[a].] And it is said indeed, and is rightly said, that the whole circle exists centrally in the centre, since the centre is the cause, but the circle the thing caused; and for the same reason every number subsists monadically in the monad. All things, however, exist in *the one* of Providence in a far superior manner, since it is in a much more transcendent degree one than a centre and the monad. As, therefore, if the centre had a knowledge of the circle, it would have a central knowledge of it, as it likewise has a central hypostasis, and would not distribute itself into parts with the parts of the circle; [thus also the transcendently united knowledge of Providence, is a knowledge of all divisible essences in the same impartible nature, and of each of the most individual and most total things; and as it gave subsistence to everything according to *the one*, so like-

[a] The following is the original of the part within the brackets, and is to be alone found in the before-cited work of Philoponus: *Συλληβδην ουν λεγοντες παντων παρακτικον εκεινο το ἑν, παντων σωστικον ειναι φαμεν· πασης ουσιας ὑπαρξιν εχον αληθεστεραν, και πασης γνωσεως τρανεστεραν*· ου μεριζομενον τοις γνωστοις, ουδε κινουμενον περι αυτα, τουτων μεν γαρ ἡ ψυχικη και νοερα γνωσις εχει τας ιδιοτητας. και γαρ νους πας εις πολυς και τῳ ειναι και τῳ νοειν, και ψυχη πασα κινησις ουσα, και νοει μετα κινησεως. εκεινο δε εν τῳ ἑνι μενον* (lege *μενον*†,) *αμεταβατον ἁμα και αδιαιρετον, και γινωσκει παντα τον αυτον τροπον. και ουκ ανθρωπον μονον, και ἡλιον, και παν οτιουν τοιουτον, αλλα και ἑκαστον των καθ' ἑκαστον. ουδεν γαρ εκφευγει το ἑν εκεινο, καν το ειναι λεγης, καν το γινωσκεσθαι.*

* Morbeka has here *eminentiorem*, but erroneously; for *τρανεστεραν* should be rendered *clariorem*.

† Morbeka also has rightly in this place *manens*.

wise by *the one* it knows everything[a]]. And neither is its knowledge divided with the things known; nor are the things that are known confounded on account of the profound union of knowledge. This knowledge, however, being one, comprehends indeed all the infinity of the objects of knowledge, but is transcendently united above all the union that is in them. Such, therefore, is the answer to the first of the doubts concerning Providence.

2. If you are willing, however, we will direct our attention to a second object of inquiry. We say, then, that Providence knows things of a contingent nature; and by the ancients the profundity of this doubt has been sufficiently established: for on account of this profundity, some of them, admitting the existence of Providence, have taken away from beings the nature of what is contingent; but others, not at all contradicting the evidence which presents itself for the subsistence of contingent events, have denied that Providence extends as far as to these. Both these, however, preassume rightly that Providence exists, that the thing known is definite to the gnostic nature, and that the indefiniteness of that which is known arises

[a] This part also within the brackets, is to be found in the beforecited work of Philoponus, and the original of it is as follows: *οὕτω και ἡ της προνοιας ενιαια γνωσις εν τῳ αυτῳ αμερει, παντων εστι των μεριζομενων γνωσις, και των ατομωτατων ἑκαστου, και των ὁλικωτατων, και ὡς ὑπιστησιν ἑκαστον κατα το ἑν, οὕτω και γινωσκει ἑκαστον κατα το ἑν.*

from its own nature. We however say[a], that Providence knows the whole of this, in consequence of possessing a definite knowledge of the indefinite, the indefiniteness being about to be, but not actually existing, and knowledge antecedently comprehending the cause of that which is indefinite. For Providence knows that something indefinite will take place, and looking to the cause of this, it knows the indefinite thing; and as it gave subsistence to, so likewise it knows the indefinite, not by the indefinite, but as it produced the indefinite by the definite: in like manner it knows the indefinite definitely, just as it knows incorporeally and without interval, that which is distended into bulk and is corporeal. And if, indeed, the reason [or productive principle] which is in seed, being one and wholly in each part of the seed, and possessing the cause of the seed, should know that there would be a separation of its productive power from itself, existing indeed as the cause of a distribution into parts to that which is posterior to itself, but being itself impartible;—in this case, it would say, I possess the whole of this partibility impartibly; not existing separately from either, but containing that which is subordinate in that which is more excellent; so that neither is the distribution without a cause, nor does it pre-exist in the cause [distri-

[a] It appears to me that in this place, immediately after the words in Morbeka's version, "et τὸ indeterminatum esse propter illius naturam," it is requisite to add, Dicimus tamen ut Providentia, &c. For in what follows, Proclus gives his own opinion, and not that of the ancients.

butedly], but it subsists there according to cause, and in its participants, according to hyparxis. And if, indeed, it should investigate the cause of that partition, it would find it in itself, because in itself it is impartible; but when it becomes situated in another subject, and not in itself, it is the source to them of a distribution into parts, in consequence of which each of the parts is not everywhere. After this manner therefore we say, that Providence being the cause of all things, knows the things of which it is the cause, has a definite knowledge both of that which is definite and of that which is indefinite, and gives generation to things which will have an indefinite subsistence. Nor does anything impossible happen on account of this, [the indefiniteness existing in things posterior to Providence[a],] in whose knowledge they are antecedently comprehended, and in such a way as is adapted to causes. But this is now manifest.

3. In the third place, the doubt consequent to this deserves to be considered, since it likewise requires much attention; viz. if Providence is the cause both of things definite and indefinite, whether it is the cause of both these according to one and the same thing, or according to different things. For if according to the same thing, how can it perceive in its knowledge, that *this* thing which is pro-

[a] This part within the brackets is in the version of Morbeka, "in determinatione in iis quæ post ipsam existente." But for *in determinatione*, it is necessary to read *indeterminatione*, conformably to the above translation.

duced by it will be definite, but *that* indefinite? But if according to different things, how will it any longer remain one in hyparxis, if *this* thing which pertains to it is one thing, but *that* another? Invoking, therefore, Divinity to illuminate the reason which perfects our conceptions on this subject, we must say to ourselves, that Providence is established in *the one* [and this is the same with *the good*]. For everything which is of a providential nature, if we believe in common conceptions, always procures some real or some apparent good for the objects of its providential care; nor is providential anything else than beneficent energy. But we have before observed, that to impart good is the same thing as to impart unity, because *the one* is good, and *the good* is one; and this has been ten thousand times asserted. We say, therefore, that Providence is characterized by *the one*, or, which is the same thing, by *the good*. *The one* of it, however, as we have before observed, is neither such as a material one,—for this is inefficacious and unprolific, because after matter there is nothing,—but *the one* of Providence is prolific and most efficacious, because all things are posterior to Providence. Nor is it one as that which is an individual; for this presents itself to the view in the last division of things, and is one in such a way as to be none of other things. But Providence is one as containing all things, as present to all things of which it is the cause, and as the salvation of all things; [not after the same manner as the universal which subsists in opinion, and

which some assert to be *the one*[a];] for this, indeed, though it comprehends the things which are under it, and imparts essence to each of them, in consequence of containing their differences causally, yet it is essentially *one many*. *The one* of Providence, however, is exempt from all the beings of which it is the productive and perfective cause, and is unreceptive of variation of every kind. Providence, therefore, being no one of these, but established above every *specific essence*[b], and nevertheless producing all things according to the most profound union, possesses a power uncircumscribed, and incomprehensible by all things; so that neither can any one of the natures which subsist from it, nor all of them taken collectively, unfold the power which pre-exists in it, or receive and comprehend the immensity of it in its bosom. But all things being as it were absorbed by Providence, they participate of it in some way or other, according to the natural adaptation of each to this participation.

Hence *the one* of Providence, being more profoundly one than every incorporeal and corporeal union, and being infinitely powerful, possesses this power in an infinitely greater degree than every infinite and finite power. For it is not at all wonderful

[a] The part within the brackets is in the version of Morbeka as follows: "non quod inopinabile dicere, ut universale quidam aiunt unum;" instead of which I read, conformably to the above translation, *non ut universale quod in opinione subsistit, et quod quidam aiunt unum esse.*

[b] What I have rendered *specific essence*, is in Morbeka *speciona-lem essentiam*, which doubtless was in the Greek ειδικην ουσιαν.

that in infinite powers one should be more infinite than another. For the infinite according to quantity must not be considered as existing in *the one* of Providence; since in quantity there is not [in energy] the infinitely more than the infinite. Nevertheless, everything infinite will be such to the natures which are under it, according to infinite power; but to the natures which are prior to it it will be finite, in consequence of being bounded by them. For if it were not comprehended by the natures prior to it, neither could it be under the dominion of things more excellent than itself, and therefore would not be contained by them. If, therefore, it is contained by them though it is infinite, they predominate over it; and if they predominate over it, and it is comprehended by them, it is not infinite [with reference to them]. Neither, likewise, is it infinite to itself. For that which is infinite to itself, is incomprehensible to itself; and hence it is not able to contain, and be the saviour of itself. But every being is according to power preservative of itself. It remains, therefore, that each of the things that are infinite, is alone infinite to the natures posterior to itself. Hence the infinite power of Providence, being comprehensive of all the powers of the natures which are the subjects of its providential energy, generates as well as contains them according to the most profound union in the infinite depths of itself; just as it imparts to all things a union commensurate to each. For neither is *the*

one everywhere the same, for instance, in incorporeal natures and in bodies; nor in perpetual bodies, and in such as are corruptible. For the union of perpetual is greater than that of corruptible bodies; or how could the former remain indissoluble, but unity perish in the other? To which also it may be added, that an incorporeal nature is more proximate to *the one*; but body, on account of the infinite separation of its parts, falls very far short of *the one.* Nor must it be doubted whether one thing is in a greater degree one than another; since we see that everything by diminution always becomes something different from that which is prior to itself, till it proceeds to the extremity of the order to which it belongs.

Providence, therefore, existing according to transcendent union, and possessing infinite power, some of the natures which are produced by it and partake of its beneficent energy, (though all things proceed from, and participate of Providence,) subsist according to *the one*, by which they are connascently bounded; but others subsist according to the infinite, indefiniteness being connascent with their essence. For imitations of the infinite which is with Providence subsist here through *indefiniteness*; but the imitations of its unity, through *bound.* On this account, the first of the natures in the universe, and which are unchangeable, subsist according to one bound; but the natures that succeed these tend to indefiniteness, in consequence of pos-

sessing a second rank. But every infinity subsists according to the infinity of Providence, and everything definite subsists according to union. The infinity likewise which is in primary natures is vanquished by unity, and largely partakes of *the one*. Here too [*i. e.* in the sublunary region] things naturally indefinite, are subservient to such as are definite; and definite natures give an orderly arrangement to such as are borne along indefinitely according to an all-various transmutation. As primary natures likewise are to each other according to their mutual order, thus also such of their recipients as possess a habitude analogous to them, give completion to the world; less excellent being suspended from more excellent beings.

What has been said, however, will become more evident by assuming that intellect produces both body and that which is incorporeal, but each of these incorporeally, and that it knows and produces them conformably to its own nature. And as the productive principle of incorporeal natures is in intellect incorporeal, so likewise the cause of body in it is incorporeal; the former assimilating to itself the things which are produced, but the latter, *on account of diminution*[a] with respect to intellect, producing things more foreign to the incorporeal species. Soul itself likewise generates those vital and motive productive powers or forms which are in other souls; but of those forms which fall into mat-

[a] The words in italics are in Morbeka's version "*propter submissionem*"; but the original was, I have no doubt, διὰ ὑφεσιν.

ter, some it produces of a gnostic, but others of a fabricative nature. And it produces indeed all these vitally, some proceeding through life into life, but others proceeding through life into the privation of vitality. And, in short, everything which generates, and at the same time knows that which it generates from different causes, generates and knows the thing produced by it, by a knowledge superior to the object of its knowledge. Of the natures, however, which are produced by this cause, some are produced conformably to it, but others according to diminution. Hence, you may say that Providence, possessing through *the one* of itself the cause of definite natures, but through *infinity* the cause of such as are indefinite, knows and generates both of them definitely; just as intellect knows and produces incorporeally, both that which subsists according to the form of the incorporeal essence, and that which subsists according to the form of body. But you will speak rightly if you say, that of the things produced, these indeed are definite on account of *the one*, but those are indefinite on account of *infinity*. For *neither* are beings which have a necessary existence without infinity, nor such as are contingent without bound[a]. For the latter are entirely terminated in the bound of necessity, and the former, being eternal essences from a necessity of nature,

[a] Morbeka's version of this sentence is, "Nam necessariis entibus expertibus infinitate, neque contingentibus termino." But for "Nam necessariis," it is necessary to read, conformably to the above translation, *Nam neque necessariis.*

participate of infinite power[a]. Or whence do they derive this perpetuity, and an invariable sameness of subsistence? Here, indeed, *the one* predominating, and, on account of this, causing that which is generated to be necessary, and being the cause of the colligation of the infinite; but there the infinite predominating, and causing *the one* to be diminished, through flying from the infinite, which runs above it, and comprehends it in its embrace. Providence, however, possesses a knowledge of both these, though, as we have already said, its knowledge is according to that which is more excellent than the things which it knows[b], and antecedently comprehending in its knowledge a power productive of the peculiarity of each, and causing this thing to be characterized by bound, but that by infinity.

Every bound, therefore, is from thence, and every infinity, whether in incorporeal natures, or in bodies; and, in like manner, that which consists of both these is from thence derived. Hence also the knowledge both of simple and of composite natures is there, just as the generations of things simple and of things composite proceed from thence.

[a] This sentence in the version of Morbeka is, "Etenim hæc penitus in eum qui necessarii terminum *terminate*, et illa propter ipsam necessariam naturam æterna entia participare infinitâ virtute." But for *terminate*, it is necessary to read *terminari*.

[b] For knowledge subsists according to the nature of that which knows, and not according to the nature of that which is known. This is admirably illustrated by Proclus in his Commentary on the Parmenides of Plato.—See vol. iii. of my translation of Plato, p. 82.

Because, likewise, *the one* of Providence produces every kind of bound, and every kind of infinity, and also every whole, which consists of both these; hence, either from *the one* prevailing, that which is produced is necessary, or from *infinity* running before bound, that which is contingent is effected. Because, however, neither here was it lawful for the infinite to be deserted by *the one*, hence the contingent, as we have said, terminates in the nature of that which is necessary: and this is either in a greater degree detained by *the one*, and, passing into a necessary event, becomes for a longer time definite; or, in consequence of participating of *the one* in a more debile degree, becomes necessary in a less time, but suffers the same thing, and becomes definite. The contingent likewise imitates the infinite power of *the one*, but not the power of itself. For every power is the power of another thing which possesses it, but not of itself; since everything, of whatever kind it may be, which is indefinite, in consequence of not yet having a definite existence, possesses what is said to be contingent, but necessarily terminates in either being or not being; and this either prior to a greater, or prior to a less time. And this is manifested by conjectural divinations. For they are more verified in a less than in a greater time, as if the indefiniteness had now passed away. That it is requisite, however, that there should be a knowledge of the indefinite in beings superior to us, if this also ought to have an allotted order, and not to be, as it were, adventitious to the universe,

must be admitted at present, as being elsewhere demonstrated; but we now alone investigate after what manner it is effected. And this likewise will become manifest. For the universe would not be one, nor the government of it according to intellect, if this government was not definite; and of those things of which there is the same order, there is a certain colligation.

It is necessary, however, to attribute this knowledge either to dæmons alone,—for as they are proximate to things in the sublunary region, they appear to have a knowledge of, and to preside over them,—or this knowledge must be attributed to the Gods prior to dæmons, to whom the Gods commit the providential inspection of all mundane affairs. But if we leave to dæmons alone the knowledge and providential inspection of things indefinite, we must say either that they know them apart from each other, and also the subjects of their providential attention, and the natures prior to themselves, as we do, or that they have a simultaneous knowledge of both. And if, indeed, they have a knowledge of these separate from each other, in what do they differ from our souls? For these are incapable of paying attention to themselves and their own concerns, and of surveying at the same time the natures which are above them. But so far as they do not extend themselves to external objects, and yet possess a knowledge of these, we must confess that they tend to a definite knowledge of things indefinite. If, however, at the same time it is necessary

to admit that their knowledge of the natures over which they preside is derived from a reasoning process, we must also grant that they contain the forms and exemplars of things indefinite. For διανοια (*i. e.* the discursive energy of reason) is the knowledge of these. Or if we assert that this knowledge pertains to beings who energise prior to ratiocination, much more must we refer it to the Gods, from whom dæmons also possess the power of divination, and the definite foreknowledge of things indefinite. For if, indeed, they perceive definite things indefinitely, we must not ascribe to them an impassivity which is adapted to immutable genera. For everything of this kind requires phantasy and sense, so that in consequence of not remembering present circumstances, the soul may conjoin the assimilation of future events to the present and the past. But if they perceive *indefinite*[a] things definitely, why, if we ascribe this power to dæmons, should we not admit that this in a much greater degree is possible to the Gods, so as to grant that they know temporal concerns untemporally, *indefinite* things definitely, and that they provide for indefinite natures according to a *definite*[b] mode of knowledge? For if, indeed, they are unable to know things indefinite, definitely,—but this is possible to dæmons,—then the

[a] In the version of Morbeka in this place, "Si autem determinate," after *autem* it is necessary to add *indeterminata.*

[b] The word *determinatum* is evidently wanting in this place in the version of Morbeka; for he has only in the latter part of this sentence, "et providere indeterminatis secundum cognitionis modum," instead of secundum *determinatum* cognitionis modum.

Gods will be deprived of a knowledge of this kind through want of power, which is absurd. And if it should be said, that they do not wish to possess this knowledge, this would be attended with a much greater absurdity than to assert that they are not able to possess it; since, though they give subsistence to things of this kind, they would be unwilling to pay a providential attention to their own productions. Or on this hypothesis it must likewise be granted, that not all mortal natures and particulars, and everything which the world contains, were produced by the Gods. And some things, indeed, were [immediately] fabricated by the one father of the universe, but others by the mundane gods, yet through the command of their father, who at the same time through them produced these. But it is not lawful for those beings who produce other things either immediately or mediately to neglect the Gods.

If, however, the Gods *wish*[a] to provide for things indefinite definitely, and are able to effect this, they will entirely both provide for them, and at the same time that they providentially attend to, will know the desert of the subjects of their providential care. And the Gods, indeed, will possess this knowledge exemptly[b], extending to all things their providential attention: but dæmons, distributing into parts

[a] The version of Morbeka has here "*nolunt*," but the true reading is obviously *volunt*.

[b] This word, used here by Morbeka in his version, is "*exaltatim*;" but the word used by Proclus was, I have no doubt, conformably to my version, ἐξηρημένως.

the superessential illuminations which they receive from them, are allotted a different prefecture over different herds of animals, as far as to the last partition, as Plato says; so that some of them preside over men, others over lions, and others over other animals, or have dominion over plants. And still more partially, some are the inspective guardians of the eye, others of the liver, and others of the heart. But all things are full of Gods; some providing for certain things, immediately, but others, as we have said, for other things through dæmons as media: not that the Gods are incapable of being present with all things, but ultimate natures are not able of themselves to participate such as are primary. The inaptitude of participants likewise, by insinuating itself, becomes sometimes an obstacle to the enjoyment of the beneficent influence of the Gods, and to the conscious perception of the providential interference of dæmons. That, however, which possesses a proper adaptation, has the Gods immediately present with it, and hence knows when it is known by them; and begins *to see*[a] Providence descending into it, the guardian care of which it was ignorant of prior to its adaptation, and which it had participated immanifestly. But if some one sleeping in the light of the sun, and being illuminated by it, should be ignorant during his sleep that he was thus illuminated, and on waking should see himself surrounded by the solar splen-

[a] It appears to me to be necessary to add in this part of Morbeka's version, *videre*.

dour, he might then think that this light was not present with him before, because he, on account of his ignorance, was not present with the light. Then, therefore, [*i. e.* when a thing becomes adapted to the participation of the Gods,] the indefinite also becomes definite, and is converted to divinity, with whom the indefinite subsisted definitely, and from thence derives, through participation, bound. For prior to its conversion to divinity, it was indeed with reference to itself indefinite, but not such to divinity; but conformably to his nature, had with him a definite subsistence, and was known to him as a thing separated from him through its own indefiniteness, yet not so separated as to escape all bound; for in this case, falling into the abyss of nonentity, it would become latent; but it is cut off from him in such a way, as neither to be without bound, nor yet to be perfectly established in it. After its conversion, however, it both has a knowledge of its own indefiniteness, and of the pre-existing bound by which indefiniteness is adorned.

This will likewise follow, if we admit that good accedes to all things from Providence alone, in the same manner as intelligence proceeds from intellect, and life and vital motion from soul. But if everything which lives, in any way whatever, lives on account of soul, and everything intelligent intellectually perceives on account of intellect, it is evident that whatever participates of the good of Providence, possesses this good on account of Providence, though the participant should rank among

partial natures, and things which participate of it only at times, and not always. For it is requisite to lead everything to its fountain, from which the whole series of it is derived. If anything, therefore, which the world contains is benefited[a], it is benefited on account of Providence; and this is not only the case with eternal, but likewise with corruptible natures; and not only with definite, but also with such as are indefinite, whether each of these receives its proper good from Providence immediately, or through media is first benefited by it. For intermediate beings do not subvert the gifts of the causes prior to themselves, but render the inaptitude of ultimate natures adapted to the participation of such as are primary, corroborating them by their own forerunning illuminations. Hence things which are more proximate to Providence enjoy and are adorned by it in a greater degree; just as we must admit from common conceptions, that the natures which are nearer to the sun are more illuminated by it than those which are more remote from it; that the beings which are more proximate to soul, are more vital; and those that are nearer to intellect, are more perfect in intellectual perception. For proximity is said to be that which it is, on account of the alliance of its essence to the things to which it is near, and remoteness is entirely so denominated on account of its essential elongation from something else. It be-

[a] In Morbeka's version, for "*bonificat*" in this place, it is necessary to read *bonificatur*.

ing admitted, therefore, that Providence is nothing else than that which imparts good to all things, those natures which more largely participate of it, are in a greater degree benefited and adorned. Hence it is not requisite that everything should be proximately suspended from Providence, but it is proper that intermediate natures should be suspended from those that are proximate to Providence; for this causes the latter to enjoy the good of Providence by themselves, and the former to be in want, as it were, of other colligations, in order to receive the good which it imparts. For if there was not a co-ordination of all things with reference to *the one*, neither would the world be one; or if all things participated of their adorning cause after the same manner, there would not be an order of things adorned. If, therefore, there are both order and co-ordination, the former giving distinction to all things, and causing some things to be prior and others to be posterior,—but the latter converting divided natures to one good,—if this be the case, it is necessary that all things should participate of Providence, but that the participations should not be the same; that all should participate, indeed, on account of co-ordination; but not of the same things, on account of order, which causes some things to be first, others to be second, and others to be successive to these. For, as Plato says, every power which is motive of greater, is much more motive of less things, and obtaining dominion over stronger, it will much more predominate over more

debile natures. There[a], however, will concurring with power, it is necessary that Providence should extend its beneficent care to things of a less excellent nature. For it must not be said, that Providence is able indeed, but unwilling, to effect what it is able to effect; since whatever good men are able to accomplish, they also wish to accomplish. Nor is the power of Providence without will, nor its will without power; since the latter would render appetition vain[b], and the former would cause power to be imperfect.

If, however, it is requisite that Providence should extend itself to secondary, it is much more necessary that it should extend itself to primary natures. For it does not pertain to Providence to profit and adorn less excellent beings, but leave such as are more excellent destitute of itself. For if more excellent beings are not in want of anything, they derive this superiority to any kind of indigence from Providence, which imparts to primary beings the power of being sufficient to themselves. Our common conceptions, therefore, as we have before said, necessarily proclaim, that we should assert Providence to be the cause of all good, and that we should confess that the power by which any being is sufficient to itself is thence derived, and subsists for its sake. Whether, therefore, beings are indigent, they

[a] *i. e.* with Providence.

[b] The version of Morbeka in this place is, "Hoc quidem enim appetitum facit *verum*, hoc autem virtutem imperfectam;" but for *verum* I read *vanum*.

are allotted plenitude from Providence in a way conformable to their nature; or whether they are not indigent, they are always filled, and have sufficiency from themselves (το αυταρκες) prior to the natures which are always indigent; but at the same time they always receive from Providence an appropriate plenitude. All things, therefore, as I have said, according to the order which they possess, derive their subsistence from Providence; and of the beings which are generated, and are not always, some are essentially produced from it, and from eternal beings; but others have their generation through eternal beings, not because Providence is indigent of things posterior to itself for the production of these, but these, in consequence of being much distant from it, requiring to the participation of it the influence of the beings which it proximately produced. If, however, though Providence is present everywhere and in all things, yet the same good is not in all things, we ought not to be surprised. For this is the work of the most excellent Providence, to impart good indeed to all things, but to measure the participation of it by the desert of the recipients; and for everything to receive only as much as it is able to receive, whether essence causes a difference, as in souls and bodies, (for the good of each of these is not the same, because the essence is not the same,) or whether their desert arises from energy alone, as we say, that souls differently energising, always receive from Providence different allotments. And all souls, in-

deed, have allotments from Providence; but some submit to their allotment with facility, and others with difficulty; because they cannot be converted to Providence without obstacle. This, therefore, must be admitted. For that it is most true that there is also a particular Providence, may be assumed by directing our attention to sublunary affairs, because all these contribute something to the universe, and no one of the things which it contains is superadventitious, though we are not able to perceive the causes from which it is derived. To which it may be added, that in certain souls also the power of Providence is displayed. But it would be ridiculous to admit that these things thus subsist, and others do not, if all things existed after a similar manner. On this subject, however, enough has been said.

4. Respiring however, as it were, from the discussion of this head, let us consider in the fourth place, from another principle, after what manner we say the participations of the Gods are effected: which also those who engage in the speculation of ideas are accustomed to investigate. For if the Gods always energising, the natures which are here do not always participate of them, must it not follow that the Gods would energise in vain? Or if we do not admit that they possess an eternal energy, a still greater absurdity will follow: if it is proper to call that which is impossible absurd. For whatever exists with the Gods, always exists with them, and prior to all time. Hence their energy does not

take place in a part only of infinite time: for time and that which is infinite are external to the Gods. That these things, therefore, may also be appropriately discussed, it must be observed, in the first place, that every participation, whether it is of eternal or of corruptible natures, is always allotted a middle order between participants and the things participated. And as a communication with the extremes is requisite to all media, it is necessary that the media should be united both with the participants and the things participated; for if the media pertained to one of these only, they would not conjoin both the extremes to each other, but being media, they subsist in the before-mentioned manner in their participants. For they proceed indeed from the things participated, but are established in the recipients of their energies; just as we say, that knowledge primarily subsists in gnostic natures, and not in the things known. For gnostic natures have to things that are known the relation of participants; since every gnostic being wishes to participate that which is known. Hence, participation having this order, and Providence being primarily participated by all things, by animate, inanimate, rational, irrational, eternal and corruptible natures, according to their several powers,—for with respect to all the instruments of it, these are more proximately produced, but those more remotely,—this being the case, it is necessary that not only participations should indicate Providence as the cause from which they proceed, but

also that there should be an antecedent aptitude in the participant. This aptitude, therefore, will subsist rationally in rational, but intellectually in intellectual natures; phantastically or sensibly in those beings which live according to phantasy or sense; and essentially, and through existence alone, in those which possess being without life. But all these being instruments, and Providence using all of them, it is necessary that each of them should correspond to the power which employs each according to its proper work; neither in its energy obscuring the peculiar hyparxis of Providence, nor its own nature, but exhibiting one thing which is effected by both. Thus the sun transmits light to the moon, and from the moon imparts it to us; yet the light which we receive is not such as that of the sun, *white*[a] and dry, nor like that of the moon, gross and caliginous, but is mingled from the power of that which is participated, and of the participant, and its colour is changed conformably to its energy; and in many other particulars this also may be seen. Hence, Providence being placed above all beings according to divine union itself, and energising conformably to one energy adapted to *the one*, everything which accedes to participates of it, and in a way conformable to its natural adaptation; one thing indeed essentially, another vitally, an-

[a] In Morbeka's version "*calidum*"; but the true reading is doubtless *candidum*, agreeably to the above translation. For according to Plato, as is shown by Proclus in Tim., the solar light is vivific and *unburning*.

other gnostically, and another participating of it according to all these, and being naturally perfect. One thing, likewise, always receives the beneficent illuminations of Providence, on account of its own power, and possesses a never-failing participation[a] of it through the infinite energy of the giver, and through its own permanent and firm habitude with reference to it; but another is a participant only sometimes, in consequence of not being allotted a stability of nature. Hence, on account of its debility not being always a participant, it possesses, indeed, well-being from Providence, but it is owing to the recipient that it does not always participate; Providence being always able to give, and giving to those natures that possess the power of always receiving from it that which it imparts. Hence the participation which is effected sometimes only, is not from Providence, but from the imbecility of the participant; just as the sun, illuminating perpetually that which is not always able to see its light, and which only sometimes sees, does not by its light occasion this temporary perception, but the recipient rejecting its light, deprives itself of perpetual vision, and when turned from no longer participates of the solar rays[b].

[a] In the version of Morbeka *partitionem*; but the true reading is doubtless *participationem*.

[b] That which energises essentially does not energise in vain, because such an energy is natural to it. Hence the perpetual emission of light from the sun, though it is not received by opake bodies, is not emitted in vain, because the very nature of the sun consists in such an emission, though its light is only received by bodies that

If, therefore, Providence [always[a]] energising something, only participates of it at a certain time, the thing itself diminishes its own participation, yet does not exclude the eternal energy of Providence; but the energy of deity remains always the same. Just as if a face standing in the same position, a mirror should at one time receive a clear image of it, and at another, one obscure and debile, or indeed no image at all. If some one, therefore, should say, that oracles sometimes participate of the Gods, who are the sources of divination, and sometimes fail, becoming inefficacious, and, as it were, without spirit for a certain time, the causes of the irregularity are to be referred to the spirits that use and energise through the prophetic Gods, failing in the power of always participating of these Gods. For true oracles are those to which angels, dæmons, and heroes give completion, and which are illuminated by the Gods, and by the allotments which have a perpetual subsistence in the universe; though certain waters and chasms of the earth cannot always participate of them on account of the instability of their nature. Or if it should be said that the virtues of sacred rites, which sometimes cause statues to be animated[b] and replete with divine in-

are adapted to receive it. In like manner the eternally beneficent illuminations of Providence are not extended in vain, though, through the inaptitude of participants, they are not always efficacious; for Providence is essentialized in an overflowing perennial communication of good.

[a] *Semper* is wanting in this place in the version of Morbeka.

[b] These were statues of the Gods, fabricated by *telestæ*, or *mystic*

spiration, fail in certain periods, the defect also of these, as it appears to me, ought to be ascribed to the recipients, and not to any variation in the energy of the Gods by whom these statues are inspired.

operators, so as to become animated, illuminated by divinity, and capable of delivering oracles. These statues are alluded to by Proclus, on the Timæus and Cratylus of Plato, and by Iamblichus, and the author of the Asclepian Dialogue; but are very explicitly mentioned by Hermias, in his Scholia on the Phædrus, p. 104, as follows: Πως δε και αγαλματα λεγεται ενθουσιαν; η αυτο μεν ενεργει ου περι το Θειον, ὁ γε ανψυχον εστι, αλλα την ὑλην ἡ τελεστικη διακαθηρασα και τινας χαρακτηρας και συμβολα περιθεισα τω αγαλματι, πρωτον μεν εμψυχον αυτο δια τουτων εποιησε, και ζωην τινα εκ του κοσμου καταδεξασθαι· ὁτερ αγαλμα αει χρηματιζει, ἑως δυνανται δεχεσθαι οἱ επιτηδειοι. το μεν γαρ αγαλμα, ὡς αν τελεσθη, μενει αφθαρτος, ἑως αν παντη ανεπιτηδειον γενηται προς την Θειαν ελλαμψιν· ο μεντοι δοχευς παρα μερος· νυν μεν γαρ δεξαμενον αποπαυεται, αυθις δε παλιν εμφορειται. το δε αιτιον, ὁτι ἡ μεν ψυχη εμφορουμενη αυτη ενεργει περι το Θειον, διο αποκαμνει ὑτερ την εαυτης δυναμιν ενεργουσα. ἡ γαρ αν ἡν Θεος και ὁμοια ταις των αστρων ψυχαις, ει μη απεκαμνη. το δε αγαλμα, ὡς αν παθη, οὑτω μενει ελλαμπομενον· διο και ἡ ανεπιτηδειοτης αυτου εις στερησιν πανταχη χωρει, εαν μη παλιν εκ νεας ὑπο του τελεστου τελεσθη και εμψυχωθη. *i.e.* "But how are statues said to have an enthusiastic energy? May we not say, that a statue, being inanimate, does not itself energise about divinity; but the telestic art, purifying the matter of which the statue consists, and placing round it certain characters and symbols, in the first place renders it, through these means, animated, and causes it to receive a certain life from the world; and, in the next place, after this, it prepares the statue to be illuminated by a divine nature, through which it always delivers oracles, as long as it is properly adapted. For the statue, when it has been rendered perfect by the telestic art, remains afterwards [endued with a prophetic power], till it becomes entirely unadapted to divine illumination; but the mortal who receives the inspiring influence of the Gods, receives it only at certain times, and not always. But the cause of this is, that the soul, when filled with deity, energises about it. Hence, in consequence of energising above its own power, it becomes weary. For it would be a God, and similar to the souls of the stars, if it did not become weary. But the statue, conformably to its participations,

For neither must we dare to accuse the sun as the cause of the moon being eclipsed, but we must assign as the cause of this, the conical shadow of the earth into which the moon falls. Nor, in reality, must the participation of the energies of Providence by some things at certain times only be attributed to Providence, but the cause of this must be referred to the participants, and not to that from which the

remains illuminated. Hence the inaptitude of it entirely proceeds into privation, unless it is again, *de novo*, perfected and reanimated by the mystic operator."

Conformably to this, Proclus also, in Tim. p. 239 and 240, says: Και παλιν και εκ τουτου δηλον, ὁπως τον δημιουργον κατα τους ακρους ἱδρυει των τελεστων. αγαλματοποιον αυτον αποφαινων του κοσμου, καθαπερ εμπροσθεν ὀνοματων ποιητην Θειων, και χαρακτηρων Θειων εκφαντικον, δι ὡν την ψυχην ετελεσεν. ταυτα γαρ και οἱ τῳ οντι τελευται (lege τελεσται) δρωσι, δια χαρακτηρων και ὀνοματων ζωτικων, τελουντες τα αγαλματα, και ζωντα και κινουμενα αποτελουντες. *i. e.* "And again, from this it is evident that Plato establishes the Demiurgus conformably to the most consummate of the telestæ: for he exhibits him as the statuary of the world, just as before he represented him the maker of divine names, and the enunciator of divine characters, through which he gave perfection to the soul. For these things are effected by those who are telestæ in reality, who give completion to statues, through characters and vital names, and render them living and moving." It must be observed, that these *telestæ* were initiators into the mysteries, and were *theurgists*, or capable of performing divine operations.

And again, in his Scholia on the Cratylus, p. 21: Και ὡσπερ ἡ τελιστικη δια δη τινων συμβολων και αποῤῥητων συνθηματων τα τηδε αγαλματα τοις Θεοις απεικαζει, και επιτηδεια ποιει προς ὑποδοχην των Θειων ελλαμψεων, οὑτω δε και ἡ νομοθετικη κατα την αυτην αφομοιωτικην δυναμιν αγαλματα των πραγματων ὑφιστησι τα ὀνοματα. "And as the telestic art, through certain symbols and arcane signatures, assimilates statues to the Gods, and makes them adapted to the reception of divine illuminations, so the legislative art, according to the same assimilative power, gives subsistence to names, as the statues or images of things." The excellent Sallust, in his treatise on the

participation is derived, both to these, and to those beings that always participate. Providence, however, according to the transcendently united and infinite energy of itself, is present to all things; and of those beings which participate of it differently at different times, in consequence of their possessing an incomprehensible variety, there are certain colligations, conjoining *the one* of Providence and the

Gods and the World, informs us, that these characters which were placed round statues were *imitations of supernal ineffable powers*, οι δε χαρακτηρες τας αρρητους ανω δυναμεις μιμουνται.

Iamblichus also, in a treatise περι αγαλματων, on Statues, which is unfortunately lost, but is mentioned by Photius, in Biblioth. p. 554, and which Philoponus attempted to confute, shows, "that statues are divine, and full of divine participation. And this he demonstrates to be the case, not only of such statues as are fashioned by the hands of men, by an occult art, and which are denominated *diopetes*, (*i. e.* descended from Jupiter, or from heaven,) through the immanifestness of the art by which they were made,—for these are of a celestial nature,—but also of such as are fashioned by artists in common, for money."

And, in the last place, in the Asclepian Dialogue, which is attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, and is only extant in a Latin translation, ascribed to Apuleius, it is said, near the end: "Omnium mirabilium vicit admirationem, quod homo divinam potuit invenire naturam eamque efficere. Quoniam ergo proavi nostri multum errabant, circa deorum rationem increduli, et non animadvertentes ad cultum religionemque divinam, invenerunt artem, qua deos efficerent, cui inventæ adjunxerunt virtutem de mundi natura convenientem, eamque miscentes. Et quoniam animas facere non poterant, evocantes animas dæmonum, vel angelorum, eas indiderunt imaginibus sanctis, divinisque mysteriis, per quas sola idola et benefaciendi et malefaciendi vires habere potuissent." In this extract it is clearly asserted, that the ancient Egyptians evocated the souls of dæmons, or angels, and inserted them in sacred images; and that it was through these souls alone that idols possessed the power of being beneficent or malefic. These sacred statues are likewise alluded to in other parts of this work of Hermes.

multitude of these, the impassivity[a] of the former and the instability of the latter. Hence, as it appears to me, of these colligations, angels are more proximate to Providence, but heroes to beings of an unstable nature; and dæmons form the connecting link between the two, uniting the beings which participate of deity differently at different times, to the perpetually-abiding hyparxis of Providence, and multiplied natures to *the one*. And sometimes, indeed, the illuminations of Providence immediately extend to the beings posterior to angels, dæmons and heroes, but sometimes through these as media. For there is a great difference between illuminating some of the better genera, and the transmission of illuminations through the better genera. For the natures to whom these illuminations are transmitted, scarcely participate of the beings which are proximately arranged above them, through the inferiority of their aptitude; but the better genera, on account of the excellence of their nature, tend upwards to the participation of superior beings, and the illuminations which they receive from these, have the relation, as it were, of matter with reference to supernal gifts. Thus, if some one should be able to participate of geometry alone, but another[b], not only of this, but also of a sublimer theory, though not without the assistance

[a] The version of Morbeka has in this place, "et το passivum illius, et horum instabilitatem." But for *passivum*, it is obviously necessary to read *non passivum*.

[b] The version of Morbeka has in this place *aliter*; for which it is obviously necessary to read *alter*.

of geometry, through which he is led upwards, and becomes accustomed to an incorporeal nature; the former of these characters delighting in geometrical speculations, but not having the eye of his soul sufficiently able to perceive the objects of intellectual vision, it is again evident that the perfection of the former is derived from geometry, and that his ascent is as far as to this; but that the transition to the latter is through geometry, and that by means of this he ascends to things which are prior to it. If, therefore, the like takes place in the genera that are more excellent than our nature, it is one thing to be illuminated by the genera which are posterior to the Gods, and another to be illuminated by the Gods themselves; and the former, indeed, refers the cause of the illumination to the attendants of the Gods, but the latter to the presiding Gods themselves; except that though illuminations are transmitted by the better genera, certain splendours are imparted after another manner in a greater degree by Providence, from whom the guardian care of the former is derived, in consequence of their imitating its beneficent energy[a] according to the order which they are assigned. And such are my answers to this question, through which we may be able to lead those that are well adapted to the perfect speculation of Providence.

5. After this, if you please, let us direct our at-

[a] In Morbeka *felicitatem*; but it appears to me, that for *ευδαιμονιαν*, which I suppose Morbeka found in his copy, it is requisite to read, conformably to the above translation, *ενεργειαν*.

tention to a fifth subject of inquiry, which disturbs the imaginations of many, I mean, why, if Providence exists, evil has a place among beings? For through this many are persuaded, either to deny the existence of Providence, in consequence of perceiving that evil extends to all things; or, if they admit that Providence adorns all things, they are induced to exclude evil, and to assert that all things are alone good, though certain persons think fit to call that good which is most remote from primary natures evil, for there is not any evil, which is not a less good. If, therefore, we also accord with these, there is no occasion to investigate any further what we proposed to consider. For there will not be anything evil, which, as we have said, will molest Providence. But if there is something, which in some way or other we assert to be evil, it is necessary to explain whence this is derived. For it is not proper to say that it is from Providence, from whom everything that is good proceeds; but if it is derived from another cause, if this ranks among the causes which originate from Providence, then again it will be requisite to refer to it this cause. For the beings which proceed from the causes that owe their existence to Providence, proceed likewise from Providence. If, however, they are produced without Providence co-operating in their existence, we shall make two principles, one of good, and the other of evil, and we shall not preserve Providence unmolested, since it will have something contrary

to it. Admitting, therefore, that there is such a thing as evil, let us consider what kind of a thing it is, without molesting the kingdom of Providence.

And in the first place, because evil is twofold, *this* existing in bodies, and being preternatural, but *that* in souls, and deviating from reason; and because that which is preternatural does not subsist in all bodies, nor in souls that rank as wholes, let us direct our attention to the bodies in which, by the will of Providence, the preternatural exists. It is obvious, therefore, that what is preternatural, is in corruptible bodies alone: for that which is not susceptible of the preternatural, is perpetual, since the preternatural is the path to non-being. But everything which is corrupted has a place among beings. Hence, it ranks among beings, either on account of some other cause, or in order, as Timæus says, that the universe may not be imperfect, and that primary natures may not be the last of the whole of things. For primary natures are eternal, and congenial to their cause. If evil therefore exists, it exists as that which is corruptible; but this is, in order that there may not only be that which is eternal; and this again in order that the universe may be perfect. Hence, it is most manifest that evil subsists on account of *that* Providence which energises about the world, and that Providence may be entirely what it is, by causing the world to be perfect. For to this evil the end is good; since on account of good, evil was

introduced among beings, as contributing something requisite to the whole of things. For all corruption is on account of the generation of another thing, and everything which is preternatural exists in order that something may be produced which is according to, but not contrary to, nature. Hence, that is not in every respect evil, which is for the sake of good, nor is it unmingled with good, but to a certain thing it is evil, viz. to that which is corrupted, and to another thing good, viz. to that which subsists on account of the corruption of it. Hence, likewise, it is good to the universe, as the cause of the corruption of one thing, and the generation of another. For it is necessary that there should be both generation and corruption, and the universe requires both these, in order that it may be truly all[a], as we have frequently said. And if, indeed, that which corrupts energises according to nature, but that which suffers, suffers preternaturally, perhaps this also suffers according to nature. For being a contrary, it is natural to it to suffer from a contrary, and thus it now becomes manifest to us, that on account of the most excellent Providence by which the universe is governed, that which is preternatural takes place among beings, and that it is not absolutely preternatural,

[a] Proclus alludes here to the following words of Plato in that part of the Timæus in which the Demiurgus says to the junior or mundane Gods, Ιν' ουν θνητα τε ᾖ, το, τε παν ουτως ὂπαν ᾖ, κ.τ.λ. viz. "In order, therefore, that mortal natures may exist, and that the universe may be truly all," &c.

but is in a greater degree conformable to than contrary to nature; since it is natural for that which is corruptible to be corrupted, and for that which is capable of corrupting to corrupt. And if they are contraries, it is requisite that the one should be corruptible, but the other corruptive. If, also, it is necessary that generation should always exist, it is necessary there should be contraries: for generation is from contraries. Hence, if generation is according to Providence, and that which is prior to generation is likewise according to Providence; and if, also, that which is preternatural subsists differently from alternate generations,—if this be the case, the preternatural is an instrument of the cause of generations, and gives completion to that which is natural. But let us here terminate that which does not require much discussion.

Let us, therefore, pass on to the consideration of that which is preter-rational, and evil in souls, in order that we may understand how this likewise subsists according to Providence. Here, therefore, the association of certain contraries, I mean of the immortal and mortal soul, affords a place for that which is preternatural. For when that which is mortal in us predominates over that which is divine, then the generation of evil is effected in the soul; as, for instance, when either anger or desire predominate, in consequence of either of them suffering that which is conformable to its nature; the one in wrath, but the other in concupiscence. For each of them suffers that which it

is naturally adapted to suffer; but on account of that which is essentially divine being extraneous to mortal passions, and the irrational nature existing in those beings in which this conjunction takes place, the natural union of these two becomes preternatural. Hence reason, which possessed in us the appellation of divine, is denominated preter-rational, instead of preternatural; at the same time both the rational and irrational part of the soul, wishing to energise conformably to the desire of that which is natural; the one desiring to live with passion, but the other without passion; and the one rationally, but the other irrationally. In the mixture, however, of both these, and in their depraved habitude with reference to each other, that which is denominated a *parypostasis*, or *a deviation from subsistence*, takes place, which as it has not a principal essence, it is evident that what is called preter-rational and not preter-irrational, is not only evil, but is likewise not evil; for it is evil to that to which a deviation from reason is not natural, but not evil to that to which the preter-rational is according to nature. For where there is not reason, nothing of this kind is evil, as in irrational animals; and this, not because to suffer through passion is according to nature, but to be vanquished by reason preternatural; since the latter is in a greater degree conformable to nature, because reason is naturally adapted to vanquish. For when of opposites, one is better, but the other worse; though the latter, in energising as it is adapted to energise,

suffers that which pertains to itself, yet when subservient to the former, which is better, it is transferred to that which is above its own nature; since reason, also, energising in us as reason, impedes the energy of that in us which is divine and better than reason, though in so doing it operates conformably to its nature; nevertheless, from the predominance of what is divine, reason [being corroborated] exists as reason in a greater degree. For every being has both a good connascent with itself, and a greater good derived from that which is more excellent than itself. Thus intellect is able to energise divinely, soul intellectually, and body self-motively. That which is irrational therefore, and anger and desire, are moved as such, according to nature; and the more vehemently they are moved, the more natural are their energies. But when considered with reference to that part in us which is divine, and as impeding its energy, and also as capable of participating from it another greater good, of which they are deprived, as long as they wish to be moved with their own motions, which are preter-rational, they occasion an ingress of evil to partial souls.

If, however, these things are truly asserted, it is necessary that those who think they do not exist through Providence, should either blame a divine soul for its descent into generation, or the mortal soul which is in generation. For admitting that both these subsist through Providence, it is entirely necessary to refer the generation of that which is

preter-rational to good, in consequence of Providence distributing everything into the world according to its desert. But, indeed, it is evident that it is good for the human soul to descend to the ultimate part of the world, in order that the universe may be perfect, and that it may not only be full of rational and immortal animals, and again, of such as are irrational and mortal, but likewise of the media between these, viz. rational, and at the same time mortal animals. For a thing of this kind exists in the universe; since if these natures were wanting, the world would be truly imperfect. It is likewise manifest to every one, that in consequence of a divine soul acceding to generation, it is requisite that prior to this a mortal soul should be present with bodies; and that the divine soul should not dwell in these fleshly, bony, and, in short, terrene organs. For how is it possible that body destitute of vitality, and mingled from many things, should of itself participate of an incorporeal and immortal soul? How also in reality is it possible, if it were merged in material masses, that it should not blind its own reason, itself suffering everything which pertains to the mortal soul; perceiving indeed the passions of the body, which are the objects of sense; being captivated by imaginative forms; desiring whatever is adapted to the wants of the body; and wishing, by energising according to anger, to repel whatever is noxious to the mortal animal. For suffering all these, it would be corrupted in as great a degree

as the body, *and its descent would be in vain, through not being assisted, but corrupted by its recipients*[a]. For neither would it be possible to know the things which externally corrupt, without sense which knows particulars; nor to desire liquid and solid aliment, without that part of the soul which is the source of all-various appetitions; nor to pursue what is mortal, without the remembrance of that which is able to hurt or assist it. By how much better, therefore, it is for that which is connected with another thing different from itself, by which also it is perhaps molested, to be thus connected, sometimes only, and not always,—by so much more beneficial is it for the soul, to direct its attention to the irrational nature, than to become itself irrational. If, therefore, it is necessary that the immortal soul should descend hither, that the mortal soul also should subsist on account of it,—and the existence of both these is conformable to the will of Providence,—if this be the case, the preternatural[b] also must be referred to the same bound of Providence, for the sake of that which is according to nature. Thus too in souls, that which is preter-rational is for the sake of that which is according to reason, that which energises preter-

[a] The whole of the above which is in italics, is in the version of Morbeka, "et frustra utique descensus esset, non jam adjutus ab ipsis suscipientibus ipsum, sed corruptis." But as Proclus is here speaking of the rational soul, for *adjutus* it is necessary to read *adjuta*; for *ipsum, ipsam*; and for *corruptis, corrupta.*

[b] In Morbeka "*præter rationem*;" but it is obviously necessary, from what immediately follows, to read *præter naturam.*

rationally in us subsisting for the sake of our rational energy. But respecting this problem enough has been said at present.

6. Consequent to this, let us direct our attention to the sixth problem. If Providence exists,—and Providence existing, it is necessary there should be that which is according to desert,—how does it happen that there is so great an inequality of human lives in the universe?—some tyrannizing in consequence of being depraved characters, but others being in a state of servitude, though they are virtuous?—and some, indeed, being prosperous, in consequence of having a good condition of body, living in affluence, and the like; but others, on the contrary, being deprived of these, so that worse circumstances fall to the lot of better men? For everything of this kind appears to accuse Providence as not only here distributing equal things to things unequal, which is itself irrational, but, on the contrary, in things unequal, distributing what is worse to the better, and what is better to the worse; though neither can it be thought that arithmetical media will accord in such cases, nor the geometrical, by which a distribution of external good or evil is made according to the desert of those that receive it. In the first place, therefore, we should say, that Providence distributes to everything that which is adapted to it,—for this is admitted,—and bestows ends which accord with habits. But this being the case, it is not at all wonderful that it should give to good men what-

ever may increase virtue; nor that depraved men, relinquishing the benefits with which virtue is surrounded, should earnestly endeavour to procure health of body, and should be solicitous to obtain wealth and power, which are wholly neglected by the good. Hence, as those who direct all their attention to apparent good, are not grieved that they are not temperate, that they are not contemplators of real being, and that their soul is mutilated,—thus, also, neither are good men afflicted because they are not rich, or because they are deprived of power; but pursue virtue alone, with the possession of which they are satisfied. For neither are husbandmen indignant because they do not obtain the same things as sailors; nor sailors, because they do not reap; but both these, being intently occupied in their proper ends, if they obtain these from Providence, they are satisfied and rejoice.

We must not therefore say, that the donation of Providence is destitute of geometrical proportion; for it is the most harmonic of all gifts, imparting to all things good, and to each that good which it shows itself qualified to obtain, viz. either *true* or *apparent* good. *For this is evident, that he who pursues virtue, always obtains the object of his desire, and lives according to virtue; but he who desires externals, does not always obtain that which is conjoined to his appetition*; here, also, Providence bestowing what is adapted to habits,—to the virtuous, indeed, that which is stable, and sufficient to itself; but to those who pursue externals, that

which is dubious and full of indigence. This, therefore, must be learnt in the first place: but this, in the second place, that with worthy men a deficiency of apparent good contributes to virtue; for it accustoms them to despise the body, withdraws them from a solicitude about appearances, enlarges their conceptions of the magnitude of virtue, discloses to them the inanity of those things which are believed to be good by the multitude, and exhibits to those who are able to perceive true beauty, *that* good which is essentially venerable, and admirable in the most transcendent degree. For we do not admire the pilot's art during the tranquillity of the sea and air, but in tempest and storm; nor virtue in an affluence of human good, but in those things which the violent attacks of fortune cannot shake.

In the third place, if we say that Providence affords instruction to those who do not live according to Providence in such distributions, we shall assert that which is not very remote from the truth. For if Providence always imparted to the good, riches, beauty of body, and power; but to the bad, deformity, ignominy, poverty[a], and everything of this kind, it would indeed truly[b] appear that virtue, comprehending all things, possesses what is honourable, and vice what is fleeting. But now,

[a] The version of Morbeka has in this place "*pecunias*;" but it appears to me to be necessary to read instead of it *paupertatem*.

[b] Morbeka has here "*exter*;" but it should be, conformably to his barbarous version, *enter*, i. e. in Greek, *ονπως*.

exhibiting virtue by itself alone, and vice with all its abundance, it renders the former in a greater degree admirable in a worse fortune, but shows that the latter is to be in a greater degree avoided in a better fortune, and excites those that are *well born* to the love of virtue and the avoidance of vice: the latter [*i. e.* the bad] blaming fortune on account of itself; but the former [*i. e.* the good] truly adorning every condition: and the latter not suffering any diminution in that which is foreign to itself, but filling it with turpitude; but the former using every circumstance that may occur as its proper ornament. Or will not justice[a] blame wealth, but *health intemperance*[b], and magnificence of soul, power? *And magnanimity, indeed, adorns poverty, but a masculine mind sorrow, and a transcendency of wisdom the privation of power.* If we assert, therefore, that these things thus distributed are the eruditions of Providence, we shall not wander from the truth. This, likewise, as it seems, must be said by us, that man is soul, and this has been well demonstrated; but he is soul, using the body and the mortal form of life. And the two latter frequently oppose the amatory energies of the immortal soul about that which is truly good, and require such things as may be able to prevent

[a] The version of Morbeka has here erroneously "*injustitia*," instead of *justitia*.

[b] Morbeka's version in this place is, "*sanitatem autem intemperantia*;" instead of which it is necessary to read, *sanitas autem intemperantiam*.

their attacks. Thus, for instance, affliction is requisite, that the body may not, by its wanton impulses, draw down the intellect which is in us [from the contemplation of real being]; *but poverty, that the soul may not through wealth be filled with an intemperate form of life*; *and the privation of power, that it may be void of ambition.* Hence many worthy men have thought fit to live in insalubrious instead of salubrious places, punishing the evil germinations of corporeal desires, and choosing rather to carry about with them a feeble instrument, than to become *unwise*[a] by using one that is robust. But others have abandoned the riches which they possessed, in consequence of wishing to have a soul liberated from those passions which germinate through wealth. And many instances may be adduced of those who have acted in this way. Thus, Plato dwelt in an insalubrious place[b], in order that he might subdue the excessive impulses of the body. But Crates abandoned his wealth, at the same time exclaiming, *Crates liberates himself from the sordid burden of riches!* And other examples are recorded of the like kind.

If, therefore, Providence imparts to good men such things as they themselves affect through the

[a] In Morbeka here for "*despicere*," it is necessary to read *desipere*.

[b] See the first book of my translation of Porphyry's treatise on Abstinence from Animal Food, in which this is asserted, accompanied by many admirable observations of Porphyry, well worthy the attention of the liberal reader.

love of virtue, independently of Providence, how can any one complain of its dispensations to those that are worthy? And how is it possible that the donations to the wicked of wealth and power, and the like, should not rather be called punishments [than blessings]? For these gifts call forth into energy their latent evil, in order that by punishment they may be finally purified from it[a].

Again, therefore, according to another mode of considering the subject, we must say, that it is the work of Providence not to comprehend in one description of persons alone the donations of all-various good,—as neither did Plato, when instituting the most excellent city, think it fit that one genus only should be adorned with every good, but that different things should be distributed to different persons,—and that this is the province of him who intends to make the whole city happy, and not one part of it alone. Because, however, souls descend into generation, it is requisite that they should have a certain experience of those evils in which they are here involved, by which they are

[a] Synesius, in perfect conformity to what is here asserted by Proclus, says, in his excellent treatise on Dreams, p. 141: "Misfortunes, which are said to happen contrary to our deserts, are of the greatest advantage in extirpating the affections by which we are captivated with externals: and thus the doctrine of a Providence is confirmed to the intelligent, from the very circumstances which produce diffidence in the ignorant. For no place would be left for the soul to take her flight from the dominion of matter, if in the present state she lived free from the incursions of evil. Hence it is proper to believe, that the præfects of the infernal regions have invented vulgar prosperities as the snares of the soul."

excited to desire a transition from hence, to that place which is beyond the reach of every ill. To those, therefore, who are good from themselves, things apparently disastrous are for this purpose sent by Providence. But as it is requisite that bad men also should participate of good, they participate indeed of a certain image of it; and the punishments inflicted by divine vengeance lead these likewise to a flight from this terrene abode. With respect also to everything which we possess,—some of these belong to us on account of the free will of our soul, some on account of our being passive to other things, and some on account of the universe alone as the cause. Hence, if those things over which we have dominion through our own energies [terminate badly], we must accuse ourselves. For if any one becomes diseased, or is in poverty, through his own misconduct, the cause of this must be referred to him, and not to Providence. For we must not say that free will obtained the power which it possesses in the universe for the destruction, but for the salvation of its possessor. And with respect to those things which we suffer from others, though we may unjustly suffer, we should consider that the law of the universe permits parts to act on each other according to their own impulse: for such are all things which conspire in union; these, indeed, *naturally* acting and suffering, but those *electively*. Retribution[a],

[a] In Morbeka "*vindicta*;" but the original was, I have no doubt, *ανταποδοσις*, *retribution*.

however, follows both those that act well, and those that act ill. That also which suffers, suffers according to its desert, and what it does is not neglected by the law [of the universe]. For as it is said of beings which energise immaterially, that they produce what is contingent in an uncontingent manner, and that they do not suffer from what is contingent; thus, also, in those beings that energise electively, it does not appear that everything suffers from everything indiscriminately, but that only which has an opportune arrangement in the universe for this purpose. Nor does the self-motive agent relinquish its proper motion, though it may become the instrument of the universe: for the quality of the impulse leads that which acts to retribution; since it was not an inanimate instrument, but an instrument co-adapting itself to that which uses it. The cause, however, of those things which we suffer from the universe, whether they are better or worse, must be ascribed to our desert; and this must either be referred to the present life, —as if we should require, for instance, a certain bridle, as it were, (since many on account of circumstances become better,)—or it must be referred to a former life; since if those that suffer, were not worthy from the first, purification is requisite prior to the possession of virtue,—or it must be referred to a future life, Providence withdrawing us from human concerns, in order that, by considering virtue alone to be the perfection of our nature, we may establish the love of it in ourselves,

and be persuaded that nothing else is our proper good.

Further still, if some one after the same manner should inquire, why equal things are imparted by Providence to things unequal, according to arithmetical equality, (for this remains to be considered,) —as for instance, when whole cities perish, and one destruction ensues both of the good and bad, and a similar circumstance, as it appears, takes place with respect to those who are dissimilar in their habits,—in answer to this inquiry, therefore, it may I think be said, in the first place, that they do not suffer what is similar so far as they are dissimilar, but so far as they are similar; being willing, perhaps, to inhabit the same city, to enter the same ship, to engage with others in the same battles, or act in conjunction with them in anything else, and, by thus acting, suffer with them the same calamity. Hence, so far as some of them are better, and others worse, they bear the common calamity differently; the latter, indeed, impatiently, but the former mildly, though they perish. And after a separation from the present life, the abode of more excellent souls receives the former, but of depraved souls the latter. In the second place, it may be said, that of such co-ordinations of those that are at the same time saved, or at the same time perish, there is an order by which they are similarly collected together in the universe, and a common period of fate, proceeding from different principles to the same end. There is likewise a concurrence of progressions,

which are either preservative or destructive of all; and it is requisite that of parts, in consequence of their following wholes, these should effect and suffer something in conjunction with certain things, but those with other things of a different nature; since with us, also, the heart is sometimes so disposed that a certain part is copassive, but many parts at another time. In this universe, likewise, with respect to the less principal parts, these suffer peculiarly, but those in common from the more principal parts; and some suffer nothing from those things from which others suffer. It is not wonderful, therefore, that the motions of one of these should be conformable to Providence, but those of the other should be from necessity, in consequence of being subdued by passions.

It may also be added, in answer to those who accuse Providence of distributing equality in things unequal, that they are ignorant of the different equality of souls, which originates from many causes. For of souls which proceed from the same divinity, as, for instance, the sun or the moon, there is an assimilation of the former to the latter in different conditions of life, and in former periods there was a conformity in their energies. Nor is it at all wonderful that they should suffer the same thing, since this is nothing more than a retribution of actions which proceeded in common from common passions; and by how much the more amply they corresponded with each other in different circumstances, by so much the greater is the similitude of

the incidental events which befall them. But in answer to those who accuse Providence on account of the inequality which takes place in the external circumstances of the good and the bad, we ask whether laudable renown, which is alone bestowed on the good, is not to be preferred to corporeal delight, to riches, and bodily health? For all bad men are inglorious and without honour, though they may be surrounded by myriads of flatterers; since those who extolled them when living, scorn them when dead. But those who despised good men when they were alive, admire them in a transcendent degree when they are dead. If, therefore, *better men partake of the greatest of external goods* [*i. e.* honour], how can it be any longer said, that Providence does not impart that which is according to desert, bestowing on those who desire nothing else, such things as extend only to the present life, but conferring on others those benefits which are capable of being transmitted to a future and more excellent life? For the former live according to the mortal, but the latter according to the immortal part of the soul. Hence, whatever is of a more mortal nature, is adapted to those who prefer that which is mortal in things within and external to them; but such as are more immortal, are adapted to those who prefer[a] that which is immortal. And thus distribution according to desert is preserved in each, through the

[a] For "*angentibus*," in this place, in Morbeka's version, I read *anteponentibus*.

similitude of the gifts to the life of the recipients. But if to him who possesses virtue, that which is propitious is always present, and this is imparted by the Gods themselves; but the whole life of the depraved man is full of inquietude and perturbation, of brutal delights, ferocity, and the envenomed bitterness of guilt; and if he finds no rest from these evils, which are to him inexplicable, is it not perfectly evident that Providence proclaims the former character to be deserving of things of a more excellent nature; but that the latter, by subjugating himself to the dominion of his passions, connumerates himself with beings inferior to the nature of man?

7. Relinquishing, therefore, any further consideration of this subject, let us pass on to those questions, which are wont to be continually agitated, respecting brutes, and let us direct our attention to this seventh problem, Providence also proceeding to irrational, as well as to rational animals. What equality, therefore, is there in brutes, since some of them are well disposed, but others not; some of them possess an ill, but others a good habit of body; and according to other such like differences they are separated from each other? Again, therefore, what equality can there be in them, since they are thus dissimilar? For of these also, as well as of men, we see that there are certain common corruptions; and it is requisite in these to contemplate the cause of the events, being persuaded that Providence extends even to the last of

things; and likewise to consider what reason can be assigned for their ultimate devoration. For these are the three particulars which occasion men to doubt respecting the administration of Providence, viz. the inequality in what happens to brutes, the common corruptions of these, and their devoration of each other, of which it is now requisite to say something; and to discuss this in the first place as follows: Either there is some vestige of a self-motive life in brutes, and which is separable from body, or there is none; and every species of soul which is in them is extinguished together with the body, and is assimilated to [corporeal] qualities, and to innate heat. But this division being made, we shall abound with arguments, by which we may be able to show that there is a Providential dispensation in these.

If, therefore, as we have said, there is some vestige of a self-motive life in them, and a brute can do something worse and something better from itself,—such as we say is the case with the self-motive nature, whether according to opinion, or according to truth, —if this be admitted, then we must refer to Providence their good domestication, their devoration of each other, and their common corruption, just as we refer to Providence what happens to men from the management of their passions, and the co-ordination which they are allotted, either according to a similitude of life, or according to mundane periods, or according to both these. But if brutes are only corporeal, it is of no consequence if they suffer the

same thing as a shadow all-variously transformed, and are subject to the dominion of Fate[a].

8. After this, let us consider, in the eighth place, a doubt which is very widely diffused, and occasions many to oppose the existence of Providence, viz. why punishments do not immediately follow the commission of crimes, but this happens some time after, or even after a great lapse of time? For offenders will be corrected in a much greater degree when they are immediately punished, than if the punishment is deferred for so long a time that they forget for what they are punished. And, indeed, they are excited to murmur at Providence, in consequence of feeling the punishment, but forgetting the offence which they had committed; in the same manner as he is affected who suffers for the crimes of others a long time after they have been committed[b]. In answer to this we may say, that the implanted root of wickedness causes the same energies to take place in consequence of continuing inflexible by punishment, just as the earth bearing thorns, though the germs are a thousand times cut off, still produces the like. Providence, therefore, waits for an appropriate time, not such as may be pleasing to the vulgar, but such as it knows will contribute to the health of souls, and will in-

[a] Morbeka's version of the remaining part of this seventh question is, unfortunately, so barbarous, that I found it impossible to translate it.

[b] Here, too, in the remaining part of this eighth question, the version of Morbeka is so barbarous, that I have been obliged to epitomise it.

struct many by endurance. For, together with the Gods, says Plato, Fortune and Time govern all things, whether it be requisite that some good should be imparted, or that there should be a purification from something contrary to good. The cure of souls, indeed, which is called δικη (or justice), is more artificial than all external medicinal arts. For the cure of the soul may be said to be a divine thing, the evil which is in it being more various than that which is in bodies. In the next place, vice is a punishment to itself, and the most grievous injury the soul can sustain. Precipitate anger, also, is not a good dispensator of punishments. Plato once, being about to chastise a slave, was seen holding his hand in an elevated position for some time, and being asked why he did so, said that he was punishing his own impetuous anger. Archytas said to his servants in a field, who had not done what he had ordered them to do, and expected to be punished for their negligence, "It is well for you that I am angry." And Theano[a] said to one of her servants, "If I were not angry I would chastise you." Among the Egyptians there was a law, that a pregnant woman, who was judged worthy of death, should not be put to death till she was delivered[b]. Is it, therefore, wonderful that Providence should for a time spare those who are deserving of death, but are able to perform not

[a] The wife of Pythagoras.

[b] See Plutarch, *De sera Numinis vindicta*, in which treatise he says the same thing.

trifling, but illustrious actions, till they have accomplished them? If Themistocles had been immediately punished for what he did when he was a young man, who would have delivered Athens from the Persian evils[a]? Who, also, would have explained the Pythian oracle? If Dionysius had perished in the beginning of his tyranny, who would have freed Sicily, which was thought to be irremediably lost, from the Chalcedonians? If the punishment of Periander had not been deferred for a long time, who would have freed the pleasant island of Leucadia,—who would have liberated Anaxorium from its adversaries? To which may be added, that the time of deferred punishment seems long to our feeble vision, but is nothing to the eye of Providence, just as the place, also, in which we live, and carry about these bodies, is perfectly small for the punishment of great offences; but there are many and indescribable places of punishment in the infernal regions, and excessive torments for the offenders that are there. On account of the magnitude of the punishments, likewise, the whole of them are not inflicted at once. Souls, also, are naturally adapted to feel remorse, which is the forerunner of their greater sufferings. For they say, that Apollodorus the tyrant saw himself in a dream scourged and boiled by certain persons, and his heart exclaiming from the kettle, "I am the cause of these thy torments!" But Ptolemy, who was

[a] See the before-mentioned treatise of Plutarch, in this and the following historical instances.

surnamed *Thunder*, thought in a dream that he was called to judgement by Seleucus, and that vultures and wolves sat there as his judges. Such are the preludes to the vicious of impending punishment.

9. After this, let us consider how the crimes of other persons, as, for instance, of parents or ancestors, are punished in their posterity. For that certain persons are said to have suffered punishment for the crimes of their ancestors, both revelations and the mysteries manifest, and certain liberating Gods are said to purify from them. In answer to this it may be said, in the first place, that every city and every genus is one animal, in a much greater degree than every man, and is more immortal and sacred[a]. For one tutelar deity presides over a city as over one animal, and likewise over the whole of one race; and there is one common period to a city, and also to a generation, comprehending in one boundary the life and death of each[b], as if one nature pervaded through the whole city, and every individual that it contains. And hence, one common nature extending through a whole city, and a whole race, makes each to be one. If, therefore, as we have shown, every city, and each genus of men, is a certain one, why is it wonderful that the crimes of progenitors should be

[a] See Plutarch in the before-mentioned treatise.

[b] Morbeka's version of the concluding part of this sentence is, "*et generis equidem secundum eadem concludens utriusque vitam et mores.*" But for "*mores*" I read *mortes*, or *mortem*.

punished in their posterity? And the life of cities being one, has a retribution in after-times for the better or worse deeds which it performed in prior times. For Providence not only rewards or punishes each of us for what we have done at another time, but considers a city as one, and a race as one; the first agents also not being neglected. For Providence existing, it is not lawful that anything should be neglected. There is also a co-passivity of posterity with their ancestors; for the former have a reference to the latter as to a summit or leading monad, being generated from, and having a common life and nature together with them; and hence, on account of them, they are deservedly honoured or punished. I do not, however, conceive it to be at all wonderful, if all being parts of one, and some things being co-adapted to others, not those that are near, but those that are remote, should be allotted circumstances similar to those of their ancestors. For neither is there the same similitude of all the parts to all; but of these it is greater, and of those less. Nor is there the same proportion; for there is a greater colligation of these, but less of those; and this, not because that which is near has more similitude, but that which is more remote less[a]. For nothing hinders us from admitting, that things which are more remote may

[a] The latter part of this sentence is both defective and erroneous in Morbeka. For instead of, "*et hæc quidem non, eo quod prope habet το magis aut το majus*, I conceive it necessary to read, *et hæc quidem, non eo quod prope habet το magis, aut quod remotius το minus.*

be more assimilated than such as are more near. And this, also, is manifest from medical operations. For when the loins are diseased, physicians cauterize, not the parts which are near, but those which are opposite to the loins; and when the liver is imposthumated, they scarify the epigastrium. When, likewise, the hoofs of oxen are extremely tender, they anoint the tips of the horns, and not the parts which are proximate to the hoofs[a]. For the effect produced in them is not through the parts which are near, but through those which from co-passivity are in want of sanation. All the first delinquents, therefore, suffer punishment for their crimes; and through these, something occultly passes to their co-passive posterity. Nor do these suffer unjustly, but from a similitude of life similar things are allotted to them by Providence. If, also, it be requisite to speak of the transmigrations of souls, and their transitions into different lives, it must be admitted by those who believe in this doctrine, that souls are rewarded or punished in a posterior, for what they have done in a former life. Besides, in

[a] This, and the preceding sentence, are taken from the treatise of Plutarch, Περι των ὑπο του θειου βραδεως τιμωρουμενων, i. e. *Concerning those who are slowly punished by Divinity*. And the whole passage in the original is as follows: Καθολου δ' εικον ὡσπερ εν ιατρικη το χρησιμον και δικαιον εστι, και γελοιος ὁ φασκων αδικον ειναι των ισχιον πονουντων και ειν τον αντιχειρα, και του ἡπατος ὑπουλου γεγονοτος, αμυσσειν το επιγαστριον, και των βοων αν εις ταις χηλαις μαλακιωσι προσαλειφειν τα ακρα των κερατων, κ.τ.λ. But for τον αντιχειρα, in this extract, I read τα αντικειμενα, *the opposite parts*. Morbeka, also, has in his version, "*angis enim ægrotantibus, non quæ prope, sed quæ ex opposito adurunt.*"

human life, the whole period of a race is analogous to a drama, different souls being frequently introduced in it, and often the same souls, in order to give completion to the inevitable scene[a]; just as there the same players sometimes speak in the character of Tiresias, and sometimes in that of Œdipus. Providence, however, punishes or rewards souls according to their desert, and, through a similitude of life, punishes some on account of others, as if cutting off a certain malignant root of a plant, which it could easily antecedently perceive. For a sting is congenial to scorpions, and venom to vipers. But there is a power in the universe which knows this prior to the percussion. After the same manner, therefore, Providence, perceiving in souls iniquity congenial to that of their ancestors, punishes them for it, though they may not have committed the same crimes; previously destroying the similar evil in those who possess it, like a malady growing to an epilepsy. For as the excrescences of the extremities, blackness, and marks of fathers which do not appear in their immediate offspring, reger-minate in their grandchildren, thus, also, the peculiarities of manners burst forth in more distant progeny, which are indeed unknown to others: but by *the one* of Providence, which knows all things, it must be granted that they are known by an antecedent knowledge. The similitude, however, becomes evident through this, that it is seen to

[a] Morbeka has here "*funem*;" but the original was, doubtless, conformably to the above translation, σκηνην.

extend to them punishments correspondent to the crimes which their ancestors committed. But I well know that I have elsewhere discussed these particulars.

10. I shall, therefore, put an end to these doubts, by adding as a colophon, as it is said, a tenth inquiry. For Providence, by this its much celebrated unity, knowing and reducing all things to good, how are angels and dæmons said to energise providentially; and, if you are willing, heroes likewise and souls, governing the world in conjunction with them and the Gods? For it is requisite that we should define what the nature is of their providential energy, since it is not, like that of the Gods, characterized by *the one*, if we admit that a dæmon, an angel, a soul, and a hero, are not the same with deity. For the hyparxis of every God, as I have before said, subsists according to *the one*; and this *one* is prior to intellect, and is the same with *the good*, from which also it proceeds. But unities or goodnesses are twofold, which *the good itself* produces, being the cause of both, and being one in a more transcendent degree. And of these unities, some indeed are self-perfect, but others are distributed in their participants. For *the one* and *the good* have a triple subsistence; viz. either according to cause, as, for instance, the first good; since this is from itself the cause of every good, and of all unities;—or according to hyparxis, for thus every God is one and good;—or according to participation, as, for instance, *the one* and *the good* which

subsists in beings, on account of which every essence is united, and every God is boniform, though he is a unity. The unity, however, of self-perfect natures does not belong to anything else, but pertains to itself only. But every intellect, and every soul, participates of a certain one. For the one which soul, and also the one which intellect participates, possess *a transcendency of union*[a]. Thus, likewise, one all-perfect intellect is the cause of all intellects. But of the intellects which proceed from it, some are self-perfect, each being partially that which the all-perfect intellect is totally; one possessing the partial according to a certain thing, but another according to something else; and this existing in the moon, but that in the sun. This, also, being distributed into some other of the forms contained in all-perfect intellect, but that being an illumination from these intellects in intellectual souls; on which account, also, these souls are said to be intellectual according to participation, and tend upward to the first intellect. And all souls, indeed, have the self-motive nature in common; but those which participate of intellect, universally possess intelligence. If, therefore, we direct our attention to the first soul, and the twofold souls that proceed from it, we shall perceive that some of them are essential and separable from bodies, but others are illuminations in bodies, derived from

[a] In Morbeka's version, "*unialis est*;" but this in the Greek was doubtless ενιαιον εστι, and ενιαιος signifies της ενωσεως υπεροχη, *a transcendency of union.*

essential souls[a]. For that which is animated, is so through the participation of a certain soul, which some one[b] calls (εντελεχεια) *entelecheia*, and which may be denominated *an animated bond.*

Hence, there is a number proceeding from each of the principal hypostases, viz. from soul, intellect, and *the good.* But this number is twofold, the one consisting of self-perfect essences, but the other of illuminations proceeding from these self-perfect beings into subordinate natures[c]. Hence, too, though angels and dæmons are neither Gods nor unities simply,—and the like is true of heroes, of souls superior to ours, and also of ours,—yet they participate of certain unities, and are profoundly united. And the first of these illuminations are those which are suspended from the Gods themselves; the second in order are suspended from the first; the third from the second; and the fourth, which is our order, is suspended from illuminations which rank as the third. For in us, also, there is inherent a certain occult vestige of *the one*, which is more divine than our intellect, and in which the soul, perfecting and establishing herself, becomes divine, and lives, as far as it is possible for this to be accomplished by her, a divine life. All the Gods, therefore, energise providentially.

[a] For a demonstration of what is here said by Proclus about intellects and souls, see my translation of his Theological Elements.

[b] It is so called by Aristotle in his Treatise on the Soul, to my translation of which I refer the reader.

[c] See Proposition 64 of my translation of Proclus's Theological Elements.

But angels, dæmons and heroes, in consequence of possessing a certain seed, as it were, of *the one*, exert a providential energy, not so far as they are vital or intelligent,—for it is the province of soul to move, and of intellect to know, and the former characteristic property exists in all souls, and the latter in all intellects,—but they energise providentially through *the one* which they contain. For according to that through which they imitate[a] the Gods, they provide for all things. But if all the Gods primarily exert a providential energy, because they are primarily good, but souls after these, when they are established in unity, energise divinely, and provide for other things without habitude together with the Gods, and the genera which transcend our nature,—if this be the case, the providential energies of souls do not consist in reasonings conjectural of futurity, like those of human political characters, but in illuminations in *the one* of the soul derived from the Gods. Hence, being surrounded with the transcendently united splendour of deity, they see that which is in time untemporally, that which is divisible indivisibly, and everything which is in place unlocally; and they energise not from themselves, but from the powers by which they are illuminated. And souls, indeed, are sometimes affected in this manner, but the abovementioned energy is always present with angels, dæmons and heroes. On this account, likewise,

[a] In Morbeka's version in this place, for "*mirantur*," it is necessary to read *imitantur*.

they providentially attend to subordinate natures in a more excellent manner than if they energised according to ratiocination, not in a way similar to their productions, but perceiving all things according to *the one* and causally, without any diminution of providential energy. These powers, therefore, differ, as we have said, from souls, by always attending to the objects of their care; but they differ from the Gods, of whom they are the attendants, by not energising providentially according to the whole of themselves, but according to their most divine part, by which they are conjoined with the Gods themselves. For of the Gods, each is a unity; but of these, each possesses through participation a transcendency of union. Hence, each having something else besides unity, imitates through unity the divinity prior to itself, and from which it is suspended; but by something else, it lives according to another energy. And the summit of the essence of each is according to *the one*; but *being* subsists in each according to that which is not one [but united]. This, however, being known, other particulars which have been mentioned concerning Providence may be adapted to dæmons and heroes in a secondary degree, except that in these also, in the same manner as in the Divinities, unity has in some of them a more total, but in others a more partial power. The ineffable principle of things, however, as it is more excellent than every power, so likewise it transcends Providence. But if some one should dare to assert, that

it providentially attends to all things, it must be said that this is in no other way than as desirable to all things, and as that for the sake of which all things subsist, and as the cause of Providence. For the providential energies of the Gods, and of all the beings posterior to the Gods, are on account of good; and this both things themselves manifest, and also Plato, as we have said in the beginning of this discussion.

ON THE SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL.

WHAT the nature of evil is, and whence it derives its generation, some of those who preceded us have investigated, and engaged in the theory of it not superfluously, nor for the sake of something else; but have considered whether evil itself, surveyed by itself, is, or is not; and if it is, what kind of a thing it is, and whence it proceeds into existence and hypostasis. But it will not be amiss that we also, since we have leisure, should briefly narrate what each of these has said rightly, and prior to these, what have been the speculations of the divine Plato concerning the essence of evil. For by understanding what has been asserted by these men, we shall always more easily and more nearly comprehend the subjects of investigation, and shall, as it were, enkindle a light in ourselves from these inquiries.

1. In the first place, therefore, it must be considered whether evil is, or is not. And if it is, whether it is in intellectual natures or not? And if it is in sensibles, whether it subsists according to a principal cause, or not? And if not, whether some kind of essence must be given to it, or its existence must be considered to be wholly unsubstantial? And if it be admitted that it has some

kind of essence, how does it subsist, there being another principle [contrary to it]? And, further still, how Providence existing, evil exists, and whence it is derived? In short, all such particulars must be considered as we are accustomed in our Commentaries to investigate.

The beginning, therefore, according to nature, of the speculation of these things will be, whether evil ranks among beings or not? But after what manner is it possible for that to exist, which is entirely destitute of the principle of beings? For neither is it possible for darkness [so far as it is darkness] to participate of light, nor vice of virtue, nor evil of good. As, therefore, if light was the first cause, there would be no darkness in secondary natures, as the generation of it would not be from chance, nor from anything else than the principle of things; so, because good is the cause of all things, it is requisite that evil should have no subsistence among beings. For if it is from goodness itself, how can *the good*[a] be any longer the cause of all good, when it also produces the nature of evil? But if it does not derive its subsistence from *the good*, *the good* will not extend itself to all things, and will not be the principle of all beings, since evil having an arrangement among beings, will escape the progression which is from *the good*. In short, if everything which has an essential subsistence, of whatever kind it may be, derives this subsistence from

[a] For "et αγαθων" here in Morbeka's version, it is necessary to read τ'αγαθον.

being; but that which participates of being, necessarily likewise participates of *the one*; since at the same time that a thing has being, it is one; for *the one* is prior to being: and if it neither was nor will be lawful for eternal natures [a] to produce what they produce in any other way than in conjunction with the principles superior to themselves,—intellect indeed with life, but life with being, and all things with *the one* [b],—if this be the case, it is again requisite that evil should suffer one of two things. * For it is necessary either that it should not at all participate of being, or that, deriving its existence in some way or other from being, it should at the same time participate of that cause which is beyond being. And again, as consequent, and, as it were, successive to these things, it is necessary, either that there should be no principle of things, or that evil should have no existence, or that it should not have been generated as evil. For that which is deprived of being is non-being, and that which proceeds from the first cause is not evil [c].* But in either way it is necessary to assert that evil has not anywhere an existence. And if, as we have said, *the good* is above being, and is the fountain of beings, because all beings and generated natures, of whatever kind they may be, desire

[a] For *seculis* in this place, in Morbeka's version, the original was doubtless τοις αιωνιοις.

[b] See my translation of Proclus's Theological Elements for a demonstration of what is here asserted.

[c] The punctuation of the part between the asterisks, is in Morbeka's version obviously very erroneous.

good, how can evil rank among beings? For it will be excluded from such an appetition of good. If, however, it should be said that it is requisite evil should exist, because it is necessary there should be something subcontrary to good, yet being subcontrary, how can it desire a nature contrary to its own? But it is impossible for that which does not desire good to rank among beings. For on account of this desire all beings are produced and exist, and from this derive their salvation. If, therefore, evil is contrary to good, evil is not one among the number of beings[a]. And what occasion is there to be prolix. For if *the one*, which we also denominate the nature of *the good*, is beyond being, evil is beyond non-existence[b]. But I mean non-existence or non-being simply considered; for *the good* is better than that which is simply being.

One of two things, therefore, must follow, if non-being is that which is in no respect being, much more is evil without existence, which is more debile and less permanent than perfect non-entity. For

[a] This sentence in Morbeka's version is, "*Quare si malum contrarium bono, malum non est æternum.*" But the word *æternum* is here obviously irrelevant. Instead of it, therefore, I substitute *unum entium.*

[b] In the version of Morbeka, "*ultra ipsum esse malum*"; but it is necessary to read, *ultra ipsum non esse malum.* For as *the good* through its transcendency is beyond being, the processions from it extend beyond those of being. But non-being is that in which the progressions of being terminate, and that which is non-good bounds the progressions of *the good.* Hence evil is something more debile than non-entity.

evil is much more distant from good than non-being. Hence that which is in no respect being, has a subsistence rather than that which is called evil. And consequently evil is much more deprived of existence, than that which is in every respect non-entity. But if the Demiurgus, as Plato says [in the Timæus], not only produced the nature of good, but was also willing that there should be nowhere anything evil, by what contrivance is it possible evil can subsist contrary to the will of the fabricator of all things? For it is not lawful for him to will some things, and produce others [contrary to his will]; since will and productive energy are simultaneous in divine essences. Hence, evil is not only contrary to the will of the Demiurgus, but is likewise unhypostatic; not because he did not produce it, (for it is not lawful to conceive that he did,) but because he was willing, in short, that it should not exist. What, therefore, can cause evil to have an existence, after the father of all things has brought it to a perfectly non-existent state? For what is there contrary to him, and whence does it derive its being? For that which is malefic is not from divinity, (since it is not lawful to admit that it is,) and it would be absurd to suppose that it is derived from anything else. For everything which the world contains proceeds from the father of it, either immediately—and these are self-subsistent natures—or mediately, through the energies of other superior powers.

And such is the reasoning which exterminates

evil from existence; and such are the arguments which may with probability be adduced. But he who asserts the contrary to this will require us to look to the hypostasis of things, and to direct our attention to intemperance and injustice, and whatever else we are accustomed to call the evil of the soul. He will also ask us whether we call each of these good, or each of them evil. For if we admit that each of these is good, we must necessarily say one of two things, either that virtue is not contrary to vice, the whole to the whole, and the parts likewise analogously, or that what opposes good is not always evil. But what can be more contrary to common sense than each of these, or less congruous to the nature of things? For the virtues oppose the vices, and the manner in which this opposition subsists is evident from the hostile conduct of men towards each other, viz. of the unjust towards the just, and of the intemperate towards the temperate; and also from the dissension which is in souls themselves; as when in the incontinent man reason draws one way, but passion compels another[a] way, and both acting in contrary directions, the better is vanquished by the worse. For what else is this, than the dissension of the temperate with the intemperate manners of the soul? And does not something else of the like kind take place in the opposition between reason and the irascible part? And is it not so in other evils, in which we perceive

[a] In the version of Morbeka, "*ducit quidem ratio aliò, cogat autem passio*;" but after *passio*, it is necessary to add *aliò*.

discord in the soul? For, in short, the apparent contrarieties of evil to good, by a much greater priority occultly subsist in souls themselves; and this disease of the soul then takes place, when our more excellent part, and its inherent forms which participate of good, are subdued by passions which are terrene and vile. The recalling these things, therefore, to our memory through many arguments cannot be considered as very foreign to the purpose.

If, however, as we have said, the vices are contrary to the virtues, but evil is entirely contrary to good,—for the nature of good is not adapted to be discordant with itself, but as being the offspring of one cause and one unity, through similitude and friendship and unity, it adheres to it,—and if beings which possess a greater portion of good are the saviours of such as possess a less degree of it, and the latter are adorned by the former as being more perfect,—if this be the case, it is necessary that the vices should not only be evil in definition, but that each of them should be really evil, and not a less good. For nowhere is a less contrary to a greater good, as neither is what is less to what is more hot, nor what is less to what is more cold. But if the vices of the soul must be confessed to be of the nature of evil, it will be shown that evil effects something among beings; and the effective power of evil is likewise evident from this, that it is corruptive of everything. For that evil is this, is demonstrated by Socrates in the Republic, who

very properly says, that the good of everything is that which is preservative of everything, on which account all things desire good; for existence and salvation to all things are thence derived; just as non-existence and corruption are on account of the nature of evil. Is it necessary, therefore, that nothing should be corruptive of anything?[a] But thus the progress of generation would be stopped. For things of a corruptive nature not existing, neither is it possible that there should be corruption; and corruption not existing, neither will there be generation, because all generation is effected through the corruption of another thing. Generation likewise not existing, the whole world will at the same time be imperfect; for it will not contain in itself the mortal genera of animals. It is, however, requisite that it should, in order (says Timæus[b]) that it may be sufficiently perfect. If, therefore, it is requisite, [as Plato says in the Timæus,] that the world should be a blessed God, it is also requisite that its similitude to all-perfect animal[c] should be perfectly preserved. And if this is necessary, it is requisite that mortal genera should give completion to the universe; but if this, then there must be generation and corruption; and if this also be admitted, different things must be

[a] This sentence is not interrogative in Morbeka, but doubtless ought to be.

[b] *i. e.* the Timæus of Plato.

[c] The paradigm of the universe is called by Plato, in the Timæus, *all-perfect animal.* See my translation of the Commentaries of Proclus on that Dialogue.

generative and corruptive of different things. For generation and corruption are not from the same things to all things. But the natures which are allotted generation being corruptive, are so from an innate power, and this is their evil. For the evil of that which is generated, is a corruptive principle, primarily and essentially inherent in it. For, indeed, one thing is corruptive of the soul, but another of the body. That also which is corrupted is different from that which corrupts; and there is not the same mode of corruption; but in one thing it is essential, and in another vital; *and in this thing essentially leading to corruption*[a]; but in that vitally, in consequence of the life of it flying from being to non-entity. The same reasoning, therefore, will preserve for us the whole world perfect, and will give a place to evil among beings. Hence, not only will evil exist on account of good, but it will also be good for it to exist. This, therefore, which is most paradoxical, will again become more known.

If, however, it be requisite not only to acquiesce in the above reasonings, but to pursue the object of inquiry in another way, let us unfold it in the following manner. Every good which receives the difference of the more and the less, according to the more has a greater degree of perfection, and is constituted nearer to the fountain of its existence.

[a] In Morbeka, "*et hujus quidem substantiâ ut esse et corruptionem ducente.*" But for *ut* I conceive it to be necessary to read *et*, and for *et*, after *esse*, to read *ad*, conformably to the above translation.

Again, according to the less becoming debilitated and more imperfect, it recedes to the less excellent part of its unity. For with respect to the equal, also, that which approximates to it in a superlative degree, will be most allied, and, as it were, consequent to it; but that which is equal in a comparative degree, will have the second order after this; and that which is equal in a positive degree only, will possess the ultimate order [in the approximations to equality]. And the same reasoning will take place with respect to the hot and the cold, the beautiful, the great and the small. Must we not, therefore, also admit that injustice and intemperance have the more and the less; or must we assert that all men are equally intemperate and unjust? By no means must we admit the latter. But with respect to the more and the less, must we not say, that what is less unjust is less distant from the nature of good? And again, with respect to that which is more unjust, must we not say, that by how much the greater its possession is of injustice, by so much the more it is destitute of good? This, indeed, must be necessarily admitted. Of every good, however, whether it be less or whether it be greater, it must be granted, that when augmented it becomes nearer to the first good, and that what is perfectly good, is the same with that which is good in the most transcendent degree. Hence it is not proper to call either a greater or a less injustice good, but each of these must be denominated entirely evil. For that, indeed, which is a less good,

becomes by increase good in a greater degree; but that which is unjust, when it increases does not become a greater good. Subsisting, therefore, in a way contrary to good, how is it possible it should not rank among evils? Hence reason confidently asserts these things of the hypostasis of evil, which is also corroborated by the testimony of Plato, who not only enunciatively, but also demonstratively, appears to have introduced the nature of evil into beings. For Socrates, in the Theætetus, strenuously asserts that it is not possible for evils to perish; and again says, that the existence of them is not superfluous, and, as it were, casual; for they are necessary, and are good. But if it is good for evil to be, evil exists as Socrates says; and thus indeed by its transition into existence, it has good for its principle.

What cause, therefore, shall we assign of the necessary existence of evil, and that contrariety of it to good, according to Socrates? For there are, as we have elsewhere observed, both all forms, and that which is beyond forms. But divine forms are not adapted to generate immediately after themselves that which participates of essence casually; nor do they extend their energy as far only as to those beings which, without transition, are always able to enjoy them with invariable sameness; but on account of exuberant power, and transcendent goodness, they produce orders which proximately participate of themselves, and subsist uniformly, without being mingled with privation. They like-

wise produce by their energies the last hypostases, which are incapable of remaining immaculate and intransmutable. For these cannot participate of those beings which are inseparable from wholes, and exempt from all the natures which subsist in others; and they rank among participants alone[a]. Nor is it proper that those beings alone should exist, which always receive the impressions of divine forms, and that the last of things should not be produced, which sometimes only participate of these forms. For in this case, all excellent beings would have an ultimate rank, and things which have an eternal subsistence would have a material order. Hence they would be sterile and debile, and would have all the properties which we are accustomed to ascribe to generable and corruptible natures, in the same manner as if such natures did not exist. If these things, therefore, are necessary from the omnipotent and all-beneficent energy of first causes, neither will good always subsist with invariable sameness in all beings, nor will the generation of evil be expelled from beings. For if there is that which is sometimes able to participate of good, but again sometimes neglects a co-existence with it, there will indeed, from necessity, be a privation of participation; but as the privation of good is not able to subsist by itself, nor can be entirely liberated from the nature of which it is the priva-

[a] *i. e.* They are merely participants, and are not participated by other things. But the beings which are inseparable from wholes, are participated by inferior natures.

tion, it is after a certain manner rendered powerful by this nature, on account of its complication with the order of things contrary to good. Other privations, indeed, are alone produced by the absence of habits, assuming nothing from themselves which contributes to existence; but good, on account of the transcendent excellence of its power, gives strength even to the privation of itself. For as in all beings *the good* implants the first power, so likewise every being which is perfectly good generates its own power. But, as we have said, the privation which is complicated with good, using as a remedy for the instability of its nature the power of good, becomes indeed contrary to good, yet is corroborated by its mixture with it, and thence is enabled to oppose that which is proximate to it. Nevertheless it is not affected in the same manner as other privations. For these have an existence when habit departs; but evil, when good departs, vanishes into non-entity. For there is no species of life so bad as to extinguish entirely the power of reason; since reason remains within, but speaks in a debile manner, in consequence of being surrounded by all-various passions. These things, however, will be considered by us again.

But if, as we have said, it is not only requisite that the above-mentioned arguments should have been adduced, but that the doctrine concerning the existence of evil should be unfolded from the writings of Plato, what has been already delivered by us is sufficient even for those who are only able

in a moderate degree to comprehend discussions of this kind. It is fit, however, in the same manner as in a court of justice, that we should not only hear the arguments of the contending parties, but that we should offer some opinion of our own. Let the following, therefore, if you please, be our decision on the subject,—that evil is, as I may say, twofold; one, and that the first, being real evil, unmingled with good; but the other not being real, nor unmingled with the nature of good. For with respect to good also, one kind is primarily good, and, as it were, good itself, and nothing else than good, being neither intellect, nor intelligence, nor truly-existing being; but another kind is mingled with other things. And good is sometimes found unmingled with privation, and sometimes is to be seen mingled with it. For that which sometimes participates of what is primarily good, is complicated with what is not good; because being itself, also, and the nature of being, is in its highest subsistence truly-existing being; and being alone, but in its last subsistence, is in a certain respect comingled with non-being; so that in consequence of being replete with non-entity, it possesses more of non-existence than of existence. And non-being itself, which is in no respect whatever another being, and is beyond the nature which subsists accidentally, is neither able to subsist according to itself, nor according to accident. For that which is true non-entity, has not existence in one way, but in another not. But the being which subsists simultaneously with non-being,

whether it be lawful to call it a privation of being, or difference, is not the same with true non-entity. For with respect to non-entity, one kind is entirely deprived of being, but another kind, which subsists in intelligibles, suffers, as the Eleatic stranger [or guest] says[a], no diminution of being. But in those things which are sometimes beings, and sometimes non-beings, non-entity is more debile than entity; but yet after a certain manner they are vanquished by being. As, therefore, with respect to non-being, if some one should ask us, whether it has an existence, or whether it has not, we should reply, that what is entirely non-being, and in no respect whatever participates of existence, is in no respect whatever being; but, nevertheless, that non-being is after a certain manner to be connumerated with beings. Thus also with respect to evil, because it has a twofold subsistence, one kind being evil alone, but another not unmingled[b] with good; the former has no existence whatever, in consequence of falling below being, just as *the good* is beyond being; but the latter must be ranked among beings. Hence it is not deserted by being[c], on

[a] The non-being of which Proclus is here speaking, is denominated by the Eleatic guest, in the Sophista of Plato, *difference*, and is one of the five genera of being in intelligibles. But these five genera are, *essence*, *sameness*, *difference*, *motion*, and *permanency*. See my translation of the Sophista.

[b] In Morbeka, "*hoc autem non permixtum ad bonum*;" but for *permixtum*, it is necessary to read *impermixtum*.

[c] For "*abesse*," here in Morbeka's version, it is necessary to read *ab esse*.

account of the intervention of good, nor by good, since it is still capable of remaining, on account of being: for it is at one and the same time being and good. And that which is in every respect evil, since it is a perfect falling off from the first good, is deservedly likewise deprived of being. For what can have a progression into beings that is unable to participate of good? *But that which is not in every respect evil, is sub-contrary indeed to a certain good, but not to all good.* It is, however, arranged and benefited through the transcendency of the source of all good. *And it is evil to those things to which it is contrary; but it is nevertheless suspended as good from total good.* For it is not lawful to act in opposition to this; but it is requisite that all things should be disposed according to justice, or that they should have no existence whatever.

Plato, therefore, rightly says in the Timæus, that so far as pertains to the demiurgic will, all things are good, and nothing is evil. But in the Theætetus he asserts that evil cannot be destroyed, and that it has from necessity a place among beings. For all things partake of good through the will of the father; and nothing is evil with reference to his fabrication, either of real beings, or of things which are becoming to be. And darkness, indeed, which is entirely mingled with its contrary, is therefore not destitute of light; and things which are made in the light, are on all sides terminated by it. With the sun, indeed, nothing is dark, for it gives even to darkness a debile splendour; but in the air,

darkness is a privation of the light which was in it. All things, therefore, are good with the father of all; and evil is in the natures which are not able to remain established in good. On what account, however, this is necessary, we have before shown. After what manner, therefore, evil subsists, and after what manner it does not, is from these things evident. For both those who assert that all things are good, and those who do not, speak in one respect rightly, and in another erroneously. For that all beings are good is true; but non-being also is complicated with being. All things, therefore, are good, because there is no evil which is not adorned and mingled with good. And evil is in those beings whose nature is not adapted to remain in good in an unmingled state.

2. In the next place it is requisite to consider, in what beings evil exists, after what manner it subsists, and whence it is derived; because the nature of it has appeared to us to be something belonging to beings. Let us begin, therefore, from on high, and survey as far as we are able, where evil subsists.

The Gods, then, the kingdoms of the Gods, their numbers and their orders, obtain the first portion of being, or rather they preside over all beings and an intellectual essence, on which being, as it were, seated, they generate and rule over all things, proceed to and are present with all things, without being mingled with them, and exemptly adorn everything which the universe contains. Nor is their intel-

ligence debilitated by their providential energies, nor their paternally transcendent government dissolved by the purity of their intellections. For their intellectual energy is the same with their essence; and providential inspection is present with them on account of goodness, and likewise on account of their twofold power, [viz. providential and demiurgic,] not being *willing*[n] to remain in itself, but, as it were, producing into light from themselves whatever it is lawful for them to produce, viz. all beings, the genera that are more excellent than souls, souls themselves, and whatever else has a being inferior to these. For the Gods themselves, indeed, are beyond all beings, and are the measures of existence, because every being is contained in them, just as number is in monads. But beings proceed from them, some indeed [at the same time that they proceed from,] abiding in them, but others, through their manifold nature, falling off from the unity of the Gods, in consequence of a diminution of essence. And these latter, indeed, are placed in the order of participants, suspended from the goodness of the Gods; but the former are essentialized in good itself, and the measure of wholes, and are nothing else than the unities, and measures, and goodnesses of beings. They are likewise, if you are willing, summits, and as it were flowers, and superessential luminaries, and everything of this kind. And they are indeed participable according

[n] For "*valentem*," here in Morbeka's version, it is necessary to read *volentem*.

to true being and the first essence; but they produce from themselves everything good and beautiful, all media, and being of every kind. As, therefore, if some one should interrogate us respecting this visible light, which the God who is the king of it, and who has an arrangement analogous to *the good*, scatters through the whole world,—whether it is of itself susceptive of darkness or not, our answer to him would be multifarious. For at one time we should adduce the simplicity of its nature; at another time, its continuity with the *divine*[a] genera; and at another something else. Thus also in speaking of the Gods, we must assert that evil has no subsistence whatever in them; and it is requisite to recollect that the Gods adorn all things, that they are not indigent of anything, and that their life is perfectly blessed and divinely exuberant. For these are our unperverted conceptions respecting them, and from these we should assume what it is requisite to assert of the Gods themselves. But souls of a fortunate destiny[b], giving themselves to intellect, expanding the winged part of themselves, and being assimilated to the Gods, are permanently established in good; and no evil is pre-

[a] In Morbeka, "*quandoque autem eam quæ ad genera continuitatem.*" But for *ad genera*, it is requisite to read *ad genera divina.*

[b] In Morbeka "*animæ ephimeræ.*" But for *ephimeræ*, which in the Greek, as the learned Professor observes, was ἐφημεριαι, I read ευμοιριαι: for Proclus is here speaking of that order of souls which are denominated by the Platonists ἀχραντοι, or *undefiled.* See Proclus in Tim., and elsewhere; for this order of souls is mentioned by him in many places in his works.

sent with them, nor ever will be. Perfect hilarity, likewise, an innoxious life, and the choir of the virtues, *lead such a soul to the supernal region, to the banquet, and the enjoyment of delicate food*[a], and to a condition of being far removed from the evils which are here, not for the purpose of vanquishing these maladies, but that together with the Gods, adorning sublunary affairs according to justice, they themselves may remain established in the Gods. And though while they are filled with the contemplation of real being, they possess a latent tendency to these inferior realms, yet they do not experience that which is perfectly evil. If, therefore, there is no evil in souls which are divine, how is it possible it should exist in the Gods? For, as it is said, heat is not in snow, nor cold in fire: and hence, neither is evil in the Gods, nor is a divine nature situated in evil.

In addition, therefore, to what has been said, it must be remembered that the very essence of the Gods is established in good. For as souls are derived from that soul which ranks as a whole[b], and as partial intellects are derived from an all-perfect intellect, thus also, from the first good, or rather, if it be lawful so to speak, from goodness itself, and from the unity of all good, the most pri-

[a] All the above in italics is, in Morbeka, "*quæ utique talem animam ducunt ad superiorem locum, ad epulationemque et fruitionem.*" But Proclus in what is here said, alludes to the following words of Plato in the Phædrus; *ὁταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαῖτα τε καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην ἰωσιν, κ.τ.λ.* p. 23. Astii edit.

[b] *i. e.* as they are derived from the soul of the world.

mary number of things that are good is derived, the being and existence of which is nothing else than unity and goodness. For neither is the essence of partial intellects anything else than intellection, nor of souls anything else than vitality. For if to all the preceding natures there is a continued progression from their principle, through similitude,—if this be the case, the progressions from the first unity must be primary unities, and from the one [first] good a multitude of natures characterized by good. How, therefore, can evil, and the nature of evil, be inherent in things essentially good? For it is not lawful that it should; since good is measure and light; but evil is darkness and incommensurability. And the latter, indeed, is without location, and is debile; but the former is the cause of all location, and of all power. The former likewise is preservative of all things; but the latter leads everything with which it is present to destruction, according to the order which each thing is assigned: for, as we have said, there is not the same mode of termination in all things. Whether, therefore, shall we say, it is false that the Gods are good, or shall we admit that being good they are changed; which we assert to be the case with partial souls, these being transmuted into different forms of life? In thus speaking, however, we shall assert of the existence of the Gods what is both impious and absurd. For good is not congenial with non-good; and that which is not good is not God. Nor is that which is trans-

muted similar to *the one*, and to that which is better than all energy. For what similitude is there between that which subsists according to an eternal essence, and that which is prior to eternity; or between that which is established in an invariable sameness of energy, and that which is more excellent than the peculiarity of even the highest energy? Hence, there is no evil in the Gods, neither simply, nor according to time. For, in short, the eternal and time are posterior to the Gods[a]; since both these are essences, and subsist about essence. But the Gods are prior to essence and being. For beings derive their subsistence from them, they having an hyparxis prior to being. And here, indeed, every one is good; but truly-existing being is suspended from the good [which is the characteristic of the Gods].

Again, therefore, after the Gods, if you are willing, let us direct our attention to the order of angels, and consider, whether we must assert this to be perfectly good, or that evil subsists in this order primarily. If, however, evil, of whatever kind it may be, is in them, how can we any longer call them the messengers of the Gods? For all evil, indeed, is far distant and foreign from the Gods, and is like darkness with respect to the light which is with them. It also is not only ignorant that it is itself evil, but it is ignorant of everything else, and especially of whatever is good. For it flies from

[a] See my translation of the Theological Elements of Proclus, in which this is demonstrated.

and destroys itself, not being able to know either itself or the nature of good. But the genus which is the interpreter of the Gods, is continuous with the Gods, knows their intellect, and elucidates the divine will. This angelic genus, also, is itself a divine light, proceeding from that effulgence which is concealed in the adyta of deity, becoming externally manifest, and being nothing else than good primarily shining forth from the beings which eternally abide in the unfathomable depths of *the one*. For it is requisite that the progression of wholes should be continued; and, on account of similitude, one thing is naturally consequent to another. To the fountain, therefore, of all good, many natures characterized by good are consequent, and an occult number of unities abiding in the ineffable fountain of deity. But the first number of preceding and proceeding natures continuous with the divine unities is that of the angelic order, which is situated, as it were, in the vestibules of the Gods, and unfolds their truly mystic silence. How, therefore, can evil exist in those beings whose essence consists in the elucidation of good? For where there is evil, good is absent; so far is it from being elucidated; but it is rather concealed by the presence of a contrary nature. That, however, possesses a transcendency of union which is enunciative of *the one*; and this is also the case with whatever in a second order is enunciative prior to that energy which is in other things. Hence, the angelic tribe is in a transcendent degree assimilated to the Gods, from

which it is suspended, so that it is able, by a most manifest similitude, to unfold its peculiarity to posterior natures.

If, also, you are not willing to survey the beneficent order of angels in this way only, but according to another mode, consider that in all the genera, and all the numbers of beings, of whatever kind they may be, that which is allotted a first and principal order possesses good genuinely, and unmingled with evil. *For it is requisite that what is first in every series of things should bear the image of the first cause; since everywhere primary natures are analogous to this cause, and the salvation of all things is through the participation of it.* For whether you divide all beings into intellectuals and sensibles; or, again, the sensible nature into heaven and generation; or, in like manner, the intellectual essence into soul and intellect,—you will everywhere find, that what ranks as first and most divine is unreceptive of evil. It is requisite, therefore, that not only in these, but also in the triple empire of the better genera, [viz. of angels, dæmons, and heroes,] there should be the immaculate, the intellectual, and the unmingled with evil. And this is likewise the case with everything that has a first order essentialized in good, because the progression of it takes place on account of goodness; just, again, as the progression of dæmons is according to power, and to that which is *generative*[a] in the

[a] In Morbeka, "*genimum Deorum*;" but for *genimum* it is necessary to read *genitivum*.

Gods; and hence, also, they rank as media in the three genera. For power pertains to the middle[a], just as intellect, and a circular conversion to the principle, pertain to the third progression, which is that of heroes; but goodness energises in angels, and defines their existence by its own unity. How is it possible, therefore, for any one to admit that evil can enter into such natures as these? Hence, that alone which is boniform will obtain the order of angels, but will never partake of any evil. For angels are the elucidators of the Gods, are the summit of the better genera, and their very being is characterized by good.

Does evil, therefore, subsist primarily in dæmons? For they exist in an order consequent to that of the angelic choir. There are, therefore, some who speak of the passions of dæmons, and these, indeed, such as are according to nature, when they tragically narrate their different deaths and generations. But of other dæmons, the passions are from choice alone, and these they denominate wicked and evil dæmons, who defile souls through iniquity, lead them to matter, and draw them down from their celestial journey to the subterranean place. The authors of these assertions, likewise, think that they have Plato as the patron of this doctrine, who establishes twofold exemplars in the universe; the one divine, luminous and boniform, but the other without

[a] In Morbeka, "*Medii enim potentiâ*;" but for "*potentiâ*," it is requisite to read *potentia*.

God, dark and malefic. Of souls, also, according to them, some tend to the former, but others to the latter, at which when they arrive, they suffer the punishment of their crimes. As, again, of those that are in Hades, some fly from the mouth of the opening which is there; but others are dragged along by fiery and fierce phantasms, are torn on thorns, and hurled into Tartarus[a]. What is asserted by these men, therefore, insinuates that every such genus of dæmons which is seductive, malignant and destructive of souls, is susceptive of primary evil, and that the nature of dæmons is distinguished by good and evil. It is requisite, however, to inquire of these, if we ask them nothing else,—*for the fathers of these assertions are divine men*[b], —whether are the dæmons which you call evil, such to themselves; or are they not evil to themselves, but to others? For if, indeed, they are evil to themselves, one of two things must follow; either that they must remain in evil for ever, or that they are susceptive of transmutation. And if, indeed, they are always evil, how can that which subsists from the Gods be perpetually evil? For it is better not to exist at all, than to exist always essentially evil. But if they are changed so as to pass into different forms, they do not rank among

[a] See the 10th book of the Republic of Plato, near the end, from which what is here said by Proclus is derived. The version of Morbeka in this part is extremely barbarous and inaccurate.

[b] Among these is Porphyry. See the 2nd book of my translation of his treatise on Abstinence from Animal Food.

those that are essentially dæmons, but among those who are such only through habitude [a] [*i. e.* through proximity and alliance]. The like must be said of that which is better and worse, and has another form of life. All essential dæmons, however, remain so perpetually, and continue in the order which they are severally allotted. But if they are good to themselves, and evil to others, in consequence of leading them to a worse condition of

[a] After *essential* heroes, an order of souls follows, who proximately govern the affairs of men, and are dæmoniacal κατα σχεσιν, *according to habitude or alliance*, but not essentially. Of this kind are the Nymphs, that sympathise with waters, Pans, with the feet of goats, and the like: and they differ from those powers that are essentially of a dæmoniacal characteristic, in this, that they assume a variety of shapes (each of the others immutably preserving one form), are subject to various passions, and are the causes of manifold deception to mankind. Proclus, in his Scholia on the Cratylus of Plato observes, Οτι εισι και Πανες τραγοσκελεις και Αθηναϊκαι ψυχαι σχημασι ποικιλοις χρωμεναι, και προσεχως ὑπερ τους ανθρωπους πολιτευομεναι, οἱα ην ἡ Αθηνα ἡ τῳ Οδυσσει και τῳ Τελεμαχῳ φανεισα. *i. e.* "There are Pans with the feet of goats, and Minerval souls assuming a variety of shapes, and proximately governing mankind, such as was the Minerva that appeared to Ulysses and Telemachus."

Proclus also, in Plat. Polit. p. 359, remarks concerning dæmons κατα σχεσιν, as follows: Προσθεντος δε του Πλατωνος εν τοις περι της αληθειας, ὁτι παντη ψευδες, ου μονον το θειον, αλλα και το δαιμονιον, δει λαβειν απο ταυτης της προσθηκης, ὁτι το ὡς αληθως δαιμονιον παντη, ου το κατα σχεσιν, ὁ και μεταβολας ὑπομενει παντοιας, και απατᾳ τουτους οἱς αν γενηται φιλον. παν δε το κατ' ουσιαν δαιμονιον λογικον μενον, παντως αληθευτικον εστιν. αλογον δε ον αδεκτον και αληθειας και ψευδους. διο και ὁ Πλατων ουκ ειπεν αληθευτικον παν το δαιμονιον και θειον, αλλ' ὁτι ψευδες παν. αδεκτον γαρ παν ψευδους· αλλα το μεν ὡς πεφυκος αληθευειν μονως, το δε, ὡς μητ' αληθευον, μητε ψευδομενον. ὁσον ουν απατητικον γενος ὁ ἱστορειται, ἡ τας χρησμωδιας ὑποδυομενον, ἡ ταις κλησεσιν ὑπακουον, ἡ και εκ ταυτοματου τισι συγγινομενον, των κατα σχεσιν εστιν δαιμονων. ει δε τινες ὑπο δαιμονων απατωνται των οντως δαιμονων, δι' ἑαυτους απα-

being, this is just as if some one should call certain preceptors and pedagogues wicked, who, from ranking as castigators of faults, do not permit those whom they superintend to pursue a better order in an unappropriate manner. Or as if some one should denominate those evil, who, standing [as guardians] before sacred places, prevent the impure vulgar from entering within the curtains, because they prohibit them from a participation of

τωνται, και ου δι' εκεινους, ωσπερ και επι των θεων ελεγομεν. i. e. "As Plato however adds, in what he says about truth, that not only divinity, but likewise a dæmoniacal nature, is entirely without falsehood, it is necessary to assume from this addition, that what truly possesses the nature of a dæmon, and not a dæmon according to habitude, is perfectly free from falsehood. For a dæmon according to habitude sustains all-various mutations, and deceives those with whom he is friendly. But every essential dæmon, and who is at the same time rational, is perfectly veracious; and if he is irrational, he is unreceptive both of truth and falsehood. Hence, Plato does not say, that every dæmoniacal and divine nature is *veracious*, but that every such nature is *without falsehood*. For all these are unreceptive of falsehood; but this is the case with the rational kind, as being naturally adapted to be alone veracious; and with the irrational, as not being conversant with either truth or falsehood. Hence, whatever deceitful kind of dæmons is mentioned in history, either as secretly assuming the office of delivering oracles, or becoming obedient to invocations, or being casually present with certain persons,—every such kind pertains to those who are dæmons according to habitude, proximity and alliance. But if certain persons are deceived by those who are truly [or essentially] dæmons, they are deceived through themselves, and not through them, as we before observed respecting the Gods." To such dæmons as these may be applied what Iamblichus says, De Myst. sect. 4. cap. 7., viz. "*An evil dæmon requires that his worshiper should be just, because such a dæmon assumes the appearance of one belonging to the divine genus; but he is subservient to what is unjust, because he is depraved.*"

the internal rites. It is not evil, therefore, for those to remain external to these sacred places, who are not worthy to enter into them; but it is evil to be of such an order, and to deserve such prohibitions[a]. Hence, if of the mundane dæmons, some lead souls on high, but others keep the souls that are not yet able to ascend, in their own manners, we cannot justly say that either of these are evil,—either those by whom souls are separated from hence, or those by whom they are detained. For it is requisite there should be dæmons, who keep in custody about the terrestrial region souls that are

[a] What the Pseudo Dionysius says in that part of his treatise on the Divine Names in which he shows that there is no such thing as evil itself, is wholly derived from this treatise of Proclus, as will be evident by comparing the one with the other. I give the following extract from that work, as an obvious proof that what is said by Proclus in this place, was taken from thence by Dionysius: *Ουκ αρα ουδε εν αγγελοις εστι το κακον. αλλα κολαζειν τους αμαρτανοντας εισι κακοι. τουτῳ γουν τῳ λογῳ και οι σωφρονισται των πλημμελουντων κακοι. και των ἱερων οι τον βεβηλον των θειων μυστηριων απειργοντες. καιτοι ουδε το κολαζεσθαι κακον· αλλα το αξιον γινεσθαι κολασεως. ουδε το κατ' αξιαν απειργεσθαι των ἱερων· αλλα το εναγη, και ανιερον γινεσθαι και των αχραντων ανεπιτηδειον. i. e.* "Hence, neither is evil in angels; unless it should be said that they are evil because they punish offenders. But if this be admitted, the castigators of all those who act erroneously will be evil; and consequently, this will be the case with those who exclude the profane from the inspection of divine mysteries. It is not, however, evil to punish those that deserve to be punished, but it is evil to deserve punishment. Nor is it evil to be deservedly excluded from sacred mysteries, but to become defiled and profane, and unadapted to the participation of what is pure." The learned reader will find, on perusing the whole of what is said by this Dionysius concerning evil, in the above-mentioned treatise, that the greater part of it is derived from the present work of Proclus.

defiled with vice, and unworthy of a progression to the heavens. Neither, therefore, does it appear that evil, even in these dæmons, can rationally be found; for they severally effect that which is conformable to their nature, and always after the same manner. But this is not evil.

Again, with respect to the genus of heroes, does not, in the first place, the very being of these consist in an essential conversion to that which is more excellent? And, in the second place, heroes are always the causes to other things of a conversion to better natures. This providential employment, therefore, was assigned them by the father of the universe; and if their energy is invariably the same, it is not evil. For everything evil is naturally unstable and without locality; but the contrary is true of that which is always a whole. For perpetuity is power; but a subsistence in capacity pertains to those things to which evil pertains. In short, to be changed in the form of life, in any way, causes those who suffer this change to be heroes according to habitude, and not yet to be such as essential heroes. For every angel, dæmon and hero, who is such essentially, is naturally adapted always to preserve its own order, and does not subsist in one way at one time, and in a different way at another, but energises always according to the nature which it has received. Further still, if anger, violent efforts, and everything of this kind which is called evil, are employed by them through a perversion of what is

according to nature,—in this case, evil in them is a disorderly use of their power, and is everywhere a departure from a perfection adapted to their essence; for evil is impotent and imperfect, and is of a nature too debile to effect the salvation of anything. But if each in thus acting preserves itself and its own nature, and the condition which it is perpetually allotted in the universe, how can it any longer be preternatural in them thus to act? For if it is according to nature, to them it will not be evil, if the evil to everything is that which is preternatural to it. For you would not say, that fury is an evil to lions or leopards; but it is an evil to men, to whom what is most excellent is reason. To other beings, however, whose essence is according to intellect, it is not good to energise according to reason[a]. For it is requisite that evil, as we have frequently said, should not be that which is according to nature, and which in everything is the better part,—for a thing of this kind is good,—but that it should be the concomitant of a deteriorated nature. Hence a precipitate phantasy, fury, anger and pertinacity, are not unnatural to those beings to whom such things, and not reason, are essential.

What, therefore, is evil to them from these things? But the above-mentioned particulars are impediments to souls, and a bond; for to those, a tendency downward is a deviation from rectitude. For these powers do not lead to the place adapted

[a] Because reason is inferior to intellect. For the intellectual perception of a thing is intuitive, and not the result of ratiocination.

to themselves, those souls which have not yet fallen into vice, because this would not be possible. But, in conformity to the laws of the universe, they punish souls that tend to a subordinate nature, and that require chastisement [as preparatory to their purification]. And these powers, indeed, in so doing act according to nature; but the universe[a] uses them as instruments for the sanation of souls. For it also uses brutes for the devoration of men, and inanimate substances for some other natural purpose. And a stone, indeed, in falling naturally strikes that with which it meets; for these actions are the percussions of bodies; and the universe opportunely uses the nature of these in order to give completion to the necessity of that which ought to suffer. Neither, therefore, is percussion evil to bodies; nor, in short, is there any evil in the operations of things which act conformably to their own nature. But everything acts according to nature, which has no energy better than its natural energy. Hence, it is not possible to assign any more excellent energy of these heroical powers than what has been before mentioned. For this is their order; and this species of energy was assigned to them by the fabricator of the universe, for the sake of guarding the perfections of things. Hence, whatever is transacted in the boundaries of these

[a] Morbeka's version of this part is, "*utitur autem ipsis ut organis ad sanationem omnem.*" But for "*omnem*" it is necessary to read, conformably to the above translation, *omne*, i. e. *το παν*, *the universe.*

powers, contrary to their life, becomes in destined periods of time subject to their guardian care. But the period of the time of punishment corresponds to the power of the patients; and the purgation being perfect, the mouth of the opening [a] ceases to bellow, and all the other impediments to ascending souls are withdrawn. While the punishment, however, is as yet imperfect, some souls, on account of an ignorance of themselves, desire a progression upwards, and the universe leads these to what is appropriate to their condition. The guardians of such, likewise, being subservient to the will of the universe, convert some to one, and others to a different kind of punishment; and employing coercion to *these* for a longer, but to *those* for a shorter time, they at length dismiss them conformably to the arrangements of the universe and its laws. We must say, therefore, with respect to the Gods, and the genera superior to our species, that their conduct towards us is through commiserating our condition, and that there neither is any evil in them, nor ever will be. For they energise in all things conformably to the order in which each of them is arranged, and, abiding in their accustomed manner, they preserve invariably that boundary which they possess from the fabrication of things.

3. In the next place, let us direct our attention to the natures consequent to the above, and investigate whether evil is anywhere to be found in these.

[a] See the latter part of the 10th book of the Republic of Plato, from which what Proclus here says is derived.

If, however, it must be said, that evil has nowhere an existence, it follows that it is neither there, nor in human souls. For all the above-mentioned genera are unreceptive of transmutation; I mean, of a transmutation according to their order[a]. For each of them is always adapted to preserve the order which it received. But the natures consequent to these [viz. human souls] possess a power of sometimes ascending, and sometimes tending to generation and a mortal nature. Of these, likewise, some are better and more divine, and, in being connected with a mortal nature, do not abandon divine knowledge; but others sustain all-various fractures and distortions of their circles[b], and are replete with oblivion, habitude [to things subordinate], and evil. Let us, therefore, in the first place, consider the better kind of human souls. That these, then, in consequence of being better, do not admit in themselves any passion of human depravity, is indicated by Socrates in the Republic, where he accuses the poets of representing the offspring of the Gods [*i. e.* heroes] as equally avaricious with [other] men, and replete with such evils as we perceive to be accidental to human nature[c]. If, however, as it is said, a very great part of their period consists in contemplation, in an innoxious

[a] *i. e.* they cannot be changed into a different order.

[b] This is asserted by Plato in the Timæus. See my translation of the 5th book of Proclus on that Dialogue.

[c] See the Introduction to the 2nd and 3rd books of the Republic, in vol. i. of my translation of Plato, in which the reader will find an apology for what is here said, from Proclus.

life, and in a secure providence of wholes in conjunction with the Gods; and if, when they descend into generation, their descent is for the benefit of terrestrial souls,—some, indeed, for the purpose of procuring a good offspring, others for the sake of purity[a], but others for the purpose of transmitting the illuminations of a divine intellect,—and if, also, they accomplish this in conjunction with the Gods, with renown, together with the inspiration of good dæmons, and the consent of the universe,—what evil, in short, will there be in them, unless you are willing to call generation itself [or the whole of a visible nature] evil? For, as Socrates says in the [10th book of the] Republic, it is necessary that every soul should drink[b] a certain measure of the cup of oblivion. With respect to oblivion, however, it is different in different souls; in some, indeed, the habit of recollection being lost; but in others, remembrance in energy being alone buried [for a time, but not destroyed]. This rest of energy therefore,—habit remaining within, like a concealed light, incapable of proceeding externally on account of the adjacent darkness,—you may call oblivion, or, if you are willing, the evil of these souls. These souls, likewise, are impassive

[a] In Morbeka, "*pro paritate*"; but the true reading is, I have no doubt, conformably to the above translation, *pro puritate*.

[b] Morbeka's version of this part is, "*Mensuram enim quandam poculi oblivionis necessarium omnem animam facere*"; but for "*facere*" it is requisite to read *bibere*. Morbeka appears to have had in his MS. ποιειν instead of πιειν, which is the true reading. The words of Plato are: Μετρον μεν ουν τι του ὑδατος πασιν αναγκαιον ειναι πιειν.

to the perturbations which subsist about the soul in generation, and on this account we are accustomed to call them immaculate[a]; because the evils which are here cannot enter into them, though they are incapable of preserving in this terrene abode that invariable and immutable life which they led in the intellectual realms; but they permit that which is adapted to disturb them, and is unstable, to remain in the natures which are suspended from their essence. These impassive souls, too, are internally silent, as long as they are situated in tranquillity; but when they are excited to vehement energy, then their beauty shines forth, so as to evince that they are truly the offspring of the Gods. Hence, whether in terrene animals, or in other parts of the universe, there are generations of souls, this is the mode of descent to all of them, and as far as to this, oblivion and evil are the result. For we say, that light is darkened, because the extraneous nature of that which surrounds it being gross and nebulous, it cannot illuminate that which is near to it. But that is perfectly involved in darkness, which cannot even be the saviour of itself. The descent, therefore, of these divine souls, not destroying their internal life, gives to them a debility of energy.

[a] See an admirable account of these undefiled souls in the Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus, in the notes at the end of the 5th volume of my Plato; where the reader will find a translation of nearly the whole of these most excellent Scholia, which are nothing more than extracts from a complete Commentary on that Dialogue of Plato, by some one of the disciples of Proclus, as will be evident to the intelligent reader from the perusal of them.

With respect, however, to the souls that are posterior to these, and which destroy their internal life, and fall into an oblivion of the contemplations arising from the energies of it,—in souls of this kind there is death, an insatiable tendency to mortal concerns, a *defluxion of their wings*[a], and whatever else of such souls, we are accustomed frequently to assert. For what other medium is it requisite to assign between that which is unsusceptible of evil, and that which is entirely malignant, than a slender, and, as I may say, apparent evil? These things, therefore, must be asserted of such souls. The habit, too, of these latter tribes[b] of souls is truly all-various, and is transmuted by all-various impulses and elections. Their internal powers, likewise, suffer defalcation, and their energies are attended with great labour. Being also lame and debile, they suffer all the evils in which souls are said to be involved through falling from that place, the inhabitants of which are free from sorrow, and lead a blessed life. For every soul when on high is conversant with sublime concerns[c], governs the whole world, and ascends, together with the presiding Gods, to the contemplation of the felicitous and most perfect energy of truly ex-

[a] See the Phædrus of Plato, where it is said that such souls suffer this defluxion.

[b] In Morbeka, "*Habitum autem iis φυλον, id est tribus omnimodum enter est et varium*," &c.; but for "*φυλον, id est tribus*," it is necessary to read *φυλοις, id est tribibus*.

[c] In Morbeka *μιστωροστοιτι*; instead of which it is requisite to read *μιστωροστολει*. For Proclus here, and in what immediately follows, alludes to what is said in the Phædrus, where this word is used by Plato. See Plat. Phædr. p. 23. Edit. Ast.

isting being, and surveying all the forms that it contains, is filled with the nectar which is there. For, as some one says, contemplation, prudence, and an intellectual life, are not the primary good of the beings that energise according to these; but the energy according to a divine intellect is that which is primarily good, comprehending intelligibles in the intellectual perception of itself, but encompassing sensibles by those powers which belong to the circle of difference[a], and exhibiting to these also a certain portion of the most exalted good. For that which is perfectly good, not only possesses plenitude in the salvation of itself, but likewise in what it imparts to other things, *and through the unenvying abundance of its energy*, desires to benefit all things, and causes them to be similar to itself. But when the soul, according to both species of life[b], is incapable of imitating its presiding Gods, it then indeed becomes deprived of the contemplation of truly-existing being, and is attracted by other secondary powers, which revolve about the world. This, then, is to souls the principle of generation, and of a periodic revolution, and is the cause to them of impotency, and of a privation of the contemplative energy; and this is their evil. For there that which is sufficient to itself primarily exists, where there is that which is primarily good;

[a] *i. e.* to opinion; for opinion is called by Plato in the Timæus, *the circle of difference*; just as διανοια, or the discursive energy of reason, is there called by him *the circle of sameness.* Morbeka's version of this part is, "*Ambiens autem sensibilia iis quæ alterius potentiis.*"

[b] According to the theoretic and practic life.

and there power is transcendent, where that which is sufficient to itself subsists. This, therefore, is the debility of the soul, that, failing of the perfection pertaining to the first life, it tends downwards; but it there again acquires a power of ascending to the region from which it fell, before it sinks into the profundity of a material life. For there is not the same mode of debility to all things. For neither are all bodies placed in the same degree of deterioration through their distance from the power[a] by which they are measured and preserved. But if, as Plato says[b], the soul through an unfortunate occurrence, by which it becomes connected with generation and mortality, is filled with oblivion, and, becoming heavy, falls to the earth, then *the universe*[c], *indeed, leads it to an appropriate order*; but it varies the form of its life, till, as it is said in the Timæus, following the revolution of that same and similar nature contained in its essence, it vanquishes those abundantly turbulent passions, tumultuous and irrational, which afterwards *externally*[d] adhere to it, and is led back to being itself, and the most splendid of being.

[a] *i. e.* through their distance from the physical power by which their parts are held together.

[b] Plato says this in the Phædrus.

[c] In Morbeka, "*Ducit quidem ipsam ad convenientem ordinem omnem.*" But for *omnem*, it is, I conceive, obviously necessary to read *omne*, i. e. το παν, *the universe.*

[d] In all the printed editions of the Timæus, the word εξωθεν, *externally*, is wanting in this place. For it is evident from the Commentary of Proclus on that Dialogue, that it ought to be inserted. Hence, in τον πολυν οχλον και ὑστερον προσφυντα, κ.τ.λ., immediately after οχλον it is requisite to add εξωθεν.

The soul, therefore, descending from thence, arrives at the circumambient ether[a], and surveys the souls that are there. It likewise proceeds under the throne[b] of Necessity to the plain of Oblivion, no longer contemplating such objects as it did, when it possessed a primordial nature. For the objects of contemplation to souls when on high, were the plain of Truth, and the divine forms which it contains. The nutriment, however, as Plato says, which is adapted to the soul in its best condition of subsistence, is derived from the meadow which is there[c]; but the nutriment which is here, is procured through opinion. Hence, also, this terrene abode is near to the river of Oblivion, *and the dire world*[d], through which the soul is filled with folly and darkness, and is surrounded with all the evils to which the mortal nature is subject. For the fractures and distortions of circles [mentioned in

[a] By *the circumambient ether*, I suppose Proclus alludes to what is said by Plato near the end of the 10th book of his Republic, viz. "that souls descending pure from heaven, rested themselves in the meadow, as in a public assembly," &c.

[b] In Morbeka, "*veniet autem et sub necessitatis terminum, et oblivionis campum.*" But for *terminum*, it is necessary to read *thronum*: for Proclus here alludes to the following passage in the 10th book of Plato's Republic: Εντευθεν δε δη αμεταστρεπτι ὑπο τον της Αναγκης ιεναι θρονον· και δι' εκεινου διεξελθοντα, επειδη και οἱ αλλοι διηλθον, πορευεσθαι απαντας εις το της Ληθης πεδιον.

[c] *i. e.* from the meadow in the supercelestial place. See the Phædrus of Plato. This meadow, therefore, is very different from the circumambient ether, mentioned in Note [a].

[d] In Morbeka, "*et mundum horum dirum.*" But the *dire world*, is the μισοφανης κοσμος, or *light-hating world*, mentioned in the Chaldean Oracles.

the Timæus], and whatever introduces death to souls, the periods of a thousand years, the punishments of the passions, and all that is tragically said respecting the law which the universe ordains, are the consequences of the soul's lapse into this mortal abode. And we shall not be able to fly from these maladies, nor to rest from labours, till rising above things foreign to our nature, we separate from mortal nugacity, our own good and the contemplation of real being. We must therefore strip ourselves of the garments with which in descending we became invested[a], we must proceed naked from hence thither, must entirely purify the eye of the soul by which we contemplate truly-existing being, and instead of sense must make intellect to be the principal ruler of our internal life. Our communication indeed, and life in conjunction with a nature subordinate to our own, exhibit to us the generation of evil; and our oblivion and ignorance arise from surveying that which is unintellectual and dark; but our good consists in a flight and similitude to that which is divine. For there total good exists,

[a] Proclus here alludes to the following beautiful passage in Porphyr. de Abstin., lib. i. p. 27. Απολυτεον αρα τους πολλους ἡμιν χιτωνας, τον τε ὁρατον τουτον και σαρκινον, και ους ἐσωθεν ημφιεσμεθα, προσεχεις οντας τοις δερματινοις· γυμνοι δε και αχιτωνες επι το σταδιον αναβαινωμεν, επι τα της ψυχης Ολυμπια αγωνισομενοι. *i. e.* "We must therefore divest ourselves of our manifold garments, both of this visible and fleshly vestment, and of those with which we are internally clothed, and which are proximate to our cutaneous habiliments; and we must enter the stadium naked and unclothed, striving for [the most glorious of all prizes] the Olympia of the soul."

and the fountain of all good, and there the purity of [real] being, and a felicitous life are present with perfect souls. And thus with respect to the soul which is able to ascend to a divine nature, and also to descend hither, we have shown after what manner evil subsists in it, together with debility, misfortune, and everything else which we have before mentioned.

With respect, however, to those souls, which are not parts of [real] beings, but certain images and parts of a worse soul, which the Athenian stranger or guest calls malefic, it is requisite to consider whether they are unreceptive of evil, or whether evil also exists in them, but after a different manner. If, therefore, they are indeed worse than the souls of men,—I mean than the image of the rational soul which is in us,—evil in them consists in not acting conformably to nature. For in the natures which are always changed according to a good and a bad condition of being, the good and the evil have not a uniform subsistence; since the good as well as the evil varies. But if, like our souls, they pertain to another soul which is prior to them, again it is necessary that the soul, which is capable of being better and worse, and which is also connected with the image of the rational soul, must sometimes tend to supernal beings, and sometimes to generation and the abode of matter; and that in consequence of irrationality being suspended from reason, that which is worse in them must consist in a discord with reason, in not receiving light

from thence, and in the incommensurability of its nature being deprived[a] of the measure which is thence derived. For this is not the power of such souls, but debility, and a defect of power. Hence, to these souls, the ascent to that which is better takes place when some energy is resplendent in them conformable to reason, which, like a present dæmon, inspires them with an energy leading to such a progression. But again, their tendency to that which is worse is effected, when, on account of the evil condition of the body, or unappropriate aliment, the natural energy being vanquished, the soul is filled with a depraved habit.

In the next place, let us consider nature, and everything to which this imparts the whole of its being and existence. Whether, therefore, is there evil in this, or not? And if there is, on account of what cause does it subsist? We neither assert, therefore, nor conceive, that the nature of the universe, nor the nature of any eternal body, departs at any time from its own habit. But we are of opinion that abiding such as it is, it leads conformably to nature the body with which it is connected: for what else is the employment of nature, than to preserve and perpetually retain that in which it subsists? And the same thing is effected by all causes. This nature, also, when it exists in a part over which it entirely predominates, conducts it rightly and wisely; but when as being partial it is

[a] In Morbeka, "*et το immensuratum ipsius curante eo quod inde metro*"; but for "*curante*," it is necessary to read *carente*.

vanquished, then the whole of that which uses it thus perverted, acts in a way contrary to its native adaptation. For to nature, indeed, considered as a whole, nothing is preternatural; because all natural productive powers are derived from it. But to the nature which ranks as a part, one thing is according to, and another contrary to nature. Thus the form of a lion is preternatural to the nature of man, because neither the productive power of this, nor of any other species, is inherent in man, but that of man alone. And thus in every other class of beings, the productive powers of different species are different. Hence it pertains to a partial nature to be vanquished, and to act contrary to nature, but not to the nature which ranks as a whole, nor to anything which is eternal. For matter, when it is the subject of beings that are not eternal, is frequently vanquished by the bonds proceeding from nature, and then it adorns and as it were illuminates its own darkness and deformity, and invests itself with a foreign ornament. And thus in the beings that rank as wholes, its turpitude is concealed. Hence though it subsists from a principle, it does not become known to every one, nor even to those who have elucidated many of the secrets of nature. But the nature which exists in a part is impotent through a defect of essential power. For it is as it were a ray, impression and reason [or form] of total nature, being divided from thence, flowing downward into body, and in-

capable of remaining unmingled and pure. This, again, likewise arises from the power of the contraries by which it is on all sides surrounded. For the things which are external to it are many, and foreign to the mortal nature.

Thus then, as we have said, this partial nature becoming debile, and superinducing the baseness of itself, defalcates indeed its own energy, and causes by its own deformity the light which proceeds from it to be darkened. For the turpitude of nature, in consequence of reason [or form] not having dominion, is passion, and is inordinate through the impotence of order; but then reason is vanquished by that which is subordinate to reason, and becomes itself irrational. If, therefore, there is also in the energy of a partial nature the unimpeded, we shall have all things according to nature, and there will nowhere in these essences be evil. But if in *this*, one thing is an end to it, and a path according to nature, but another thing is contrary to this, and an impediment to nature; and if, indeed, reason is one, but the things which are different from it are infinite, what else can we say than that this is the evil of nature? For to the being to whom contemplation is good, the privation of it is evil. But to that to which it is good to effect something in another thing, and to energise according to reason, it is evil for reason not to vanquish, and for energy not to arrive at its destined end, through being vanquished by an inferior na-

ture. And the evil of bodies consists in the form which is above them being vanquished[a] by that which is worse than themselves. For corporeal turpitude arises from reason [or form] being subdued, and the disease of body, from its order being dissolved; because beauty then exists when form vanquishes matter, and falls like a [luminous] flower on things deprived of form[b]. And with respect to health, this is produced, when the order which is conformable to nature is stably preserved. These things, therefore, as existing in nature, extend as far as to material bodies, and individual beings; but do not extend to beings which rank as wholes; nor must it be admitted that they subsist in the natures which are beyond the reach of matter. For deformity, wherever it exists, is from matter, which we are accustomed to call deformity itself, and the last of things, as being without measure, and without beauty, and as not possessing even the most debile portion of splendour. But where is inordination and the præternatural to be found in those beings which always subsist according to nature, and which, in consequence of this, possess an invariable sameness of well being? Individual or par-

[a] For "*invincibilis*" here, it is necessary to read *vincibilis*.

[b] The whole of this sentence is in Morbeka's version as follows: "*Etenim turpitudo quæ corporalis est, victa ratione; et ægritudo ordine soluto, quoniam et pulchritudo quando vincit, species velut flos speciebus superincidens.*" But it appears to me that for "*quando vincit, species,*" &c., we should read, conformably to the above translation, *quando materiam ratio vincit, species velut flos speciebus carentibus superincidens.*

ticular bodies, therefore, which in matter sustain all-various mutations, sometimes, indeed, possess order and good, but sometimes not, through contraries vanquishing their nature. But the bodies which do not rank as particulars, and which as wholes remain always the same, and complete the measure of their nature, perpetually possess order, vanquishing inordination. And of the bodies which are immaterial, some, indeed, are always numerically the same, and always possess similar energies, and are liberated from all mortal difficulty; but others are in their nature and essence the same, yet in their energies are led to the better and the worse. And such are the organs of human souls, which have, indeed, the essential according to nature, but possess a variation according to life. And sometimes, indeed, they abide in their own beauty, and in an energy and order according to nature; but at other times they are dispersed into a foreign region, are brought into a condition contrary to nature, and introduce into themselves the baseness of matter. For each organ of the soul follows the impulses of it, and in so doing sustains all-various motions, and becomes assimilated to the appetitions of the soul. We have spoken, however, of a corporeal nature, and have shown what the evil of it is, and how in a different nature, there is a different evil.

Let us, therefore, in the next place direct our attention to matter, and consider whether it is evil or not. For it is by no means possible that evil

can happen to it, because of itself it is without quality, and formless; is a subject, but is not in a subject; and is simple, but is not one thing in another. But if in short, as some say, it is evil, it is essentially evil. And hence, according to them, matter is primarily evil, and is that which is odious to the Gods. For what else is evil than the want of measure and bound, and whatever besides these, is a privation of good? For good is the measure, the bound, the end, and the perfection of all things. Evil, therefore, is incommensuration,—the infinite itself, the imperfect, and the indeterminate; for all these are primarily in matter, not being anything else than it; but they are matter itself, and the very essence of it. Hence matter is primarily evil, and is the nature of evil, and the last of all things[a]. If also good is twofold,—one being the good itself, and nothing else than good; but another good subsists in something else, and is a certain good, and not primarily so,—evil likewise will be twofold, one being evil itself, and primarily, and nothing else than evil; but another evil subsisting in something else, and being a certain evil, by a participation of, or assimilation to, evil itself. And as good itself is the first, so evil itself is the last of things. For it is not possible for anything to be better than good, or for anything to be worse than evil; since we say that all other things are better or worse on

[a] All that is here said about matter being primarily evil, and evil itself, is said conformably to the opinion of Plotinus. See my translation of his treatise *On Evil*.

account of these. But matter is the last of things. For everything else is naturally adapted either to act or suffer. But good itself and evil itself are not adapted to either of these, being deprived of the power of both[a]. Hence matter is evil itself, and that which is primarily evil.

If, however, that which is preternatural in bodies arises, as we have said, from the predominance of matter,—and in souls evil and debility are produced by their lapse into, and inebriation from matter, becoming assimilated to it, through the indefiniteness which subsists about it,—why, dismissing this, should we investigate any other cause, principle and fountain of these evils? But if matter is evil, we must either make good to be the cause of evil, or we must admit that there are two principles of beings. For everything, of whatever kind the nature of it may be, is either the principle of wholes, or from the principle. Matter, however, since it is from the principle, has also its progression into being from good. But if there are two principles of beings, we must admit that there are two principles opposing each other, viz. that which is primarily good, and that which is primarily evil. This, however, is impossible; for there cannot be two firsts. For whence, in short, can there be two principles without a monad [from which they pro-

[a] Good itself is deprived of the power of acting or suffering through transcendency of nature, as being superior to both; but evil itself is deprived of this power, through the most extreme debility of nature.

ceed]? If, indeed, each of these is a unity, it is necessary that prior to both, there should be *the one*, and one principle, through which each of these is one[a]. Nor can evil be produced from good. For as the cause of all that is good, is good in a greater degree than the things of which it is the cause; so likewise that which is generative of evil, is evil in a greater degree than the things which it produces. And on this hypothesis, how will good possess its own nature, if it is the cause of the principle of evil? But if that which is generated, loves to be assimilated to its generator, evil itself also will be good, in consequence of possessing the form of good, through participating of its cause. Hence good, indeed, will be evil, as the cause of evil; but evil will be good, as being produced by good.

If, however, matter is necessary to the universe, and the world would not be in every respect a great and blessed God[b] without matter, how can the nature of evil be any longer referred to matter? For evil is one thing, and that which is necessary another. And matter, indeed, is that without which it is impossible for the universe to exist; but evil is the privation of existence. If, therefore, matter exhibits the aptitude of itself as subservient to the fabrication of the whole world, and was from the first produced as the receptacle, and, as it were,

[a] This sentence in Morbeka is, "*Si enim utrumque duorum unum, oportet ante ambo esse το unum quo hæc ambo unum, et unum pincipium.*" But for *hæc ambo*, it is requisite to read, conformably to the above translation, *horum uterque*.

[b] The world is thus denominated by Plato in the Timæus.

nurse and mother of generation, [as Plato says in the Timæus,] how can it any longer be said to be evil, and to be that which is primarily evil? For we manifoldly speak of incommensurability, the infinite, and everything of this kind; since we say that it opposes measure, is the absence and ablation of it, and is the subject of it, and, as it were, is indigent of measure and bound. But matter is not adapted to oppose, nor, in short, to produce anything, since neither is it naturally adapted to suffer, on account of its deficiency of passive power. It is not, however, an ablation of measure and bound. For it is not the same with privation, because privation does not exist when measure and bound are present; but matter both exists, and receives the representation of these. Hence the infinite of the nature of matter, and its privation of measure, are indigent of measure and bound. But being indigent of these, how can it be contrary to them? And how can it be still evil, if it is indigent of good? For evil, and in short every habit contrary to good, flies from the nature of good. But if, as Plato says [in the Timæus], matter is the nurse of generation, which it also desires and conceives,—in this case, matter being a mother, she will not be the cause of any evil to the natures which proceed from her, or rather, which are generated in her. But if debility and misfortune happen to souls, it is not on account of matter, because they were subject to these prior to bodies and matter. And these in a certain respect preexisted in souls, as

the causes of evils, antecedent to matter. Or whence of the souls that follow Jupiter [to the vision of the supercelestial place] is the head of the charioteer in some of them, incapable of raising itself to this place, and of beholding, through dimness of sight, the blessed spectacles which that place contains?[a] How, likewise, does it happen that there is an oblivion of truly-existing being in these souls, an unfortunate occurrence[b], and a tendency downward, before they are connected with matter? For the horse which participates of depravity, becomes heavy and verges to the earth. For when the soul has fallen to the earth, she then is connected with matter, and is involved in the darkness of the terrestrial realms. But prior to her lapse, she experienced debility, oblivion and evil. For we should not have departed [from the vision of perfect realities] unless we had been debilitated, because, though we are distant from true being, we still aspire after the contemplation of it.

If, therefore, the soul becomes debile prior to her drinking of the cup [of oblivion], but proceeds

[a] See my translation of the Phædrus of Plato, from which dialogue what is here said by Proclus is derived.

[b] What is here said likewise is from the Phædrus; but for *συντηχια* in Morbeka, it is necessary to read *συντυχια*, the word used by Plato. This *συντυχια*, or *unfortunate occurrence*, is the meeting with certain malefic dæmons. For so Hermeas in his Scholia on the Phædrus explains it.—Vid. Ast. Phædr. p. 149. The word *βριθει* also employed by Plato in this part, is erroneously translated by Morbeka *exorbitat*. *Βριθει γαρ ὁ της κακης ἱππος μετεχων, επι γην ῥεπων τε και βαρυνων*. So Plato in the Phædrus.—Vid. Ast. Edit. p. 23.

into matter, after her flight from the intelligible world, debility and, in short, evil do not accede to souls on account of matter. For what can matter effect in other things, since it has no effective power? Or how, again, can that which is void of quality, so far as it is void of quality, be able to act? Moreover, either[a] matter draws souls to itself, or souls are by themselves drawn and become separate from themselves, and impotent. Hence, if they were indeed drawn from themselves, their impulse towards and appetition of that which is subordinate, became evil to them; but of this, matter was not the cause. For all flight from a more excellent condition of being is evil, and much more descent to that which is worse. And souls choosing badly through debility, suffer what such souls ought to suffer. But if they are drawn to this by matter, where is the self-motive nature and elections of the soul, if we ascribe the cause of its descent into the realms of generation to the attractions of matter, as to a certain compulsive power? Or after what manner, with respect to those souls which subsist in matter, do these look to intellect and the good, but those to generation and matter, if matter draws all of them to herself, and molests, and offers violence to souls while they are still in the intelligible world? Reason, indeed, will say this, and will

[a] For "*autem*" here in Morbeka's version, it is necessary to read *aut*. The punctuation also of this and the following sentence is erroneous, as the learned reader will from the above translation easily perceive.

compel us to confess, not merely that matter is not evil, but that it is good, giving a testimony contrary to the assertion that matter is evil itself[a].

It may seem, however, that Plato is drawn to both opinions. For in the Timæus, indeed, when he calls matter the mother and nurse of generation, and a concause of the fabrication of the world, it is manifest to every one that he admits matter to be good. He likewise denominates the whole world a blessed God, and considers matter to be a portion of the world. But in the discourses of the Elean stranger or guest, [in the Politicus,] he refers the cause of the inordination of the universe to its subject nature. He likewise says, that the world, through its producing cause, possesses every good, but through a former habit, the contraries of these are ingenerated in it. In the Philebus, however, producing matter itself, and every nature of the infinite from *the one*, and in short assigning a divine cause of the difference between bound and infinity, and asserting that good, and the generation which is from deity, are effected by the participation of deity, he grants, that evil has nowhere a divine origin, but that it is requisite to investigate other causes of it, as it is elsewhere said. Perhaps, therefore, inordination and evil are not on account of matter, but on account of that which is moved

[a] This sentence in Morbeka is, "*Hoc quidem et ista ratio dicet et coget non quod non malum, sed et bonum materiam ostendi contrario illi modo tempestans.*" But for *tempestans*, it appears to me to be requisite agreeably to the above translation to read *attestans*.

in a confused and disorderly manner. For this is a corporeal nature, which, as the Elean guest says, is the cause of inordination to the last parts of the universe. For motion subsists about a corporeal nature, matter being of itself immoveable. Nor is the body which is void of quality the first composite. For the first composite body, as Timæus says, is visible; but that which is without quality is not visible. The first composite, however, with a representation of all forms in itself,—and these, as it were, in a confused state,—in being moved, produces that which is inordinate. For the vestiges of different forms, leading to different local motions, manifest the whole motion to be fluctuating and turbulent. This, therefore, is the former habit of the world. For body of itself, not being able to retain forms, shows itself to be in its own nature unadorned, and destitute of beauty. And in wholes, indeed, *reason*[a] [*i. e.* form] has dominion; but in things which have the relation of parts, reason, on account of its debility, being vanquished by a nature contrary to itself, is led to evil, and becomes as it were irrational, in consequence of being subdued by its inferior.

After what manner, therefore, that which is præternatural enters into bodies, will be shortly after manifest. That evil, however, is not from matter, nor from bodies, is evident from what has been

[a] In Morbeka, there is nothing more in this place than, "*et in totis quidem obtinet*"; but after *quidem*, I conceive it to be necessary to add *ratio*, conformably to the above translation.

said. For matter is not the same with that which is moved in a disorderly manner. But that matter must not be considered to be primarily evil, Socrates, I think, sufficiently shows in the Philebus, in which Dialogue he generates infinity from God. If, however, it must be said that matter is the infinite itself, matter, or that which is primarily infinite, is from God. For it must be admitted that essential infinity, depending on one cause, has a divine origin, and especially that infinity which, in conjunction with bound, is not able to produce a mixture; since God is the cause of the subsistence and mixture of these. These, therefore, and the nature of body, so far as body, are to be referred to one leading cause, which is God; for it is he who produced the mixture. Hence neither is body nor matter evil; for they are the progeny of deity, the former as a mixture, but the latter as infinite. In body, indeed, one thing has the relation of a fountain and of reason or form, but another thing is analogous to the infinite. For what else is the infinite in body, than matter? And what else is bound in it, than form? What, likewise, is that which consists of both these, than the material world? If, therefore, all the natures that are generated, and the things of which they consist, are from bound and infinity,—but that which produced all these ranks as the fourth, as Plato says,—if this be the case, we must say that neither matter nor form, nor that which is mixed from both, originated from any other cause than God. But what that is

generated from thence can be evil? For [as Plato says in the Laws,] it is not the province of heat to refrigerate, nor of good to produce evil. And hence, neither matter nor body must be said to be evil.

Perhaps, therefore, some one may ask us what our opinion is concerning matter, and whether we admit it to be good or to be evil, or in a certain respect each of these? Let this, then, be our decision, that matter is neither good nor evil. For if it is good, it will be an end [to which something else will be moved], and not the last of things, and will be that for the sake of which something else exists, and will be an object of desire[a]. For all good is a thing of this kind, because that which is primarily good is an end, is that for the sake of which all things subsist, and is desirable to all beings. But again, if matter is evil, there will be another principle of beings discordant with the cause of all good, and there will be two fabled fountains[b] flowing contrary to each other, one being the fountain of good, but the other of evil. And neither will the life of the Gods themselves

[a] The punctuation of this sentence in Morbeka is very erroneous; for "*Sive enim, bonum finis erit et non ultimum omnium et cujus gratiâ et desiderabile,*" should be, *Sive enim bonum, finis erit et non ultimum omnium,* &c.

[b] Proclus here alludes to the two vessels placed by the throne of Jupiter, which are mentioned by Homer in Iliad 24. v. 527. But by the evils of which one of the vessels is the fountain, Homer meant the common calamities of human life, which are not evils in reality, but, as a certain poet said,

"Are blessings in disguise."

be innoxious, nor free from mortal difficulty, or from anything else which it is not easy to bear, and which is foreign, and, as it were, attended with molestation. If, however, evil is not, what will that be which will have an existence according to it? Or is it not sufficient to repeat what has been often said, that we must assert of it an existence which is necessary? For the nature of good is one thing, but the nature of evil another; and the one is contrary to the other. *And there is another third thing, which is neither simply good nor evil, but necessary.* For evil, indeed, leads from good, and flies from its nature; but that which is necessary is all that it is for the sake of good, has a reference to it, and whatever has a generation subsists on account of it. If, therefore, generation is for the sake of good, but another thing which is evil, is for the sake of generation,—in this case we must say, that so far as it is necessary to generation, it is an end, and is good, and must not be called [real] evil, but was produced by divinity as necessary to forms, which are incapable of being established in themselves. For it is not fit that the cause of all good should alone produce beings that are good, and who are able to generate from themselves natures characterized by good, but it is requisite that it should likewise give existence to that nature which is not simply and from itself good. This nature, however, desires good, and through this desire it gives generation to other things, and contributes to the fabrication of a sensible essence.

For being [itself] not only gives subsistence to [real] beings, but also to things which desire a participation of essence, and whose existence consists in the desire of having a being. Hence, that which is primarily desirable is one thing, and that which desires this another, and which, through this desire, possesses an intermediate good. But it desires what has a prior subsistence to itself, and for the sake of which it exists.

If, therefore, we thus consider matter, we shall find that it is neither good nor evil, but necessary alone; and that so far as it was produced for the sake of good, it is good, but is not simply good. And so far, indeed, as it is the last of things, it is evil, because that is evil which is most distant from good; but simply considered, it is not evil, but, as we have said, is necessary. In short, it is not true to assert that evil can effect anything by itself; for that which can, is not unmingled evil[a], and primarily evil. For if evil is contrary to all good, it is requisite that it should be contrary to that which is good from itself and primarily good, prior to being contrary to the good which subsists in something else; and also that evil should be twofold, this being evil itself, but that existing in another thing. But if evil is contrary to that good which subsists in something else, much more will evil be in another thing, and will not have an existence from itself; for the good also to which evil is con-

[a] For "*non mixtum malum*," in Morbeka, it is necessary to read *non impermixtum malum*, conformably to the above translation.

trary, subsists in another thing, and has not a separate existence. For what that ranks among beings will be contrary to the first good? Since all beings exist on account of, and for the sake of it. But it is impossible that a contrary should derive its existence on account of a contrary nature. For contraries are corrupted by each other; and, in short, all contraries proceed from one summit and genus. What, however, will be contrary to that which is primarily the genus of the good? For what is beyond the nature of the good? And what among beings will become homogeneous to it? For it would be requisite that there should be something else about both these, of which they will participate[a]; and *the good* will no longer be the principle of beings, but that will be the principle which is common to both these. Hence, nothing is contrary to the first good, nor to all the participants of it, but to those only which participate of it in a variable manner. Of these, however, we have before spoken, and therefore here we dismiss the discussion of matter.

Again, then, let us pass to privation, because certain persons assert this to be evil and entirely contrary to good. For, say they, it is sufficient to matter for form to be present with it; but privation

[a] Because, as Proclus just before observed, contraries proceed from one summit and genus. Thus, from being itself motion and permanency, sameness and difference proceed, which are opposed to each other.

is never good, since it is always malefic and contrary to forms. And matter, indeed, aspires after good, and partakes of it; but privation flies from good, is the cause of corruption, and, in short, is evil. If, indeed, the first good was the same with being, and good and being were at the same time one nature, it would be requisite that privation should be primarily evil, in consequence of being of itself non-entity and contrary to being. But if good is different from being, and each is not the same thing, evil also will be different from privation. In short, with respect to inordination and incommensuration, these, as we have said, must be assumed in one way, as the absence of measure and order; but in another way, as naturally contrary to them. For the latter are adverse to order and measure; but the former are only an ablation of them, and are nothing except a negation of these. For when present, they are what they are; but when absent, they leave the privations of themselves. If, therefore, evil is indeed contrary to good, and discordant with it,—but privation neither opposes the habit of which it is the privation, nor is adapted to effect anything, the essence of it, as our opponents say, being so debile and fleeting,—how can we any longer ascribe to that a malefic nature which is destitute of all effective power? For that which is effective is form and power; but privation is formless and debile, and is not power, but rather the absence of power. Hence, from

what has been said, it is evident what the beings are in which evil exists, and what those are in which it has no existence.

Because, however, evil subsists in souls in one way, but in bodies in another, what order of them is to be assumed, and whence does it begin, and how far does its diminution extend? Shall we say, that the evil of souls is greater than that of bodies; or shall we admit that the latter is the last of evils, but that the evil of the former is of a more debile nature? With respect, however, to the evil in soul, one kind extends to energy alone, but another restrains this[a]. And with respect to the powers of the soul, its evil introduces to some of them all-various fractures; but to others, as Plato says, a cessation of energy. One evil, therefore, is alone an impediment of energy; but another extends as far as to power; and another is corruptive of essence itself. And the first, indeed, is the passion of divine souls, that become connected with the realms of generation; but the second debilitates the

[a] This sentence in Morbeka is as follows: "Quod autem in animâ; hoc quidem usque ad operationem solum; hoc autem has obtinet;" but for *has obtinet*, it is necessary to read *hanc detinet*. For Proclus here, and in the sentence that immediately follows it, alludes to what is said by Plato in the Timæus, of the injury which the soul sustains from the senses. For he there says, that through them the circle of sameness, or the ratiocinative power, is restrained in its energies, (*την μεν ταυτου πανταπασιν επεδησαν, εναντια αυτη ῥεουσαι, και επισχον αρχουσαν και ιουσαν. την δε αυ θατερου διεσεισαν, ... πασας δε κλασεις και διαφορας των κυκλων εμποιειν, οσαχη περ ην δυνατον,*) and that the circle of difference, or the power by which we opine, sustains all-various fractures and distortions.

splendour of intellect, and the last is the passion of bodies themselves. Hence, the first will be only an apparent evil; but the last will be real evil,—I mean that evil which destroys the nature of the thing in which it is inherent,—and that which subsists between these, and which is the evil of power, is not adapted to effect anything in essence. In short, that which can injure greater things, is a greater evil; but essence is beyond power, and power is beyond energy. And that, indeed, which is corruptive of essence, at the same time dissipates power and energy; but that which is corruptive of power, destroys also energy; (neither, therefore, is essence the same with power and energy, nor can energy exist after the cessation of power[a];) and that which is corruptive of first power, as far as to energy, is privation, and not the contrary; but that which is corruptive of power is contrary to essence, [because essence is productive of power]. A greater evil, however, is contrary to a greater good; and therefore the evil of souls is greater than that of bodies, not indeed of all bodies [for this is not true of such as are immaterial], but of those the power of which is naturally adapted to suffer. And the evil is less to those beings in whom there is alone a cessation of energy, since it is alone the absence and the diminution of total perfection. One evil,

[a] This part within the parenthesis is in Morbeka, "*Neque ergo substantia cum iis, neque potentia post operationis cessationem;*" but the true reading is, *Neque ergo substantia eadem cum iis, neque operatio post potentiæ cessationem.*

also, is contrary to virtue, but another to the good of the body; and one is contrary to what is conformable to intellect, but another to what is conformable to nature. By how much better, therefore, intellect is than nature, and that which is according to intellect than that which is according to nature, by so much greater is the evil which is a deviation from intellect, than that which is a deviation from nature. If, however, one evil is corruptive of essence, but another of power alone, it is not[a] wonderful. For when of the same thing, this corrupts the essence, but that the power of it, then[b] that which is corruptive of essence is evil in a greater degree. But when this takes place in a different thing, and of a different nature, there is no absurdity in admitting, that what is corruptive of power, being more remote from the nature of good, exceeds in evil, as when the power of one thing is better than the essence of another. For thus the powers of the soul are said both to generate and preserve the corporeal essence [and are therefore superior to it]. Hence, Socrates in the [10th book of the] Republic says, that injustice[c] is not deadly to the soul by which it is possessed, which it would be if the soul was mortal. For it

[a] This sentence in Morbeka is, "*Si autem hoc quidem substantiæ est corruptivum, hoc autem potentiæ solum, mirabile*;" but for "*mirabile*," it is obviously necessary to read *non mirabile*.

[b] For "*tam*," in this place in Morbeka, it is requisite to read *tunc*.

[c] This sentence in Morbeka is, "*Hoc ergo et qui in Politiâ Socrates omnino διχην malitiam nominat, et non utique talem esse ait si mortale erat.*" But for διχην here, it is necessary to read αδικιαν, this being the word used by Plato in the passage above referred to.

would rapidly lead the souls that possessed it into non-existence. *But it is better not to be, than to be in an evil condition; since the former is a privation of being, but the latter of good.* Hence corporeal evil does not idly disclose to us the wickedness of souls. For one corporeal evil by its intensity terminates in non-existence [by destroying the life of the body]; but another terminates in a bad condition of being.

If, therefore, we assert these things rightly, matter will not be primarily evil, in consequence of the reason which we have assigned. For body, which is nearer to souls than matter, is replete with a less evil than that of souls. But neither is that which is more remote from good, more good, nor that which participates more of evil, a less evil; but in souls, indeed, the evil is greater, and in bodies less[a]; because the order of souls is different from the order of bodies. For of souls, those that dwell on high are entirely pure; but in others, there is a privation of malefic energy; and in others, the reception of evil extends as far as to their powers [but not to their essence[b]]. And of bodies, some indeed are always in order; in others, energy and

[a] Hence, if the evil of bodies is less than the evil of souls, the evil of matter also must be less than that of soul, because matter is one of the things of which body consists. Matter, therefore, is not primarily evil.

[b] This is the case with human souls, for their powers become at times vitiated, but not their essence. And the evil of their powers consists in the privation of symmetry between the rational and irrational parts of the soul, as Proclus elsewhere observes; so that these powers are not essentially evil, but are evil only κατα σχεσιν, according to habitude, or proximity and alliance.

power subsist differently at different times; and in others, their essence is the recipient of evil[a]. And such is the order of these.

It follows, in the next place, that we should survey what evil itself is by itself, and what nature it possesses. Prior, however, to this, we should consider whether of evils there is some one and the same cause, or whether there is not. For some say there is; but this is denied by others. And the former of these asserting that there is a fountain of evils, from this produce all evil, of whatever kind it may be; but the latter, contending that the principle of evil is a malefic soul, say that evils are generated from hence. Others, again, ascribing the species of evil to an intellectual nature, which is a medium between the two above-mentioned principles, acknowledge that evils, as well as all other things, have from thence their progression. With respect to the authors, however, of these opinions, some form their conclusions from other hypotheses; but others make Plato the father of their dogmas. And the latter, indeed, establishing intellectual ideas of all things, adduce what is said by Socrates in the Theætetus in corroboration of

[a] The celestial bodies are always in order, and experience no other alteration than a mutation of figure, and a variation of light. But of the sublunary spheres, so far as *wholes*, they always remain indestructible; but their energies and powers are different at different times. Hence, in the sublunary region there are periods of fertility and sterility, as Plato observes in the Republic. But the parts of sublunary bodies are the recipients of evil, so far as they are destructible, though this destructibility contributes to the good of the whole.

their doctrine, viz. that there are twofold paradigms, the one divine, but the other without deity: but the former cite the Athenian guest, who introduces two kinds of souls, the one beneficent, but the other, on the contrary, malefic; and they say that the universe is governed by the former of these souls alone, but the mortal region by both.

For, in short, if it is admitted that there is one cause of evils, it is requisite to think that this cause is either divine, or intellectual, or psychical. The Gods, however, intellects and souls, receive the order of cause; but of other things, some are their instruments, and others are representations and images produced in matter. In answer to those, therefore, who contend that there is a fountain of evils, what has been said is sufficient. For all the Gods, and all the fountains [or principles of things], are the causes of good; but are not the causes, nor ever will be, of any evil. For if, as we have before said, and as Socrates in the Phædrus asserts, everything divine is good, beautiful and wise, it will either produce evil contrary to its nature; or everything which subsists from thence will be boniform, and the progeny of the goodness which is established in divinity. But, as it is said, it is not the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of good to produce evil from itself. Hence, one of two things must follow; either that evil must not be said to be evil, if it is of divine origin, or that it exists, but has not deity for its cause. It has, however, been before shown, that there is another cause of evils,

and that God is not the source of them; as Plato also somewhere teaches, admitting that the progression of all good is from one cause, but referring the generation of evils to other causes, and not to a divine original. For everything which thence subsists is good, and therefore the whole is good. And from that which is, as it were, a cardiack or invigorating light of goodness in the Gods, another light proceeds, being a splendour and power, and part of deific power. Those blessed, however, and felicitous beings, the progeny of the Gods, are said to adorn and give measure to evils, and to bound their infinity and darkness, in consequence of that portion of good which they receive, and the power of existence which they are allotted. This adorning and arranging cause, therefore, is called the fountain of evils, not as the fountain from which they are generated,—for it is not lawful that the first causes of beings should be the principle of evils,—but [it is rather a fountain of good] as imparting to evils end and bound, and illuminating their obscurity by its own beneficent light[a]. For evil, indeed, is infinite from partial causes, but receives an end from wholes; and on this account it is evil to these causes, but to wholes is not evil. For the infinite in evils is not according to power,—since thus, by the infinitude of themselves,

[a] It appears to me that Morbeka, in his translation of the above sentence, has either omitted or altered something which Proclus said. For how can an *adorning* and *arranging cause* be called in any way the *fountain of evils*? I have therefore added [it is rather a fountain of good].

they would participate of the nature of good,—but it is in consequence of a defect of power. And evils are in a certain respect corroborated by good through the participation of bound.

The authors of these assertions, therefore, thus conceiving, and being persuaded that the generation of evils is not inordinate, make God to be the cause of the order of these. But it appears to me, that not the Barbarians only, but likewise the most eminent of the Greeks, ascribing to the Gods a knowledge of all things,—both of such as are evil, and such as are good,—ascribe the generation of things essentially good to the Gods, and also of such as are evil, so far as they receive a portion of good, and the power of existing, in order to accomplish a certain end. *For, as we have often said, evil is not evil without a mixture* [*of good*]; *but it is in one respect evil, and in another good. And so far, indeed, as it is good, it is from the Gods; but so far as evil, it derives its subsistence from another, and that an impotent cause.* For all evil is generated on account of impotence and defect, because evil, so far as it is good[a], receives its hypostasis from power and [so far as it is evil from] impotence. For the power of evil is in good[b] [*i. e.* exists so far as it partakes of good]. For if evil was evil without a mixture, and evil alone, it would

[a] In Morbeka, "*quoniam et bonum,*" should be, conformably to the above translation, *quoniam ut bonum.*

[b] In Morbeka, "*Ipsius enim potentia et in ipso;*" but the true reading is, *Ipsius enim potentia est in ipso* [i. e. *in bono*].

be unknown to the Gods, since they are good, and are able to benefit all things, of whatever kind they may be, which derive from them their existence; or, in other words, they benefit everything of which they have a knowledge. *For their cognitions are energetic powers, and are fabricative of all things, of which also they are said to be the cognitions.* Because however evil, at the same time that it is evil, is likewise good, and is more good than evil, because it is good to the universe, neither must the knowledge of evil by the Gods be destroyed, nor the generation of it from thence; but it must be admitted, that the Gods both know and produce evil, so far as it is good. Hence, after the same manner that they know, they produce it; and the causes of evils are with them powers which impart good to the nature of evil[a]; just as if some God should, according to forms, give a specific subsistence to intellectual powers in the forms of nature.

It is well, however, that our discussion has led us to speak of forms, and the order of forms, lest perhaps evils, and the generations of evils, should proceed from these; or whence to evils also is the never-failing derived? For everything which perpetually exists, proceeds from an immoveable and definite cause. If, therefore, evil perpetually surrounds the mortal nature, what is the perpetuity of it, and whence does it originate? For we cannot say that it proceeds from any other cause than that

[a] Proclus beautifully observes, in his Commentary on the Timæus of Plato, "that Divinity concealed evil in the utility of good."

which eternally subsists after the same manner, and from an immoveable nature. But this is the nature of forms, and that which always exists is good. And what, indeed, will be produced by intellect which is not good? If, therefore, intellect is good, whatever is produced conformably to it is good; for that which is assimilated to good, is good; but evil, so far as evil is not adapted to be assimilated to good. We likewise say, that what is assimilated to intellectual forms, is perfect and happy; but, on the contrary, we denominate every being that is evil miserable and unhappy. Hence evil, so far as evil, is not assimilated to intellect[a]; and this being the case, neither will there be in intellect paradigms of evils. For every image is the image of a paradigm. But if Plato, also, calls forms or ideas the most divine of beings,—for the Elean stranger or guest says, that a perpetually invariable sameness of subsistence alone pertains to the most divine of all things;—and if, as we have said, the paradigm of evils is destitute of divinity and dark,—if this be the case, how is it possible to suppose that such a nature as that which is most divine being innate in forms, evil can thence be produced[b]? If, however, the fabricator of the universe, who contains in him-

[a] In Morbeka, "*Non ergo malus quia malus assimilatur intellectui;*" but for "*malus quia malus,*" I read, conformably to the above translation, *malum quà malum.*

[b] The latter part of this sentence in Morbeka is, "*quod ingenitam talem naturam in illis supponentes inde producere malum.*" But for "*quod,*" I read *quomodo possibile est,* and in consequence of this, make the whole sentence interrogative.

self all forms, and the number of forms, was willing that evil should not exist in the universe, and likewise wished to generate all things similar to himself[a], and therefore free from evil, how can there still be a paradigm of evils? For, containing all things, he will benefit them, and will not permit anything to be in vain. For he does not indeed give subsistence to, and generate some forms, but with respect to others is barren and inefficacious; but by his very being producing all things, his generative power operates with an impartible energy. One of two things, therefore, is necessary, either that the divine intellect should wish evils to exist, and to be generated, if it contains essentially the forms of these; or that, not being willing, it should neither generate nor produce them, nor possess the forms of them in the same manner as it does of the mundane natures of which it is the cause.

This hypothesis, however, which introduces a paradigm of evils, is not of itself sufficient to persuade us that it is true, since it is often changed to what is contrary to truth. But it is not wonderful, if, while asserting that evil is eternal, and admitting that there are immoveable causes of eternal beings, we should at the same time refuse to grant that there is such a cause of evil. For that is [properly] eternal, which has perpetually a progression into existence according to nature, but not that which is produced [perpetually] in any way whatever; since it must be said, that evils revolve about a

[a] Plato asserts this of the Demiurgus in the Timæus.

mortal nature, not in consequence of everything mortal being evil, but because these evils also are adorned by the order of the universe, and especially by the heavens. Hence these, after imparting essence to generated natures, cause them likewise to participate of eternity. But to the bodies which have a rectilinear motion, they give circular periods, and impart order to things inordinate, bound to things indefinite, and goodness to everything that is evil. Everything, therefore, which is according to nature, and exists always, is generated from a definite cause. But evil is not according to nature. For neither is there a producing principle of lameness in nature, nor of a deviation from art in art. How, therefore, is it possible to investigate an immoveable principle, and a producing cause of evils in forms, since everything which derives its existence from them is a form and an end; but the nature of evils is of itself infinite and undefined?

In the third place, therefore, let us direct our attention to the soul which we denominate malefic, and consider whether or not we must ascribe to this the cause of all evils. Shall we say, then, that as it is essentially the province of fire to heat, but not to refrigerate anything,—and of other things, there is another employment,—so likewise it essentially pertains to this malefic soul to generate evils, and to infect with evil everything to which it is proximate? Or shall we admit that the nature of it is always good, but that its energies subsist differently according to the same order, a different

energy producing a different life? If, therefore, it should be said that these indeed are malefic, it must be granted that it is malefic, not because it is an irrational soul, but because it is better than this, and through which it is good. For to this soul there is a transmutation of habit to the better and the worse. But if, as some say, this soul is essentially and of itself evil, from whence does it derive its being? Is it from any other source than the demiurgic cause, and the mundane Gods? And how is it possible that it should not proceed from those causes, from which the species of the mortal life originates? But if it proceeds from these, how can it be essentially evil? For all the progeny of these are good, and in short, all evil is beyond essence, and is not essence; since nothing is contrary to essence. But good is contrary to evil. And a sensible essence, indeed, is the image of being; but being [*i. e.* real being,] is established in good, and generates all things according to good, and nothing which is thence derived is evil. It is not, however, wonderful, if the Athenian guest[a] denominates such a soul malefic, on account of the evil which is in

[a] *Vide* Plat. de Legibus, lib. x. The words of the Athenian guest to which Proclus here alludes are, "We should not, therefore, establish less than two souls, one beneficent, and the other of a contrary nature." See vol. ii. p. 308. of my translation of Plato. As I have there observed, however, Plato, by an evil soul, means the nature or natural life suspended from the rational soul of the world, and which is the proximate *vis motrix* of bodies. As this life without the governing influence of the rational soul of the world, would produce nothing but confusion and disorderly motions, it may be said, when considered as left to itself, to be evil.

its powers and energies, this evil not always remaining, but as I have elsewhere observed, being made in a certain respect boniform, and adapting its own energies to those of a superior soul. For this latter soul is adapted to save itself; but the former is incapable of being converted to itself. And to the latter, indeed, since it is of a boniform nature, measure and reason are derived from itself; but to the former, from an external cause: because to body, and to all alter-motive natures, both being and well-being are on account of another, and, as it were, externally acceding cause. In short, as I may say, it is absurd to make such a soul to be the cause of evils. For neither is it the cause to body of all the evils that are in it, nor to a more excellent soul. For evil and debility are to a better soul from itself, because when it descends[a], the form of the mortal life springs up together with it; but debility was allotted to it, prior to its descent into the realms of generation. For the causes of its descent were no other than debility, and an impotency of contemplating supernal natures; since neither while we were able and at the same time willing to be established in the intelligible world, did our flight from real being, and inordination with respect to the contemplation of it, exist; nor, in short, does the flight from the survey of it proceed from not wishing to see the spectacles in the superior [*i. e.* in the supercelestial] place. For all those that are distant from, aspire after the vision of it;

[a] And its descent is owing to its debility.

but, as Plato says [in the Phædrus[a]], being impotent, they are carried round in a submerged condition. Hence it remains, that this arises from debility alone. For the eyes of the soul are impotent with respect to a permanent vision of the truth and splendour which are there. By a much greater priority, therefore, is evil in souls, and does not originate from a second life. After what manner, however, evil subsists in the former soul, and why Plato denominates it malefic, has been shown by us sufficiently for the present. For its incommensurability and indefinite nature are contrary to measure, and to those boundaries which proceed from form; and it neither is alone deprived of, nor desires the participation of them. If any one, therefore, looking to these things, should denominate this latter soul malefic and contrary to form, he will not assert this of it as if it was allotted a nature of this kind, but as verging to that which is without measure and bound, though at the same time it is able to be drawn by itself to a more excellent nature.

4. But if these are not the causes of evils, why do we ourselves admit that there is a cause of the generation of them? To this we reply, it must by no means be admitted that there is one cause, which of itself is the source of evils. For if there is one cause of everything that is good, there are many causes, and not one cause alone, of evils; since all things that are good, are commensurate with, simi-

[a] The words of Plato are, ἀδυνατουσαι δε, ὑποζευχιαι ξυμπεριφεροντα. *Vide* Phædr. Edit. Ast. p. 24.

lar and friendly to each other; but, on the contrary, evils are neither commensurate with each other, nor with things that are good. If, therefore, one cause precedes the commensurability of similars with each other, but many that of dissimilars,—for all things which are from one cause, are friendly to, and co-passive with, each other, and assemble together, some in a greater, but others in a less degree,—if this be the case, and if there be many causes, and not one cause only of evils,—some, indeed, to souls, but others to bodies,—from these, and in these, evil must be surveyed. And it appears to me that Socrates, in the Republic, insinuating this, denies that a divine nature is the cause of evils; but says that other causes of them are to be investigated. For by this he signifies[a] that these causes are many, indefinite and particular. For what monad or triad, or eternally producing principle can there be of evils, the very being of which is through dissimilitude and indefiniteness as far as to an individual nature? But that which ranks as a whole is everywhere without evil. The effective causes of evils, therefore, are these: and souls, likewise, and such forms as subsist about matter, are certain causes of this kind. For some of these lead to evil, but others being adverse to each other, afford a place to that which is præternatural in generation; since that which is according to nature to some things, is præternatural to others. Let an instance of this, if you are willing,

[a] In Morbeka "*significant*," instead of *significat*.

be that paradigm, destitute of Divinity and dark, which is mentioned by Socrates in the Theætetus[a], where he speaks of the evils which necessarily revolve about a mortal nature, and this place of our abode. For souls when assimilated to evil beings, change their life by an assimilation to a more excellent nature. For the soul, indeed, beholds the exemplars of good, when she is converted to herself, and to beings better than herself, with whom things primarily good subsist, and the summits of beings, separately established on a pure and holy foundation; but again, she looks to the paradigms of evils, when she directs her attention to things external to, and posterior to, herself, which are naturally inordinate, indefinite and flowing, and are destitute of that good by which the eye of the soul is nourished and watered[b], and lives her own proper life. The forms and powers of evils, therefore, are not effective, but are impotence and debility, and an *incommensurable*[c] *communion* with, and mixture of, similars. Nor, again, are there certain immoveable paradigms of evils, and which always subsist after the same manner, but such as are infinite and indeterminate, and borne along in

[a] Proclus here alludes to the following words of Plato in the Theætetus: Παραδειγματων ω φιλε εν τῳ οντι ἑστωτων, του μεν θειου ευδαιμονιστατου, του δε αθεου αθλιωτατου, κ.τ.λ. See vol. iv. of my translation of Plato's works, p. 52.

[b] τρεφεται και αρδεται· so Plato in the Phædrus.

[c] In Morbeka, "*commensurata communio*"; but for "*commensurata*," it is necessary to read *incommensurata*.

other, and these innumerable, things. But that for the sake of which something else subsists, is the least of all things to be ranked among evils. For it is not fit that the end of evils should be good: but because souls search after good in every possible way, and for the sake of this undertake all that they effect, and act badly,—on this account, some one perhaps may think that the end of evils is good. All things, therefore, are for the sake of this good, both such as are really good and such as are contrary to it. For we act badly through an ignorance of our own nature, at the same time desiring good. And perhaps it will be well, neither to establish evil as a principle, nor as a paradigm according to nature, nor as of itself subsisting for its own sake. For the form and nature of evils is defect, indetermination, privation, and a mode of hypostasis, which, as it is usually said, may be rather assimilated to a *parhypostasis*, or deviation from subsistence. And hence, as it has been frequently observed, evil is involuntary. For how, indeed, can it be voluntary, since that which is voluntary subsists for the sake of good? But evil of itself is neither desirable, nor an object of choice to any being. These things, however, we shall elsewhere discuss. But from what has been said, it is evident that evil in souls arises from debility, and the victory of a subordinate nature; for the horse which participates of depravity, says Plato [in the Phædrus], gravitates and tends to the earth.

And in bodies, it arises from the mixture of dissimilars, viz. of form, and matter which is formless, and of contrary producing powers.

It follows, therefore, that we who admit that evil is to be called a *parhypostasis*, or *deviation from subsistence*, should show after what manner, from the above-mentioned causes and non-causes, it subsists; since it is not possible for it to exist otherwise than as a parhypostasis. For that which is produced by a principal cause, of whatever kind it may be, has itself a principal subsistence, neither having an indefinite end, nor the relation of that which alone subsists for the sake of something else[a], nor a progression from itself into being. And [in short,] whatever is generated from a cause, is according to nature. For without a cause, it is impossible for anything to have a generation, or to refer the order of its existence to any end. Shall we say, therefore, that evil is accidental to certain things, and that it subsists for the sake of something else, and is not derived from the first principle? For we also energise in everything, for the sake of the participation of good, and in consequence of looking to it, and being as it were, *par-*

[a] In Morbeka, "το *cujus gratiâ*," which in the Greek was το ἑνεκα του, which is opposed to το οὗ ἑνεκα, or *that for the sake of which other things subsist*. For as Proclus beautifully observes, in Plat. Theol. lib. ii. p. 105, Το μεν γαρ ἐσχατον των πραγματων, ἑνεκα του μονον ἐστι, το δε πρωτον οὗ ἑνεκα μονον. *i. e.* "The last of things is that which only subsists for the sake of something else; but the first principle of things is that for the sake of which alone other things subsist." Hence, the ἑνεκα του μονον pertains to *matter*, but the οὗ ἑνεκα μονον, to *the ineffable principle of things*.

turient[a] with, and always desiring it. Hence, in some things we act rightly; but in others not. For because we esteem that which is not good, [as if it were good,] we act erroneously; but because in what we do, we desire to obtain good, we act rightly. And our conduct, so far as pertains to what is universal, is right; but so far as pertains to what is particular, is wrong. Hence that which is desirable to us is one thing, and that which we obtain is another. And the one is the nature of good; but the other is contrary to it. The generation, therefore, of what is contrary to good, of whatever kind it may be, arises from the debility of the efficient, and its incommensurability to that which is effected. For we rightly assert that those things have a *subsistence* which proceed from a principle, and have a certain end to which their progression is directed; but we say that those things have *a deviation from subsistence*, which neither proceed from a principle according to nature, nor have a definite end. But evils neither have a principal cause of their generation,—for neither the nature of that which is præternatural, nor the reason[b] of things præter-rational, is a cause,—nor do they reach to an end. For everything which is generated, is generated for the sake of something [different from itself]. Hence such

[a] In Morbeka "*parientes*," for which it is necessary to read *parturientes*: in the Greek ὠδινοντες, an expression much used by Proclus.

[b] *Reason*, in the Greek λογος, signifies in this place *a productive power*, but which, from its imbecility, does not merit the appellation of a *cause*.

a generation must be said to be a deviation from subsistence, imperfect and without a scope, and also in a certain respect uncaused and indefinite. For neither is there one cause of it, nor does that which is a cause of itself, and a principal cause, effect anything, looking to evil itself, and the nature of evil. But the very contrary to this takes place. For everything which is produced, is produced for the sake of good; but evil is extrinsically derived, and is superadvenient. The attainment, indeed, of that which is appropriate, is to everything an end; but the unattainment of it proceeds from the debility of the efficient, so far as it receives a nature which is partly less and partly more excellent; and in consequence of this, one part of it is different from the other. For where *the one* is, there at the same time is *the good*; but evil is in its nature divided and not one. For the incommensurable, the unharmonious and contrariety are in multitude; but from these debility and indigence proceed; because in the Gods also [who are characterized by unity] there is the winged nature, and at the same time *each of the horses is good*[a]. There, however, all things are good, and from such things as are good, and not from their contraries; but in other beings, there is a mixture of evil and good, multitude, and a diversity of powers, through which they are drawn to things of a dif-

[a] In Morbeka, "*simul et equorum utrumque*," but after *utrumque*, it is necessary to add *bonus*. See the Phædrus of Plato, to which Proclus in what he here says alludes.

ferent nature. And among divine beings, indeed, multitude looks to one thing, and is bounded by one species of life. But where multitude and difference shine forth, there, on account of a diminution of union, there is an indigence of power. For all power is one thing, and is that which it is from unity, and discord and discrepance arise from the appetition of one thing being different from that of another. And thus we have shown after what manner the generations of evils subsist, and what that is which is called a *parhypostasis*, or deviation from subsistence, and whence it is derived.

5. It must now, therefore, be shown what evil itself is. It appears, however, to be the most difficult of all things to know what is essentially the nature itself of evil; since all knowledge is a contact with form, and is itself a form. But evil is without form, and is as it were privation. This, perhaps, will become manifest, if, looking to good itself and the nature of what is good, we thus survey what evil itself is. For as that which is the first good, is beyond all things, so evil itself is destitute of all good; I mean so far as it is evil, and a defect and privation of good. With respect to good, therefore, how far it extends, after what manner it subsists, and what orders it possesses, we have elsewhere shown. But with respect to evil, if so far as evil it is entirely a privation of good, it follows that as evil it is destitute of the fountain of good; that as infinite it is deprived of the first bound; as debility, that it is without the power

which is in the intelligible order; that as incommensurable, and false, and turpitude itself, it is destitute of the beauty, truth and symmetry[a] through which that which is mixed, and in which the unities of beings subsist; that as being naturally without location and unstable, it is deprived of the nature and power of *eternity which abides in one*[b]; but that as privation and without life it does not participate of the first monad of forms[c], and of the life which is there. And if evil is corruptive, and the cause of division to the natures with which it is present, and is imperfect, it is deprived of the perfective goodness of wholes[d]. For as corruptive, indeed, it leads from existence to non-existence; as dividing, it destroys the continuity and union of being; and as imperfect, it prevents particulars from obtaining their perfection and natural order. Further still, the indefiniteness of the nature of evil, causes it to be destitute of, and to deviate from,

[a] Proclus here alludes to what Plato says in the Philebus, viz. "that every mixture if it is rightly made requires three things, viz. *beauty*, *truth* and *symmetry*." But that which is first mixed is being itself; and in symmetry, truth and beauty, the unities of beings subsist. See the 3rd book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

[b] Plato says this of eternity in the Timæus, so that the Greek of the "*manentis æterni in uno*" of Morbeka is, του αιωνος μενοντος εν ενι.

[c] The first monad of forms is what Plato calls, in the Timæus, αὐτοζωον, or *animal itself*, and is the extremity of the intelligible triad.

[d] *viz.* it is deprived of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order of Gods.

the summit which possesses transcendent union[a]; its infecundity deprives it of generative[b], and its inertness of demiurgic[c], power. For it is the exclusion, debility and indefiniteness of every good of this kind, viz. it is a privation of the monadic cause, of generative power, and efficacious production. But if it is the cause of dissimilitude, partition and inordination, it is evident that it is thus deficient of assimilitative[d] good, and of the impartible providential inspection of partible natures, and of the order which is necessary to impartible beings. If, however, good does not only extend to these orders, but there is also the immaculate[e] genus, which is efficacious and magnificent in its energies, evil will be inefficacious, dark and material. Or whence will it possess each of these, and other things of a like kind, if not from privations of the above-mentioned species of good? For there good subsists primarily, of which the good that is in us is a part

[a] *viz.* evil is destitute of the participation of the summit of the intellectual order, *i. e.* of Saturn.

[b] *viz.* evil is destitute of a participation of the middle of the intellectual order, which is vivific and generative.

[c] *i. e.* evil does not participate of the extremity of the intellectual order, in which the Demiurgus subsists.

[d] Evil also does not participate of the good derived from the super-mundane order of Gods, who are characterized by similitude.

[e] The *immaculate genus*, is the order of the απολυτοι θεοι, or *liberated Gods*, which genus is said by Proclus, in Theol. Plat. lib. vi. p. 387, to be αχραντον, *undefiled*, ὡς μη ῥεπον εις τα χειρονα, μηδε την εξηρημενην ὑπεροχην εκλυον τη περι τον κοσμον προμηθειᾳ: *i. e.* "as not verging to less excellent natures, nor destroying its exempt transcendency, by its providential energies about the world."

and an image; and of which evil is the privation. And what occasion is there to say this, since the evil also which is in bodies, is not only a privation of the good which exists in the intelligible and intellectual orders, but also of that which prior to body is in souls. For the good which is in bodies, is a corrupt image of the good of souls. Hence, likewise, the privation of form will not be a frustration of anything else than of intellectual power; because form is the offspring of intellect; and that which is productive of essence, is essentially intellectual. And thus we have shown, that what is in every respect evil, is a privation and defect of good.

Such, therefore, being the nature of evil, let us in the next place show whence its contrariety to good proceeds. For evil, indeed, is a privation, but not perfect privation. Hence, being co-existent with the habit of which it is the privation, it causes it by its presence to be debile; but from the habit assumes itself power and form. In consequence of this, the privations of forms, being perfect privations, are alone the absence of habits, and are not adverse to them; but the privations of good, are adverse to, and in a certain respect contrary to, their habits. For they are not entirely impotent and inefficacious, being co-existent with their powers, and led as it were by them into form and energy. Plato also knowing this, says that injustice itself, is of itself debile and inactive, but through the presence of justice both possesses power and is led to energy, not abiding in its own nature,

nor in a privation of vitality alone, because that which is vital subsisting prior to evil, imparts to evil a participation of life. All life, however, is essentially power; but evil being produced through a power which is not its own, is contrary to good, employing its own power for the purpose of resisting good. And the greater, indeed, the inherent power is, the greater are the energies and the works of evil; but they are less when the power is less. In the powers of nature, likewise, in bodies, the præternatural then exists in a greater degree, when order is entirely dissolved. Hence, in souls also, greater effects are produced from a less evil, but less from a greater[a]. For evil being destitute of its contrary[b] [good,] is increased, indeed, according to its turpitude and privation of form; but being diminished according to power and energy, is debile, and at the same time inefficacious. For its strength is not from its own power, so that the power being increased, the transition would be to something greater; but it is from the presence of its contrary; just as if cold should use the power of heat for the purpose of effecting its own work, vanquishing its power, and causing it to be in sub-

[a] For a less evil, participating more of good, has more power; but a greater evil has less power, in consequence of participating less of good: because the power of evil, such as it is, is derived from good. For evil in itself, so far as evil, is powerless; so that the power which it appears to have, arises from its mixture with good.

[b] In Morbeka, "*Solificata enim a contrario*"; but the original of "*solificata*" was, I have no doubt, ἐρημουσα.

jection to itself. Hence, there being a deficiency of the nature contrary to evil, and privation increasing in proportion to the deficiency; and the effective energy likewise becoming more debile, through a diminution of power, the evil, indeed, is greater, but the effect produced by it is less. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, it must not be said that evil [so far as evil,] either effects, or is capable of effecting anything; but both its efficiency and its power are derived from its contrary good. For good, on account of its mixture with evil, is debile and inefficacious; and evil participates of power and energy on account of the presence of good, since both subsist in one thing. Thus too, in material bodies, where one thing is contrary to another, that which is according to nature corroborates that which is præternatural. Or whence do bodies derive a periodic measure, and an order of periods, except from natural numbers, and from that disposition which is conformable to nature? That, however, which is præternatural debilitates that which is according to nature, *the energy of nature being blunted*[a], and the order being dissolved in which its well-being consists. Thus also in souls, evil vanquishing good[b], employs the power of it for its own purposes, viz.

[a] In Morbeka, "*latitante naturâ ad facere*"; but for "*latitante*," it appears to me to be necessary to read *hebetante*.

[b] When evil in the soul vanquishes good, it is because the good which is mingled with the evil, is greater than the good which it subdues. For, as Proclus has well observed, all the power which evil possesses is derived from good.

it uses the power of reason and its inventions for the gratification of inordinate desires. Each, likewise, imparts to the other what pertains to its own nature; *this* indeed power, but *that* debility; because evil of itself is not adapted to the possession of either energy or power. For all power is good, and all energy is an extension of power.

6. And how, indeed, is it possible to admit that evil possesses power, if it is the province of all power to preserve that in which it resides? But evil dissipates everything of which it is the evil. Hence, evil is of itself inefficacious and impotent; and if, also, as Plato says, it is involuntary, it will be without will, and thus is deprived of the most primary triad of good, viz. of *will*, *power* and *energy*. For good, indeed, in its own nature, is accompanied by will, and is powerful and efficacious; but evil is without will, and is debile and inefficacious. For neither is that wished for by anything which is corruptive of that thing; nor is it the province of power, so far as it is power, to corrupt; nor of energy, not to have its hypostasis according to power. But as things that are evil desire what appears to them to be good, and the evil which appears to them is the object of their will, on account of its mixture with good; so, likewise, power and effective energy have in evil an apparent subsistence, because evil has not these essentially, nor so far as it is evil, but derives them externally, in consequence of not having itself a real subsistence, but being a deviation from subsistence. It appears, therefore, to me, that this is

shown by Socrates, in the Theætetus, to those who are capable of apprehending his meaning, viz. that evil is neither [absolutely] privation, nor contrary to good. For privation is not able to effect anything, nor, in short, is at all powerful; nor of itself is a contrary, nor has any power or energy. Hence, we denominate evil in a certain respect a subcontrary, because it is not of itself entirely a perfect privation, but, together with habit, deriving from it power and energy, is constituted in the part of contrariety, and is neither perfect privation, nor contrary, but subcontrary to good. But the term *parhypostasis* indicates the truth concerning it to those who do not negligently attend to its meaning. It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, what the nature of evil is, and whence it is derived.

7. In the next place, let us speak of the differences of evil, and show what they are. It has, therefore, been before observed by us, that of evil, one kind is in souls, but another in bodies; and, likewise, that evil in souls is twofold, *this* subsisting in the irrational form of life, but *that* in the rational part. And we now say, that in the three following things evil subsists, viz. in a partial soul, in the image [a] of soul, and in the body which ranks among particulars. Hence, if the good of the rational soul is derived from its conversion to intellect,—for intellect is prior to it;—and the good of the irrational part is from reason,—*for the good of everything is derived from that which is proximately bet-*

[a] *i.e.* the irrational, which is the image of the rational soul.

ter than itself;—and again, if the good of body is a subsistence conformable to nature,—for nature is the principle of motion and rest to it;—if this be the case, it is necessary that the evil of the rational part should be in a subsistence subcontrary to intellect, but of the irrational part, in a deviation from reason; since the good of it consists in acting conformably to reason; and the evil of body will be a præternatural subsistence. And these three evils are inherent in the three natures, through their being subject to debility from a diminution in the partial nature of their essence. For wholes, as we have frequently said, possess their proper good perpetually; but evil exists in particulars and individuals, in which there is a deficiency of power, through a diminution of essence, together with division and an attenuated union. In short, there is one evil in souls, and another in bodies. And of these, that which is in souls is twofold; *this*, indeed, being a molestation of the soul arising from grief or some other passion; but *that* being turpitude, as it is somewhere said by the Elean guest. But the turpitude of the soul is indeed ignorance and a privation of intellect, and its molestation from passion arises from discord in the soul, and an abandonment of the life which is according to reason. And thus, evil will have a threefold subsistence; but each of these likewise is twofold. For, with respect to turpitude, one kind subsists about the dianœtic, but another about the doxastic power; because the knowledge of each is different; and in

the one, there is a want of science, but in the other, of art. With respect, however, to turpitude and the molestations of the soul, one kind of these subsists in its cognitions, and another in its impulses. For appetite is not [in its own nature] conformable to reason,—and there are many senses and precipitate imaginations,—so that appetites oppose those whose life consists in action, and the phantasy intervening is hostile to those who give themselves to the contemplative energy by destroying the purity and immateriality of the contemplations. The præternatural, likewise, is twofold [a]. For the turpitude which is in body is præternatural; since this is the debility, the defect and malady of form, the order and commensuration of it being dissolved.

In so many ways, therefore, is evil to be divided; because the measures also of beings are in those three principles,—*nature*, *soul* and *intellect*. The incommensurate, likewise, is either a privation of the productive powers which are in nature, or of those which are in soul, or of those which are in intellect, and are generated by intellect. For that which adorns anything primarily is better than the thing adorned [b]. But I mean by this, every adorning nature which has a primary subsistence. And such in bodies, indeed, is nature; in the irrational forms of life, reason; but in the rational forms, that which is prior to them, and which is intellect; and

[a] *i. e.* the præternatural takes place both in soul and in body.

[b] This sentence in Morbeka is, "*Etenim ornans singula melius est ornantis primè.*" But for "*ornantis,*" it is necessary to read *ornatis.*

[in intellectual forms], *the good*[a]. In the images, likewise, of the rational soul, the good which they participate is either on account of the rational soul [from which they are suspended], or on account of the soul which dwells on high[b]. But whatever the natures are which are suspended from such a soul, they either [subsist on account of such a soul, or] on account of that principle which is external to them, and from which good is imparted to the beings to which it providentially attends[c]. But with respect to bodies, good to some of them is derived from a partial soul, and to others, from that soul which ranks as a whole.

Some one, however, may still doubt after what manner evils can subsist, and whence they are derived, Providence existing. For if evil exists, how will the energy of Providence be solely directed to good? Or, if the universe is replete with the energies of Providence, how can evil subsist among beings? Some, therefore, yield to one of the reasons, viz. that all things are not from Pro-

[a] The words within the brackets are wanting in Morbeka. Hence, after "*in rationalibus autem quod ante ipsas,*" it is requisite to add, *sed in intellectualibus.*

[b] In Morbeka, there is nothing more of this sentence than "*Idolis autem aut propter eam quæ sursum animam*"; but after "*aut,*" it is requisite to add, conformably to the above version, *propter rationalem aut,* &c. But by the soul which dwells on high, Proclus means *a divine soul.*

[c] This sentence in Morbeka is, "*Quæcunque autem et ex animâ dependent tali, aut propter id quod extrinsecus principium, à quo bonum iis quibus providetur.*" But immediately after "*tali,*" it is requisite to add, conformably to the above translation, *aut propter talem animam aut,* &c.

vidence if evil exists, and that evil is not, if all things are from Providence and *the good.* For this, in the first place, perhaps, disturbs the mind, that evil is in souls. For evil considered by itself is unmingled with its contrary good, is most obscure, and nothing else than darkness; and if it subsisted by itself, it might perhaps be an impediment to the works of Providence. *But, as we have frequently said, evil is not unmingled with good, and there is no such thing as evil itself; since it is in a certain respect, and not absolutely evil, through its participation of good.* For, in short, it is not the same thing to say, that God is the cause of all things, and that he is *alone* the cause of all things [since other causes co-operate with him]. For the former assertion is true, but the latter not. For intellect is the cause of the natures posterior to itself; soul, of the beings which are consequent to it; and nature, of bodies, and whatever is inherent in bodies. Each of these, likewise, produces in a different way. For God produces primarily, and according to transcendent union; intellect, according to an eternal energy; soul, self-motively; and nature, through necessity. And neither is that which produces intellectually the same with that which is prior to it, nor with that which is secondary to it, so far as it is secondary. If, therefore, all things are from Providence, and no one of all things is evil, so far as it is from, and is produced by Providence, why is it wonderful that evil should have a place among beings, so far as it subsists from soul? And the

same thing, indeed, will be evil to particulars, but good to wholes. It will, however, be in a greater degree evil to particulars, because evil is derived from them. For not energy alone, but also that which energises, possesses from Providence an excellent condition of being. Hence, in a certain respect good is in them,—I mean, in the evils which exist in the soul. And thus it will be credible that Providence does not suffer any one of these to be deprived of itself. Evil, therefore, must be admitted to be twofold; one being within the soul, and consisting either in improper imaginations, or vicious consent, or base choice; but the other subsisting externally, and becoming apparent in various actions, which are the effects either of anger or desire.

8. All such things, therefore, as these manifoldly possess good. For they are effected for the avengement of other natures. The action, also, is according to the desert of the agent; and that which acts badly, does not suffer the same punishment for every bad action, whatever it may be, nor does it require the same punishment for each. *These deeds, therefore, are entirely good to that which suffers from them; and they are also good to that which is effective of them, so far as it follows or acts in conformity to wholes; but so far as it acts from itself, the deeds are evil, and detrimental to itself, and do not give completion to the great conceptions of the soul. This, however, is the beginning of salvation to the patient.* For in many persons, the meditated

evil remaining within the soul is concealed, but at length[a], as being base and improper, is benefited, and its nature then becomes evident when it exists in energy. This is manifested by the penitence and remorse of the soul, reproaching itself, as it were, for the evil deed. For the arts of physicians, also, by opening ulcers, and thus making the passion and the inwardly concealed cause of the disease evident, exhibit an image of the operations of Providence, who admits both the base deeds and depraved passions, in order that the latter being changed from the conception which they had formed, and from the habit which was caused and inflated by evils, may assume the principle of a better period and life. But whatever passions are within the soul, are accompanied by the good of the evil, so far as they always lead the soul to what is proper. For it is not possible for that which chooses things of a worse nature to remain in such as are better, but it soon tends to that which is dark and base. And not actions only, but likewise without these, the elections of the soul contain in themselves [retributive] justice. For every election leads the soul to that which is similar to its choice. If, therefore, there is anything depraved and base and atheistical in the soul, the transferring it to that which is congenial to itself is soon attended with good, with the desert which is from Providence, and with the law inherent in souls, which

[a] *Tandem* is omitted in this place in the version of Morbeka, but evidently ought to have been inserted.

leads each of them to what is appropriate. For Providence foreknows the life of the soul, and through this conjoins it to things similar to itself; but this is the same as uniting it with that which it deserves, or with that which is conformable to its difference with respect to other souls; this, again, unites it to what is imparted by Providence, and this [finally] to good. If, indeed, it were fit that souls which act unjustly should abide on high, which it is not lawful to assert, their choice would in no respect possess what is good; but being alone evil, it would be entirely atheistical and unjust. But if choice soon removes the elective soul from things of a better nature, it possesses good mingled with evil. For every soul naturally desires the supernal region. When souls, therefore, descend into the realms of mortality, their choice is directed to a degraded life; but it is necessary that everything should descend which does not [always] energise according to intellect, though the lapse is to some souls more, and to others less, because the choice in them varies.

But after what manner is the evil that is in bodies at the same time good? May we not say, that this to the whole is according to nature[a], but to the part is præternatural. Evil, however, is in a greater degree good to the whole than to the part, because it contributes naturally to the universe; but so far as it is distributed into parts, it has from thence

[a] For "*secundum rationem*" here in Morbeka, it is evidently necessary from what follows to read *secundum naturam*.

the præternatural. But the evil which is in bodies is twofold, one kind existing as deformity, but another as disease. I call, however, the deformity of body everything which is not a præternatural disease of it. For monsters are the turpitudes of nature. And in nature, considered as a whole, deformity subsists naturally[a], because in this it is reason [*i. e.* a producing principle] and form; but in a partial nature, deformity is one reason [or form], and that which is contrary to this, is to such a nature præternatural. But in nature as a whole, all producing principles and all forms subsist naturally. And sometimes, indeed, from one species or form, that which is generated is one thing; for the form of man in nature may be said to generate man in a more principal manner than anything else. But sometimes many things are generated from one form; for there is one productive principle of figure in nature, but many different kinds of figures proceed from it. And sometimes, from many forms one thing is produced; such as are the mixtures of species about matter, that appear to be monsters to an individual nature, which desires to obtain, and subsists according to one form. Lastly, sometimes many things [of the same species] proceed from many forms; for in many such things there is both equality and inequality. All species or forms, therefore, are according to

[a] In Morbeka, in this place, after "*hoc quidem turpe secundum naturam totam,*" it is necessary to add, *est naturaliter*, conformably to the above translation.

nature, both such as are unmingled, and such as are mingled, and proceed from those producing powers which are in Nature herself, with all the variety of which she is replete. To some bodies, however, disease is according to nature; because each of these is generated that which it is said to be in a twofold respect, viz. both from a partial and a total nature. But that which is corruptible is so naturally with respect to nature considered as a whole, but is præternatural to a partial nature[a]. For that into which the thing that is corrupted is transmuted, possesses a form and reason from total nature, contrary to the nature of the thing corrupted. For so far as that which is corrupted is a whole, so far the corruption of it is præternatural; but so far as it is a portion of the universe, the corruption of it is according to nature; since every whole subsists according to the form or productive principle which is in it. And thus corruption is produced from one thing, and the corruption is again the cause of the generation of another thing.

9. Hence, the evil which is in bodies is not unmingled evil; but the evil of these, so far as it is from Providence, is natural; and, in short, those things that have a generation, have it on account of good. Some one, however, may say, How is it possible for that which is perfectly good to suffer

[a] This sentence in Morbeka is, "*Corruptibile autem secundum naturam quidem totam, præter naturam autem particularem*"; but immediately after "*quidem*", it is necessary to insert *ad*, and also immediately after "*autem*".

that which is deprived of the nature of good to remain? For neither is it possible for evil to exist, without having the appearance of its contrary, good; because all things, and even evil itself, are for the sake of good. To this we answer, that if all things are for the sake of good, Divinity is not the cause of evils. For evil, so far as evil, is not derived from thence, but from other causes, which, as we have before observed, generate not from power, but from debility. On which account, as it appears to me, Plato[a], arranging all things about the King of

[a] What is here asserted by Proclus is to be found in the second Epistle of Plato to Dionysius; and the whole of the passage to which he refers is as follows: Φης γαρ δη κατα τον εκεινου λογον ουχ' ικανως αποδεδειχθαι σοι περι της του πρωτου φυσεως. φραστεον δη σοι δι' αινιγμων, ἱν' αν τι ἡ δειλτος ἡ ποντου ἡ γης εν ατυχαις παθῃ, ὁ αναγνους μη γνω. ὡδε γαρ εχει. περι τον παντων βασιλεα παντ' εστι, και εκεινου ἑνεκα παντα, και εκεινο αιτιον απαντων των καλων. δευτερον δε περι τα δευτερα, και τριτον περι τα τριτα. ἡ ουν ανθρωπινη ψυχη περι αυτα ορεγεται μαθειν οἱ' ἀττα εστι, βλεπουσα εις τα αυτης συγγενη, ὡν ουδεν ικανως εχει. του δε βασιλεως περι και ὡν ειπον, ουδεν εστιν τοιουτο, το δη μετα τουτο ἡ ψυχη φησιν· αλλα ποιον τι μην τουτ' εστιν, ω παι Διονυσιου και Δωριδος, το ερωτημα, ὃ παντων αιτιον εστι κακων; μαλλον δε ἡ περι τουτων ωδις, εν τῃ ψυχῃ εγγιγνομενη· ἡν ει μη τις εξαιρεθησεται, της αληθειας οντως ου μηποτε τυχοι.

There is an important difference between some parts of this passage as quoted by Proclus, and all the printed editions of it, which has not been noticed by any of the editors of Plato's Works. For Proclus (in Plat. Theol. p. 103.) for εν ατυχαις παθῃ, has τυχης μαθῃ. But I have no doubt that Proclus originally wrote εν τυχαις παθῃ, and that τυχης μαθῃ is an error of the transcriber. In the second place, in the sentence αλλα ποιον τι μην τουτ' εστιν, ω παι Διονυσου, κ.τ.λ., which, from what Proclus says of it, was evidently not considered by him as interrogative, for καλων* in Proclus, it is requisite to read, conformably to all the editions of Plato, κακων. With these

* See this confirmed in the Treatise of Damascius περι Αρχων.

all, and asserting that all things are for his sake, and even such as are not good,—for they have the appearance of good,—calls this King the cause of all things, and the cause of every being. But he does not, indeed, call him the cause of evils, so far as they are evils, but so far as each of these is good, in consequence of ranking among beings. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, both

alterations, therefore, the whole passage will be in English as follows: "You say, according to his report, [*i. e.* the report of Archidemus,] that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you therefore in enigmas, that in case the letter should meet with any casualties, either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand [this part of its contents]. For these particulars are as follow: All things are situated about the King of all; and all things subsist for his sake; and he is the cause of all beautiful things. But second things are situated about that which is second, and such as are third about that which is third. The human soul, therefore, extends itself about these, in order to learn what kind of things they are, looking to such natures as are allied to itself, none of which is sufficient for the purpose. But about the King himself, and the things of which I have spoken, there is nothing of this kind; since the soul alone speaks of that which is posterior to this. Indeed, O son of Dionysius and Doris, this your inquiry [about the first nature] is as of that which is endued with a certain quality, and such an inquiry is the cause of all evils*. Or, rather, it is a parturition respecting this ingenerated in the soul, from which he who is not liberated will never in reality acquire truth."

Proclus has made some admirable observations on this passage in the above-mentioned part of his treatise on the Theology of Plato, to my translation of which I refer the English reader.

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* In translating this part of the passage in my Plato, I was misled by finding in Proclus καλων instead of κακων. And I did not discover the mistake till I had read the above-mentioned Treatise of Damascius, which was not printed at the time of the publication of my translation of Plato, but long after.

all things will be derived from Providence, and evil will have a place among beings. Hence, also, the Gods produce evil, but they produce it as good; and, as possessing a transcendently united knowledge, they know all things, impartibly such as are partible, boniformly such as are evil; and multitude is known by them according to profound union. For there is one knowledge pertaining to soul, another to an intellectual nature, and another to the Gods themselves. And the first of these, indeed, is a self-motive, the second an eternal, and the third an ineffable and transcendently united knowledge, both knowing and producing all things by *the one itself*[a].

[a] See a most admirable confirmation of all that is said in this treatise On the Subsistence of Evil, by Proclus, in my translation of his Commentary on the Timæus of Plato, vol. i. p. 311.

THE END.

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